





A Gricean Account of Assertion:  
closing the gap between the philosophy of 











Doctor of Philosophy 









Assertion plays a central role within the philosophy of language and the epistemology of 
testimony. However, the literature on assertion within the philosophy of language has 
developed from interests in a variety of different language-based issues, by means of a 
variety of different apparent cases of the speech act. And, largely detached from that, the 
literature on assertion within the epistemology of testimony has developed from interests in 
a variety of different epistemological issues, again, by means of a variety of different 
apparent cases of the speech act. The lack of integration between these two areas of 
philosophy on the topic of assertion has resulted in uncertainty about the concept, which has 
led some to think that it is not a concept we need to explain any significant component of 
human behaviour. Although I sympathise with this pessimistic view, ultimately, I think it is 
incorrect. Rather, philosophy simply has not made up its mind about how the concept of 
assertion is best understood, and so what is needed is a proposal for how it might fruitfully 
be applied. This involves reflecting on what philosophical work the concept of assertion 
should do, stipulating a definition based on these reflections, and then developing a 
theoretical elaboration which is guided by, connected to, and framed within broader 
philosophical theories, which can carry out said philosophical work. In doing this, and by 
drawing on Grice’s framework of communication and the notion of knowledge transmission 
specifically, I offer a novel Gricean account of assertion. My aim is not only to reaffirm the 
concept of assertion, but also to provide innovative solutions to problems pertaining to 
assertion’s role in communication and the spread of knowledge, as well as offer principled 
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Answers do not matter so much as questions, said the Good Fairy. A good question is very 
hard to answer. The better the question the harder the answer. There is no answer at all to a 
very good question. 
































































1. Introduction        
 
Assertion is troublesome. On one hand, you will find that talk of it is ubiquitous in 
philosophy. On the other hand, you cannot always be sure what precisely you have found 
talk of, or indeed whether you have found talk of anything concrete at all. I have been 
dogged by this ever since I was an undergraduate student working on the liar paradox. (As I 
saw it then, and as I still see it now, sentences of the form, ‘This sentence is false’, are not 
‘assertable’.) And it continued into my masters when I was working on the nature of lying. 
(As I saw it then, and as I still see it now, lying is typically, though not necessarily, a matter 
of a speaker ‘asserting’ something which they take to be false.) By the time I was ready to 
undertake doctoral study, I found myself inexorably drawn to – and eventually embroiled in 
– the debate on the nature of assertion. However, I was dissatisfied with the state of the 
debate. It seemed to me that philosophers were often talking past each other and getting 
caught up in something which was gradually losing significance in the eyes of spectators. 
Yet, it also seemed to me that assertion was undoubtedly worthy of philosophical attention, 
with many philosophically interesting and important things having been said about it, being 
said about, and indeed still needing to be said about it. This thesis therefore may be seen as a 
reaction to the frustration I have felt working with, on, and sometimes against assertion. 
More specifically, though, this thesis is my attempt to help determine not merely what we do 
talk about when we talk about assertion, but what we should talk about when we talk about 
assertion. Here is a brief overview.  
 
In Assertion & Explication, I introduce the philosophical term of art ‘assertion’ as it is 
understood in the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony – its main 
philosophical areas. This includes providing an outline of the ongoing debate about the 
nature of assertion in the philosophy of language and the important though sometimes 
unclear status assertion has in the epistemology of testimony. I explain that the way in 
which philosophical discussion about assertion has materialised, especially the lack of 
integration between the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony on the 




1950) notion of ‘explication’, however, I hold that philosophy simply has not made up its 
mind about how the concept of assertion is best understood, and that what is needed is a 
proposal for how it might fruitfully be applied. Specifically, I propose that assertion is best 
understood simply in terms of the paradigm case. In Carnap’s terminology, this is our 
candidate ‘explicatum’. I acknowledge the potential worry that restricting assertion in the 
way that I suggest is implausible, given the apparent non-paradigmatic (or borderline) cases 
of assertion that exist in the philosophy literature. However, I plead that our inquiry into the 
concept should not be guided by such cases. Instead, I recommend that our inquiry should 
be guided by, connected to, and framed within broader philosophical theories, especially 
from the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony. Essentially, my idea is 
that we are best placed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the concept of assertion only 
when our candidate explicatum has received a full theoretical elaboration.  
 
In Putting the Epistemology of Testimony to Work, I call upon the epistemology of testimony to 
consider the ways in which the speech act of assertion can put an individual in a position to 
know the truth of what is asserted. I explain that such considerations are apt to guide us in 
our inquiry and thus lay the groundwork for constructing a theoretical elaboration of our 
candidate explicatum. Although I show that there are various ways in which assertion can 
put an individual in a position to know the truth of what is asserted, I pick out one 
particular way in which assertion can put an individual in a position to know the truth of 
what is asserted which I think illuminates the speech act as I understand it: ‘knowledge 
transmission’. To fully understand this independently plausible notion from the 
epistemology of testimony literature, however, we must understand the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play between speakers and hearers in such cases. And, to 
understand this, we must understand the conversational dynamics which underpin 
communicative exchanges generally. I exhibit the current confusion in the epistemology of 
testimony literature about how to understand these things, the result of which is that I find 
myself in a predicament. I intend to construct a theoretical elaboration of our candidate 
explicatum in light of the notion of knowledge transmission. But I do not have an accurate 
account of the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges 




relation at play in cases of knowledge transmission specifically. This, in turn, means that I do 
not have a fully developed view of knowledge transmission in light of which I can construct 
a theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum.  
 
In A Gricean Account of Assertion, I use, revise, and develop Grice’s (1957; 1969; 1975; 1989) 
framework of communication from the philosophy of language literature to construct an 
account of the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges 
generally. I then use this to construct an account of the interpersonal relation at play in cases 
of knowledge transmission specifically. This, in turn, provides us with a fully developed 
view of knowledge transmission in light of which I construct my theoretical elaboration of 
our candidate explicatum.  
 
In Exploring the Exotica, I defend my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum – 













































































2. Assertion & Explication 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the philosophical term of art ‘assertion’ as it is understood in 
the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony – its main philosophical 
areas. What we find, however, is not only that there is ongoing debate about what 
assertion is within these respective philosophical areas, but that there is also a lack of 
integration between these two philosophical areas on the topic of assertion. 
Unfortunately, this has resulted in uncertainty about the concept of assertion, which has 
led some to think that it is not a concept we need to explain any significant component of 
human behaviour. Although I sympathise with this pessimistic view, ultimately, I think 
it is incorrect. Drawing on Carnap’s (1947; 1950) notion of explication, I hold that 
philosophy simply has not made up its mind about how the concept of assertion is best 
understood, and that what is needed is a proposal for how it might fruitfully be applied. 
This involves reflecting on what philosophical work the concept of assertion should do, 
stipulating a definition based on these reflections, and then developing a theoretical 
elaboration which can carry out said philosophical work. By reflecting on the least 
contentious case of assertion in the philosophy literature, i.e., the paradigm case, I 
propose that assertion is best understood simply in terms of this. Although a restricted 
conception of assertion of this sort might seem unpalatable given the various apparent 
borderline cases of assertion across the philosophy of language and the epistemology of 
testimony literature, I plead that our inquiry into the concept of assertion should not be 
guided so hastily and wholeheartedly by such things. Indeed, I argue that given the 
uncertainty about the concept of assertion (outside of the paradigm case) it is unwise to 
put much confidence in such apparent borderline cases of the speech act. I recommend 
instead that our inquiry into the concept should be guided by, connected to, and framed 
within broader philosophical theories, especially from the philosophy of language and 
the epistemology of testimony. As such, confidence about whether apparent borderline 
cases of assertion are best understood as cases of assertion may come more readily from 





2.1. Assertion in the Philosophy of Language  
 
In the philosophy of language, ‘assertion’ has become a term of art, which is intended to 
pick out a certain kind of act, namely, a type of speech act. To understand what a speech act 
is, it is helpful to consider Austin’s (1962) distinction between a ‘locutionary act’ and an 
‘illocutionary act’. According to Austin, a locutionary act is: 
 
the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain 
construction and the utterance of them with a certain “meaning” in the favourite 
philosophical sense of that word, i.e., with a certain sense and with a certain 
reference. The act of “saying something” in this full normal sense I call, i.e., dub, the 
performance of a locutionary act. (94-95) 
 
A locutionary act (or saying), then, essentially is the expression of a proposition. Cappelen 
(2011) offers a helpful illustration here. He starts by inviting us to consider the following 
sentence: 
 
N: There are naked mole-rats in Sweden. (23) 
 
As he observes, this sentence can be uttered by an English-speaking person to express the 
proposition that there are naked mole-rats in Sweden. Call this proposition ‘n’, which is the 
conventionally fixed meaning of N in English.1 (Of course, an English-speaking person need 
not utter N in order to express n, since n can be expressed using other English sentences, as 
well as non-English sentences.) Cappelen points out further that when a speaker expresses a 
proposition something that they can subsequently do is refer to it with a demonstrative: 
‘That is the proposition I have been asked to express’. Moreover, they can refer to it 
 
 
1 There is some ambiguity here regarding the phrase ‘uttered sentence’. For example, some may wish to include 
under this label smoke signals or car horns, whereas others may not. For the purposes of this thesis, I am liberal 




anaphorically: ‘It is an interesting thought, I have no idea whether it is true or false, I have 
no evidence either way, and I did not mean to convey to anyone that I think it is true. I just 
wanted to express it’. Saying something, then, may be understood as the linguistic analogue 
of attending to a thought. We can contrast this, however, with someone who makes an 
utterance but does not know the language of which the sentence is part. Here, Cappelen 
invites us to consider the following sentence: 
 
N*: Det er mange svensker som jobber i Oslo. (Ibid.) 
 
As he observes, although this sentence can be used by a Norwegian-speaking person to say 
that there are many Swedes working in Oslo, it cannot be used by those who do not speak 
Norwegian to say this, even though such a speaker can nonetheless utter the same sentence 
in just the same way. Why? Because, as Austin says, to perform a locution a speaker must 
make an utterance with a certain ‘meaning’ in the favourite philosophical sense of that word 
(i.e., with a certain sense and with a certain reference), which, in this instance, they cannot. 
Further details would be needed in order to give a full account of saying, but the following 
working definition will suffice for our purposes: 
 
Austinian saying: A says that p iff: 
 
(i) Sentence S conventionally means that p in language L among L-utterers 
(ii) A, as an L-utterer, utters sentence S 
(iii) A intends to express p by uttering sentence S.2 
 
Having specified what a locutionary act is, Austin characterises the notion of an 
illocutionary act ostensively, giving examples of the following sort: making an assertion, 
asking a question, issuing an apology, giving an order, inviting a supposition, delivering a 
reminder, offering up a speculation, etc. Importantly, on Austin’s picture, the performance 
 
 




of an illocutionary act involves the performance of a locutionary act. That is, speakers 
perform illocutions by means of performing locutions.3 A speech act, then, may be 
understood as an illocutionary act, where an illocutionary act itself is built on top of a 
locutionary act.4 A speaker, therefore, may perform a locution (or saying) in the service of 
performing one of any number of illocutions (or speech acts).  
 
Very roughly, assertion is typically understood as a type of speech act in which something is 
claimed to hold. For example, a speaker might assert, with respect to some particular cat and 
some particular mat within some particular context, that the cat is on the mat. But what 
precisely makes an assertion the type of speech act that it is, rather than some other type of 
speech act? Put differently, since only some sayings are assertions, what is it that singles out 
this sub-set of sayings as assertions?5 The answer to this question is still outstanding in the 
philosophy of language literature. There are, however, four broad accounts on the market.6  
Adopting Goldberg’s (2015) terminology, I call these the ‘attitudinal account’, the ‘common 
 
 
3 Although it is not unanimous, it is at least generally held that asserting that p involves saying that p. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I do not contest this generally held position. But for an argument against this, see Viebahn 
(2017). Of course, there are various questions and issues that arise regarding the notion of saying and its 
involvement in the speech act of assertion, but those questions and issues are ones that all parties within the 
debate have a shared interest in answering and solving. As such, whatever those answers and solutions are, they 
do not adjudicate on the assertion debate. 
4 As McFarlane (2011: 80) observes, we may use the term ‘proposition’ for the content of locutions, but the 
content of a locution used in the service of the illocutionary act of asking a question is perhaps best understood 
as a set of propositions (the possible answers to the question), not a proposition. We need not be held up by this 
detail, though. See Hamblin (1973), Karttunen (1977), and Groenendijk & Stokhof (1997). 
5 Typically, the focus is on the saying of declarative sentences. Williamson (2000: 258), for example, says, ‘[i]n 
natural language, the default use of declarative sentences is to make assertions’. However, I do not address this 
here. 
6 McFarlane (2011) was first to identify and taxonomize the four broad accounts of assertion within the 
philosophy of language literature, and so §2.1.1, §2.1.2, §2.1.3, and §2.1.4, which follow his taxonimisation and his 




ground account’, the ‘commitment account’, and the ‘constitutive rule (or norm) account’, 
respectively.7 I introduce them briefly below.8 
 
2.1.1. The Attitudinal Account 
 
The attitudinal account is developed by Bach & Harnish (1979), who write:  
 
In uttering e, utterer U asserts that p if U expresses: 
 
(i) the belief that p 
(ii) the intention that hearer H believe that p. (42) 
 
According to Bach & Harnish, the notion of expressing an attitude is best understood in 
terms of what they call ‘R-intentions’, where R-intentions are intentions to bring something 
about in a hearer by way of the hearer’s recognition of this very intention.9 (Note, the notion 
of ‘R-intentions’ is inspired by Grice’s (1957; 1969; 1989) theory of meaning, or ‘non-natural 
meaning’.) Bach & Harnish unpack the notion of expressing an attitude as follows: for 
utterer U to express an attitude is for U to R-intend hearer H to take U’s utterance as a 
reason to think that U has that attitude.10 On this view, then, what makes an assertion the 
type of speech act that it is, rather than some other type of speech act, is that a speaker says 
 
 
7 Although my taxonimisation and general presentation of the four broad accounts of assertion in §2.1.1, §2.1.2, 
§2.1.3, and §2.1.4 follow McFarlane’s (2011), my exposition of the four broad accounts of assertion in §2.1.1, 
§2.1.2, §2.1.3, and §2.1.4 are deeply indebted to Goldberg (2015), who provides helpful, updated re-articulations 
of McFarlane’s earlier expositions. 
8 For the purposes of this thesis, I present each of these accounts of assertion as though they involve the notion of 
saying. However, some of the original iterations, and indeed some newly developed iterations, do not explicitly 
state this, and some may even deny it. However, as expressed in fn.3, it is at least generally held that the act of 
asserting that p involves the act of saying that p, so my presentation of these four broad accounts as involving the 
notion of saying is not problematic. 
9 See Goldberg (2015: 10). 




that p and intends that their utterance be regarded by the hearer as a reason both to think 
that the speaker believes that p and that the speaker intends the hearer to believe that p.  
 
2.1.2. The Common Ground Account 
 
The common ground account is developed by Stalnaker (1978; 1999; 2002), who writes: 
 
[T]he essential effect of an assertion is to change the presuppositions of the 
participants in a conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is 
presupposed. (Stalnaker 1978: 86) 
 
According to Stalnaker, conversations take place and evolve against a background of 
mutually shared information, which is established by the presuppositions of the participants 
of the conversation. He calls this the ‘common ground’. He defines the common ground in 
terms of ‘acceptance’, which, he claims, is a non-factive propositional attitude that is weaker 
than belief. He employs the notion of acceptance rather than belief because he maintains that 
successful communication is compatible with presuppositions that are mutually recognised 
as false, where the information being presupposed is nonetheless actually available, and not 
just assumed or pretended to be available. He writes: 
 
Common ground: it is common ground that p in a group if all members accept (for 
the purpose of the conversation) that p, and all believe that all accept that p, and all 
believe that all believe that all accept that p, etc. (Stalnaker 2002: 716) 
 
On this view, what makes an assertion the type of speech act that it is, rather than some 
other type of speech act, is that a speaker says that p and thereby proposes that p become 
part of the common ground.  
 
2.1.3. The Commitment Account 
 




[T]o assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth. (384) 
 
Like Stalnaker’s approach, the commitment account defines assertion in terms of its 
‘essential effect’.11 However, it regards the essential effect as the conferral of new 
commitments or obligations upon the speaker. The notion of a speaker conferring new 
commitments or obligations upon themselves may be fleshed out in various ways. For 
instance, Brandom (1983; 1994) maintains that when a speaker makes an assertion that p, 
they undertake a commitment to vindicate their entitlement to p when challenged, which, in 
turn, entitles others to assert that p on the speaker’s authority. The notion of a speaker 
conferring new commitments or obligations upon themselves may be understood in 
epistemic terms. Whatever variation it takes, though, it suffices to say that, on this view, 
what makes an assertion the type of speech act that it is, rather than some other type of 
speech act, is that the speaker says that p and confers a commitment upon themselves to the 
truth of p, which involves incurring the obligation to vindicate p. 
 
2.1.4. The Constitutive Rule (or Norm) Account 
 
The constitutive rule (or norm) account is developed by Williamson (1996; 2000), who 
writes:  
 
One might suppose […] that someone who knowingly asserts a falsehood has 
thereby broken a rule of assertion, much as if he had broken a rule of a game; he has 
cheated. (1996: 489) 
 
According to Williamson, if we assume that any respect in which the performance of an act 
can deserve praise or criticism is a rule (or norm) for that act, then the speech act of assertion 
has many rules (or norms). He claims, for instance, that assertions may be praised as true, 
informative, relevant, well-phrased, or polite, and they may be criticised as false, 
 
 




uninformative, irrelevant, ill-phrased, or rude. However, he holds that not all rules (or 
norms) for assertion are on a par with each other, and that a certain rule (or norm) is more 
intimately connected to the speech act of assertion than others, namely: 
 
(KA) One must: assert that p only if one knows that p. (494) 
 
To illustrate this idea, he attempts to draw an analogy between assertion and the game of 
chess. He claims that the rule of assertion is much like the constitutive rules of chess, in that, 
the rules of chess constitute the game of chess itself. That is, it is not possible to play chess 
unless the rules of chess are in force and being observed. Accordingly, assertion is 
constituted purely by the rule that governs it. Furthermore, he claims that the rule of 
assertion is much like the constitutive rules of chess, in that, such constitutive rules do not 
lay down necessary conditions for the performance of an act. That is, the violation of a rule 
does not result in ceasing to play the game. Accordingly, if a speaker tells a lie using an 
assertion, and thus wittingly violates (KA), they nevertheless perform an assertion. In an 
attempt to clarify the notion of a constitutive rule (or norm) for assertion, Williamson writes: 
 
Constitutive rules are not conventions. If it is a convention that one must Φ, then it is 
contingent that one must Φ; conventions are arbitrary and can be replaced by 
alternative conventions. In contrast, if it is a constitutive rule that one must Φ, then it 
is necessary that one must Φ. More precisely, a rule will count as constitutive of an 
act only if it is essential to that act: necessarily, the rule governs every performance of 
the act. (490) 
 
On this view, then, what makes an assertion the type of speech act that it is, rather than 
some other type of speech act, is that the speaker says that p and their saying is governed 
necessarily by a constitutive rule (or norm), the condition of which is knowledge.12  
 
 
12 Knowledge is arguably the most popular condition for proponents of the constitutive rule (or norm) account. 




2.2. Assertion in the Epistemology of Testimony 
 
In epistemology, the speech act of assertion is treated as an instance of ‘testimony’, which 
itself has become a philosophical term of art, intended to capture a diverse array of cases in 
which an individual makes an utterance which may serve as a source of knowledge for 
another individual. For example, the term may extend over cases of every-day conversation, 
formal courtroom testimony, secret diary entries, overheard soliloquy, classroom lectures, 
examination answers, social-media posts, etc. As such, there are cases of testimony that are 
oral or written, individual or institutional, private or public, anonymous or attributable, etc. 
Due to the diverse array of cases ‘testimony’ is intended to capture, especially private cases 
(e.g., secret diary entries and overheard soliloquy), where the speaker is typically not 
understood as directing their thoughts and feelings towards another person, some have 
questioned whether testimony is a unitary category. As Lackey (2008) observes: 
 
On the one hand, we often think of testimony as a source of belief or knowledge for 
hearers, regardless of the speaker’s intention to be such a source. On the other hand, 
we often think of testimony as involving the intention to communicate information 
to other people, regardless of the needs or interests of the hearers. (19) 
 
As such, Lackey thinks we should distinguish between what she calls ‘speaker testimony’ 
(or ‘s-testimony’) and ‘hearer testimony’ (or ‘h-testimony’): 
 
S-testimony: S gives speaker testimony that p if and only if, by performing an act of 
communication a, S reasonably intends to convey the information that p (in part) in 




the constitutive rule (or norm) of assertion, e.g., truth, belief, justification, justified belief, true justified belief, 




H-testimony: S gives hearer testimony that p if and only if, by performing an act of 
communication a, S’s audience reasonably takes a as conveying that information that 
p (in part) in virtue of a’s communicable content. (Gelfert 2014: 35, which paraphrases 
and simplifies Lackey 2008: 30–32)13 
 
To clarify, for Lackey, both cases refer to testimony given by the same speaker S, who is 
performing one and the same act of communication a (e.g., penning a diary entry or 
expressing propositions aloud solitarily). The difference, as she sees it, lies in the 
perspectives of the speaker and the hearer, specifically between the speaker’s intention to 
communicate and the audience’s comprehending an act of communication as conveying 
content. The idea, then, is that an individual who keeps a secret diary, for example, and so 
seemingly has no intention of conveying the information to another person, while not giving 
s-testimony, may nonetheless be understood as giving h-testimony, if some reader 
reasonably takes the diarist’s writings as conveying information in virtue of their 
communicable content. According to Lackey, since a speaker’s intention and the hearer’s 
interpretation of an act of communication can plausibly come apart in this way, we should 




13 Lackey (2008: 28–29) uses ‘communication’ in a very broad way. That is, for her, communication does not 
necessarily involve an interpersonal relation between a speaker and a hearer, but merely requires that ‘the 
speaker intend to express communicable content’. Indeed, it might be thought that it would be better for her to 
define testimony explicitly in terms of the broader notion of an intention to express communicable content, rather 
than communication. That is not to say, though, that her notion of intending to express communicable content is 
itself entirely clear, but only to say that communication may not be the best notion to employ in a definition of 
testimony which is designed to include cases in which there is no interpersonal relation between a speaker and a 
hearer. Note further that she provides three instances of what it is for an act of communication, a, to ‘convey the 
information that p’: (i) where a is the utterance of a declarative sentence such that it expresses the proposition 
that p, a conveys the information that p; (ii) where p is an obvious (uncancelled) pragmatic implication 
of a, a conveys the information that p; and (iii) where an act of communication a expresses the proposition that q, 
and it is obvious (either to everyone in the exchange or to a normal competent speaker) that q entails p, a conveys 




The disjunctive view of testimony: S testifies that p by making an act of 
communication a if and only if (in part) in virtue of a’s communicable content, (1) S 
reasonably intends to convey the information that p or (2) a is reasonably taken as 
conveying the information that p. (35–36) 
 
The epistemology of testimony, then, is concerned with the way in which testimony 
facilitates the epistemic relationship between an individual and a fact (or true proposition). 
Specifically, it is concerned with the following two questions:  
 
• How does testimony put an individual in a position to know the truth of what is 
testified? 
• Under what conditions does testimony put an individual in a position to know the 
truth of what is testified?14 
 
Although the speech act of assertion is treated as an instance of testimony, there are two 
issues that arise with respect to its status in the epistemology of testimony literature. First, it 
is not always clear which (if any) of the four broad accounts of assertion is being employed 
at any one time by epistemologists of testimony.15 This may be because they wish to use the 
term ‘assertion’ in such a way which serves their specific purposes, and/or because they do 
not want to entangle themselves in the commitments of any particular account of assertion 
 
 
14 Wright (2018: 3–4) helpfully articulates the central concerns of the epistemology of testimony in terms of these 
two specific questions. To draw out the difference between them, he gives the example of iron rusting. As he 
says, an account of how iron rusts might appeal to the process of losing oxygen atoms, or the oxygen combining 
with the iron at an atomic level, whereas an account of under what conditions iron rusts might appeal to the 
presence of oxygen, iron and moisture. Although the two questions are not independent of each other – since 
knowing the answer to one might enable someone to infer the answer to the other – they are nevertheless 
conceptually different. 
15 See, for example, Gelfert (2014) and Hinchman (2020). For exceptions to this, see Fricker (2015) and Goldberg 
(2015), who endorse the (or a version of the) constitutive rule (or norm) account of assertion explicitly in their 




from the philosophy of language.16 Second, and related to the first, it is not always clear 
what the relation is between testimony and assertion for epistemologists of testimony.17 As 
Goldberg (2010) observes, some appear to identify testimony with assertion: a speech act 
constitutes testimony if and only if it is the speech act of assertion.18 Some, on the other 
hand, more explicitly endorse what he calls the ‘necessity thesis’: a speech act constitutes 
testimony only if it is the speech act of assertion.19 Whether epistemologists of testimony opt 
for the identity relation or the necessity thesis, it puts pressure on which (if any) of the four 
broad accounts of assertion from the philosophy of language can be utilised in the 
epistemology of testimony, for ‘assertion’ would seemingly need a considerably broad 
extension in order to capture the diverse array of cases of testimony in the epistemology of 
testimony literature. Goldberg (2015), however, argues that the necessity thesis, and thus the 
identity relation, do not hold. He starts with the intuitive claim that the speech act of 
speculation is distinct from the speech act of assertion. He then demonstrates that it is 
nonetheless possible to treat the speech act of speculation as a case of testimony, using the 
following example: 
 
When Harry Met Sally 
 
A hearer, Harry, knows that a given speaker, Sally, has extremely high epistemic 
standards. In particular, Harry knows that Sally asserts something only if she is 
absolutely (epistemically) certain. (Sally rarely asserts anything, but when she does 
 
 
16 For example, they may use ‘assertion’ to refer to only paradigmatic cases of the speech act. (See §2.5 for more 
on the paradigm case of assertion.) 
17 Goldberg (2010; 2015) is one exception since he has attempted more than most to clarify the relation between 
testimony and assertion using his version of the constitutive rule (or norm) account of assertion. Hinchman 
(2020) also provides a unique approach to the relation between assertion and testimony, though I do not have 
space to address it here. 
18 See, for example, Fricker (1987) and Sosa (1994). Note, Goldberg says ‘appear to’ because their comments are 
made in passing, and so the attribution is not certain. 




you can bet your house that it is true.) Harry also knows that Sally’s high epistemic 
standards inform her speculations as well: Sally will not speculate that p unless [p] is 
true. (Harry knows that even when speculating, Sally hates to be seen as ever having 
presented-as-true something that is false.) In fact, Harry knows that Sally’s track 
record vis-à-vis her speculations is as good as the track record of highly competent 
asserters. So when Harry observes Sally speculate that p, under conditions in which 
Harry has all of this background knowledge regarding Sally’s speech dispositions, 
Harry thereby comes to believe that p on the basis of Sally’s having so speculated. 
Unsurprisingly, [p] is true. What is more, and equally unsurprisingly, Sally’s 
speculation was in fact both sensitive – Sally would not have so speculated had [p] 
been false – and reliably formed – a preponderance of the speculations she would 
arrive at through this same process would be true. Finally, there are no relevant 
defeaters. (55)20 
 
According to Goldberg, under these conditions it seems obvious that we can credit Harry 
with coming to know that p on the basis, or at least partly on the basis, of accepting Sally’s 
speculation. As he says, we should not deny this merely because Sally’s contribution is a 
speculation, since Harry already knows this, and has taken it into account. Given, then, that 
it is seemingly possible to treat the speech act of speculation as a case of testimony, the 
necessity principle, and thus the identity relation, apparently do not hold. However, this of 
course does not explain away the issue that it is not always clear what the relation is 
between testimony and assertion for epistemologists of testimony. Indeed, it only 
underscores it. 
 
2.3. The No-assertion View 
 
As we have seen, both philosophers of language and epistemologists of testimony work on 
the assumption that the term ‘assertion’ picks out an act type that we actually engage in, and 
 
 




which delineates a category we need in order to explain a significant component of human 
behaviour. However, this assumption has recently been called into question by proponents 
of what is known as the ‘no-assertion view’. According to Cappelen (2011; 2020a), the term 
‘assertion’ not only fails to pick out an act type that we actually engage in, but it does not 
delineate a category we need in order to explain any significant component of human 
behaviour. Indeed, he thinks the concept of assertion is defective and thus that the entire 
topic of assertion is illusory and should be ignored. While this view might seem radical, 
bold, and provocative, he maintains that it is not. Why? Because, he argues, almost every 
theoretical discipline will, at core junctures, leave behind some ordinary language 
classifications. He writes: 
 
Theoretical physics […] has little use for ‘thing’ or ‘pizza’ or ‘duck’. Contemporary 
syntactic theory has little use for ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’. In the theory of meaning, 
the ordinary word ‘meaning’ should be left behind and replaced with more refined 
notions. It doesn’t have to be like that, but if it happens, as disciplines progress, bits 
of ordinary language fall out of the way we talk about that discipline. It’s not radical 
or rare. On the contrary, it happens all the time when theorizing gets more advanced. 
The No-Assertion view claims that ‘assertion’ is like ‘duck’ to physics or ‘predicate’ 
to syntax. It is an unimportant category when trying to understand language, speech 
and communication. (2020a: 139) 
 
Cappelen sees the elimination of ‘assertion’ as less troublesome than the analogous cases 
above since the term plays only a marginal role in common sense descriptions of human 
behaviour. That said, he concedes that eliminativism about assertion is radical from the 
point of view of contemporary theory, given that it goes against an entrenched tradition in 
the philosophy of language over the last 110 years or so. Nonetheless, he submits that all the 
work done by appeals to assertion in that tradition is better done without such appeals. The 
core components of Cappelen’s no-assertion view are as follows: 
 





• Sayings are evaluated by contextually variable norms, they have variable causes 
and effects, and they are accompanied by contextually variable commitments. 
None of these are constitutive of the speech act of saying. (140–141) 
 
Notice, then, that ‘saying’ is a shared notion not only among proponents of the pro-assertion 
view but among proponents of the no-assertion view as well. Cappelen, however, sees 
proponents of the pro-assertion view as proponents of different versions of what he calls the 
‘saying+ view’ of assertion, i.e., the general view that assertion involves the locutionary act 
of saying plus some other feature which is supposedly essential to it.21 According to him, 
saying+ views always proceed in three stages. First, a subset of sayings is identified in terms 
of certain causes (i.e., the attitudinal account), certain effects (i.e., the common ground 
account), certain commitments (i.e., the commitment account), or certain rules (or norms) 
(i.e., the constitutive rule (or norm) account). Second, having carved out an act type in terms 
of saying plus whatever feature, the added feature is deemed an essential element of that act 
type, in that, it could not be that act type if it did not have this particular feature, whether it 
be a certain cause, certain effect, certain commitment, or certain rule (or norm). The label 
‘assertion’ is given to this act type. Third, the act type of assertion is then put to work in 
order to play some apparently important role in theorising about speech, communication, 
and the spread of knowledge. Proponents of the no-assertion view are opposed to the 
saying+ view and thus this three-step process. Why? Cappelen (144–146) provides four 
arguments. 
 
2.3.1. The Simplicity Argument 
 
Cappelen maintains that there are two dimensions along which the no-assertion view is 
simpler than the saying+ view. First, he argues that the saying+ view involves playing the 
‘assertion counterexample game’, whereas the no-assertion view does not. The assertion 
counterexample game is where a proponent of the saying+ view, having identified a subset 
 
 




of sayings in terms of certain causes, certain effects, certain commitments, or certain rules (or 
norms), and essentialising and labelling the resulting act type ‘assertion’, is faced with a 
counterexample designed to show that it is possible to make an assertion which does not 
involve that essential feature. The proponent of the saying+ view must then explain away 
the counterexample, to safeguard their saying+ view. The no-assertion view, on the other 
hand, predicts for any ‘+’ proposed that there will be a saying which does not confirm to this 
particular ‘+’, because any causes, effects, commitments, or rules (or norms) are only 
contingently related to sayings. Second, Cappelen argues that the saying+ view, unlike the 
no-assertion view, is more complicated, because it makes claims about what happens in all 
possible worlds, i.e., it makes a modal claim. For example, Williamson’s constitutive rule (or 
norm) account, as we saw in §2.1.4, holds that the speech act of assertion is necessarily 
governed by (KA). According to Cappelen, Williamson needs ‘modal evidence’ to establish 
what happens in every possible world, modal evidence which is apparently hard to get and 
is more or less totally lacking in Williamson’s account. In other words, the no-assertion-view 
is simpler because it does not make modal claims and thus is not burdened with having to 
provide modal evidence. He concludes that the simplicity of the no-assertion view 
compared to the saying+ view makes the no-assertion view more appealing. 
 
2.3.2. The Variability Argument 
 
Cappelen maintains that there is variability in the causes, effects, commitments, and rules 
(or norms) of sayings, which undermines the saying+ view. For example, he claims, in the 
relevant contexts, it is fine for speakers to say things just to be funny or entertaining, or to 
say things they do not believe or have good evidence for, or to say things they are not 
committed to defending when challenged, or to say things they do not want added to the 
common ground. In other words, he argues that sayings take place in settings where there 
are variable causes, variable effects, variable commitments, and variable rules (or norms), 
but where no one of these plays a particularly important role over the other, and so any 
attempt to pick out any one of these subsets as capturing the essence of assertion is pointless. 
He concludes that it is not possible to formulate a meaningful and unified category under 




2.3.3. The Explanatory Power Argument 
 
Cappelen maintains that the no-assertion view can explain all the data that the saying+ view 
tries to explain but without making the same commitments as the saying+ view. He accepts 
that subsets of sayings exist which involve certain causes, certain effects, certain 
commitments, or certain rules (or norms). However, he argues that since none of these 
features are essential to any particular act on the no-assertion view, the modal component 
burdening the saying+ view is removed. Moreover, he argues that the modal claim at the 
heart of the saying+ view does not do any explanatory work anyway, but only creates 
complications, which are brought out by the assertion counterexample game. He concludes 
that the saying+ view is less appealing than the no-assertion view because it burdens itself 
with modal commitments without gaining any explanatory power over the no-assertion 
view.  
 
2.3.4. The Argument from the Method of Elimination  
 
Drawing on Chalmers’s (2011) work on verbal disputes, Cappelen maintains that the term 
‘assertion’ can be eliminated legitimately from philosophical theorising without issue. He 
observes that the literature on assertion contains different accounts of assertion but claims 
that there is a distinct possibility that participants in the debate are talking past each other, 
i.e., they are not talking about the same thing and do not have a substantive dispute. He 
then suggests, using Chalmers’s procedure for eliminating verbal disputes, that we can test 
this by eliminating the use of the term ‘assertion’ and describing the disagreement in 
assertion-neutral terms. He predicts that the disagreement can be described purely by 
appeal to the notion of sayings and their various causes, various effects, various 
commitments, and various rules (or norms). He concludes that this is the level at which the 
debate should be conducted, that it would be conducted with very little substantive 
disagreement, and that what remains would be easily resolved.  
 
Cappelen acknowledges that the no-assertion view is destructive and critical in as much as 




However, he believes that it can be looked at in another, more positive light. Specifically, he 
sees it as leading to what he calls a ‘saying-first view’ of speech act theory. Speech act 
theory, he claims, has been dominated by efforts to develop various classifications of 
illocutionary acts on the presupposition that there are tidy and useful classifications of 
locutionary acts. The saying-first view rejects this presupposition. This, he envisions, opens 
up an alternative research field with three focal points:  
 
• The nature of sayings. 
• The complex ways in which the various causes, various effects, various 
commitments, and various rules (or norms) of sayings interact in particular cases. 
• The evolution of sayings over time, the difference across cultures and contexts, and 
the intentional revision of the various causes, various effects, various commitments, 
and various rules (or norms) of sayings. (Cappelen 2020a: 153) 
 
In sum, if the no-assertion view is correct, then the whole enterprise of trying to articulate 
the nature of the speech act of assertion is entirely misguided, and a significant revision of 
speech act theory is potentially required. 
 
2.4. Conceptual Engineering: Carnapian explication 
 
Ultimately, I think the no-assertion view fails. However, I do think it sheds light on an 
uncomfortable truth: the assertion debate has lost its way. That is, it seems only fair to go 
some distance with Cappelen and admit that what ‘assertion’ denotes in the philosophy 
literature generally is not entirely clear and thus its philosophical application uncertain. 
Why has this happened? Mainly, it seems, because the literature on assertion within the 
philosophy of language developed from interests in a variety of different language-based 
issues, by means of a variety of different apparent cases of the speech act. And, in addition 
to that, but largely detached from it, the literature on assertion within the epistemology of 
testimony developed from interests in a variety of different epistemological issues, again, by 
means of a variety of different apparent cases of the speech act. As such, philosophers now 




underlying nature of some determinate philosophical category. So, where do we go from 
here? It seems we have three options: 
 
(i) Submit to the no-assertion view. 
(ii) Push for a ‘family resemblance view’ of assertion, according to which ‘assertion’ 
denotes a spectrum of speech acts all connected by a series of overlapping 
similarities, rather than some essential feature(s).22  
(iii) Endorse the saying+ view but recognise that philosophy simply has not made up its 
mind about how the concept of assertion is best understood, and thus realise that 
what must be sought is a proposal for how it might fruitfully be applied. 
 
I opt for (iii). Why? Two reasons. First, I think the arguments for (i) are unpersuasive, as I 
discuss in §2.6. Second, against (ii), I hold the general position that a systematised theory of 
speech acts is desirable, because a clear-cut taxonomy of speech acts would be useful in the 
philosophy of language and epistemology, and possibly further afield as well. However, as a 
proponent of the saying+ view who recognises that philosophy has not made up its mind 
about how the concept of assertion is best understood, and who believes that what must be 
sought is a proposal for how it might fruitfully be applied, I think a new approach is needed. 
Specifically, I think the concept of assertion is ripe for ‘conceptual engineering’.  
 
‘Conceptual engineering’ is a relatively new term which refers to a set of activities the 
general purpose of which is to assess and ameliorate our concepts, our core representational 
devices.23 The brand of conceptual engineering I think most appropriate for assertion is 
Carnap’s (1947; 1950) ‘explication’, which is a well-established and independently plausible 
account of concept assessment and amelioration. It is a model of how philosophers should 
 
 
22 For more on family resemblance concepts, see Wittgenstein (1953). 
23 See e.g., Clark & Chalmers (1998), Haslanger (2000), van Inwagen (2008), Plunkett & Sundell (2013), Scharp 





engineer concepts, rather than a description of how they in fact engineer concepts. 
Specifically, Carnapian explication is the replacement of one or more vague or indeterminate 
concepts, the ‘explicandum’ or ‘explicanda’, with more exact counterparts, the ‘explicatum’ 
or ‘explicata’. Explicanda can be concepts from an earlier stage of theorising or folk concepts, 
and explicata can (but need not) be expressed using the same words as corresponding 
explicanda. Carnap (1950) stipulates that an explicatum is to satisfy four requirements to a 
sufficient degree: 
 
• The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum ‘in such a way that, in most cases 
in which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used’. (7) 
• The explicatum is to be precise, or at least more precise than the explicandum, in 
virtue of explicit rules of use (or definition) given in terms of a ‘well-connected 
system’ of concepts. (ibid) 
• The explicatum is to be fruitful, in the sense that it facilitates the ‘formulation of many 
universal statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical 
theorems in the case of a logical concept). (ibid) 
• The explicatum is to be simple. 
 
Here is an example (from Pinder (2020a)). Last century, there was no accepted definition for 
the concept of a planet. It was explicitly accepted, though, that the concept PLANET had 
nine canonical instances, Mercury through to Plato, and a number of canonical non-
instances, such as the Sun, the Moon, asteroids, etc.24 However, in the early twenty first 
century, astronomers discovered several ‘trans-Neptunian objects’, such as Eris. These 
objects were similar in relevant respects both to Pluto and Eris, and thus seemed to be 
borderline cases of PLANET. As a result, in 2006, the International Astronomical Union (IAU) 
engineered a new concept, explicitly defined in terms of key properties of celestial bodies, to 
replace PLANET and facilitate a more principled classification of Pluto and other celestial 
 
 




objects. The IAU considered two candidate explicata, PLANET* and PLANET**, defined 




A celestial object x falls under PLANET* iff: 
 
(i) x orbits the Sun 




A celestial object x falls under PLANET** iff: 
 
(i) x orbits the Sun 
(ii) x is sufficiently large for its own gravity to have formed it into a sphere 
(iii) x has cleared its neighbourhood of debris.25  
 
Following a vote, the IAU replaced PLANET with PLANET**, since both Pluto and Eris fall 
under PLANET*, but neither fall under PLANET**. Its members now use PLANET** for 
celestial taxonimisation, instead of using PLANET. As such, the IAU count as having 
explicated PLANET.26 We might ask the following question, then: did the IAU make the 
 
 
25 See International Astronomical Union (2006a; 2006b). 
26 Note, it is a mistake to think that explication requires us to introduce formal systems for concepts. For example, 
Strawson (1963: 503) writes that ‘[the] method is to construct a formal system, which uses, generally, the ordinary 
apparatus of modern logic and in which the concepts forming the subject-matter of the system are introduced by 
means of axioms and definitions’. However, Carnap (1947: 8) explains that explication involves ‘replacing [a 
vague or not quite exact concept] by a newly constructed, more exact concept’. As Pinder observes, one 
advantage of understanding explication without this requirement is that it better reflects actual scientific and 




right decision in replacing PLANET with PLANET**? The answer to this question of course 
depends on whether PLANET** satisfies Carnap’s four requirements to a sufficient degree. 
For a deeper understanding of the method of explication, it is worth taking a moment to 
answer this question. However, to do that, some further comments on Carnap’s four 
requirements are in order.   
 
Typically, it is thought that Carnap prioritised the fruitfulness requirement over similarity, 
precision, and simplicity.27 Notice, though, that there are at least two ways to interpret this 
thought.28 First, fruitfulness might be weighted more heavily than the other desiderata, so 
that a small increase in fruitfulness is preferable to a larger increase in one of the other 
desiderata. Second, fruitfulness might subsume other desiderata so that precision and 
simplicity in particular are only desirable as a means to fruitfulness. For our purposes, it 
does not matter which interpretation we choose, for whichever way we interpret this 
thought, fruitfulness is the principal aim when undertaking an explication. That said, as 
Kitcher (2008) observes, Carnap’s conception of fruitfulness is problematic, in that it is too 
narrow: if fruitfulness is solely understood in terms of facilitating the formulation of 
universal statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in 
the case of a logical concept), not only must similarity take priority over fruitfulness, but 
fruitfulness is inappropriate for many areas of theoretical inquiry.29 Pinder (2020a) attempts 
to remedy this problem, however, by tying fruitfulness to the specific ‘theoretical goals’ that 
led to the introduction of the explicatum. I am sympathetic to Pinder’s position, so it is 
worth fleshing it out in some detail. He calls his view the ‘relevant-goals account of 
fruitfulness’, the tenets of which are as follows: 
 
 
formalised. Indeed, the explication of PLANET is a good example of this. For more on this, see Brun (2016) and 
Dutilh Novaes & Reck (2017). 
27See Schupbach (2017) and Dutilh Novaes & Reck (2017). 
28 See Kitcher (2008) and Pinder (2020a).  
29 As Kitcher (2008: 115) writes, Carnap’s proposal ‘doesn’t suit parts of the physical sciences, and [is] deeply 
problematic for the biological, earth, and human sciences’. Such sciences do not trade in the kind of universal 




• An explicatum is fruitful insofar as its replacement of the corresponding 
explicandum would facilitate, through the ordinary course of inquiry, progress 
towards achieving relevant theoretical goals.  
• Given multiple fruitful candidate explicata for a single explicatum, the most fruitful 
candidate is that whose replacement of the explicandum would facilitate, through 
the ordinary course of inquiry, most progress towards achieving relevant theoretical 
goals. (6) 
 
According to Pinder, there are two principal ways that progress should be understood as 
facilitated towards achieving theoretical goals.30 First, progress is facilitated if the goal is 
achieved by the very act of replacing the explicandum with the explicatum. Second, 
progress is facilitated if a step is made towards achieving the goal by the act of replacing the 
explicandum with the explicatum.31 As such, when deciding between multiple fruitful 
candidate explicata, we should compare how much progress would result from replacing 
the explicandum with each candidate. Pinder claims that there is no general algorithm for 
such comparisons and relative fruitfulness must be assessed, using academic judgement, on 
a case-by-case basis. It follows from this that different theorists, even those who share 
theoretical goals, may make different judgements on a given case. However, it does not 
follow from this that any one of the theorists is mistaken necessarily. There is perhaps a 
subjective element to such judgements, after all. What, then, are theoretical goals? Focusing 
on scientific theoretical goals specifically, i.e., goals the achievement of which would lead to 




30 Of course, what constitutes progress in inquiry plausibly varies between different fields. 
31 Note, Pinder holds that there is no requirement that those performing the explication know that such a step has 
been successfully made so long as, in typical cases, theorists have a good idea of what counts as a move in the 
right direction. He notes further that to say that progress is facilitated through the ‘ordinary course of inquiry’ is 
to rule out atypical cases in which an explication results in progress towards achieving relevant theoretical goals 
in deviant cases. For example, there may be cases in which a ‘bad’ explication nonetheless inspires a theorist to 




• To explain some phenomenon 
• To formulate universal generalisations 
• To formulate empirical laws 
• To develop a taxonomy 
• To provide a principled extension for a term. (7) 
 
As he points out, a notable feature of such goals is that, if achieved, they might genuinely 
lead to better scientific theories. That is, if phenomenon P falls within the scope of some 
scientific theory, then that theory is ceteris paribus better if it explains P. All else being 
equal, a scientific theory that includes (true) universal generalisations or empirical laws is 
better than one that does not. Thus, he recommends that we understand theoretical goals in 
terms of ‘theoretical values’. He writes: 
 
Theoretical values [for scientific inquiry] are general characteristics of good scientific 
theories, such as: internal consistency; coherence (with other accepted theories); 
evidential accuracy (i.e., fit with the evidence); scope (i.e., applicability to a wide 
range of phenomena and/or cases); explanatory power; simplicity; and so on. 
Roughly, the more theoretical values a theory has, and the greater extent to which it 
has them, the better the theory. (8)32 
 
Accordingly, Pinder gives an account of theoretical goals in terms of theoretical values, 




32 Note, even Pinder admits that there are complications here, since some values might be weighted more heavily 
than others (such as internal consistency over simplicity), and values might sometimes conflict (increasing scope 
can decrease evidential accuracy). Moreover, there are also important questions about what the theoretical values 
in fact are, how they are related, and why they are valued. For present purposes, however, like him, I put such 




A goal is theoretical with respect to T [where T is a scientific theory] insofar as: 
ceteris paribus, achievement of that goal would ipso facto transform T into a theory 
that is better with respect to some theoretical value(s) than T. (9) 
 
There is one obvious question that arises from all this: which theoretical goals are relevant? 
Pinder proposes a contextualist response to this question. He reasons as follows. 
Explications are performed for particular theoretical purposes and fruitfulness is the 
principal desideratum for explicata. As such, it makes good sense to measure fruitfulness 
against those purposes. However, for any given explication, the relevant theoretical goals 
are the explicator’s theoretical goals, where the ‘explicator’ may be a theorist or an 
institution. If we suppose that an individual theorist is performing an explication, then 
explicator’s theoretical goals are the personal theoretical goals of that individual theorist qua 
performer of the explication. If we suppose that an institution is performing the explication, 
then the explicator’s theoretical goals are the institutional theoretical goals of that institution 
qua performer of the explication. Pinder concedes that, on his contextualist picture, 
explicators have a significant degree of control over which of their theoretical goals are 
relevant, and thus over the measure of fruitfulness that applies in a given case. However, he 
maintains that this does not imply that anything goes. Why? He provides two reasons. First, 
he claims, relevant theoretical goals must (by value-directedness) be directed towards the 
improvement of certain theories in certain respects – an explicator cannot simply decide to 
uniformly degrade theories in the name of fruitfulness. Second, he claims, additional 
practical, personal, normative, etc. factors, external to the method of explication, constrain 
an explicator’s theoretical goals.  
 
With all this set out, Pinder demonstrates the utility of his relevant-goals account of 
fruitfulness by answering the question above: did the IAU make the right decision in 
replacing PLANET with PLANET**? According to him, the IAU did make the right decision. 
Let us see why. As mentioned above, the IAU considered two candidate explicata when 
explicating PLANET: PLANET* and PLANET**. Using its website as source, Pinder extracts 





a) To provide clearly defined astronomical nomenclature. 
b) To provide a taxonomy for celestial objects that reflects our current understanding 
(with specific reference to ‘planet’).33 
 
As such, in order to determine which candidate promised to be most fruitful, we must 
consider the extent to which replacing PLANET with PLANET* or PLANET** facilitates 
progress towards achieving (a) and (b). Let us consider (a). PLANET does not serve to 
underpin clearly defined nomenclature. Why? Since the concept is defined only by 
heterogeneous instances and non-instances, it fails to classify many celestial objects in our 
solar system and provides no principled basis for extension to objects in other solar systems. 
In contrast, in virtue of their explicit definitions, both PLANET* and PLANET** are well-
placed both to classify the celestial objects in our solar system and extend to objects in other 
solar systems. Thus, by replacing PLANET with either candidate explicatum, the IAU would 
take a clear step towards achieving (a).34 Let us consider (b). In light of the discovery of Eris 
and other trans-Neptunian objects very similar to Pluto, PLANET does not reflect 
contemporary understanding of the solar system. In contrast, both PLANET* and PLANET** 
are defined in terms of well-understood celestial properties and so replacing PLANET with 
either candidate explicatum constitutes a step towards achieving (b). So, we can see that 
PLANET* and PLANET** satisfy Carnap’s four requirements for explication. First, 
PLANET* and PLANET** are sufficiently similar to PLANET. Second, PLANET* and 
PLANET** are more precise than PLANET. Third, PLANET* and PLANET** are fruitful. 
Fourth, PLANET* and PLANET** are simple. However, PLANET** is more fruitful than 
 
 
33 See International Astronomical Union (2006a; 2006b). Other aims include: to organise scientific meetings; to 
promote educational activities; and to discuss the possibility of ‘future international large-scale facilities’. 
34 As Pinder notes, neither PLANET* nor PLANET** underpins a perfectly clear nomenclature. There are some 
difficulties spelling out, for example, how spherical an object must be in order to satisfy condition (ii) of both 
PLANET* and PLANET**, or to what extent an object must have cleared its object of debris to satisfy condition 
(iii) of PLANET**. Either of these difficulties could, in principle, have led to unclarity in nomenclature as more 
celestial objects were discovered, but there is no immediate reason to think that either candidate explicatum 




PLANET*. Why? Because PLANET** contains an additional clause, namely, that a celestial 
object x must be such that x has cleared its neighbourhood of debris. While no celestial object 
in our solar system has cleared its neighbourhood of debris completely, it was known that 
there is significant difference between the extent to which Mercury through Neptune have 
cleared their neighbourhoods of debris, and the extent to which other celestial objects have 
cleared their neighbourhoods of debris.35 As such, PLANET** reflects an important aspect of 
contemporary understanding of celestial objects that is not reflected by PLANET*. Replacing 
PLANET with PLANET**, rather than PLANET*, thus constitutes a greater step towards 
providing a taxonomy for celestial objects that reflect contemporary understanding. In other 
words, with respect to (b), PLANET** is more fruitful than PLANET*. Therefore, as Pinder 
claims, the IAU made the right decision in replacing PLANET with PLANET**.  
 
Now, as mentioned above, I think Carnapian explication is the most appropriate form of 
conceptual engineering for assertion. Admittedly, however, the focus so far has been on 
scientific inquiry rather than philosophical inquiry. This, of course, raises a crucial question: 
does explication, especially Pinder’s relevant-goals account of fruitfulness, generalise to non-
scientific (e.g., philosophical) inquiry? As Pinder observes, in order to answer this question 
fully we would have to answer several other questions: 
 
• What exactly are scientific theories?  
• To what extent are they like the theories we find in other fields of inquiry?  
• Are theoretical values applicable to non-scientific theories and, if so, to what extent?  
• Does progress in other disciplines consist of developing better theories? (10) 
 
That said, Pinder recognises that if we think of philosophy as broadly continuous with 
science, then we might think that the traditional theoretical values apply mutatis mutandis in 
philosophy. He adds a note of caution, however, that if we focus on, say, the normative 
nature of philosophical inquiry, then many of the traditional theoretical values may well be 
 
 




inappropriate. For example, it is unclear that we can straightforwardly measure progress in 
ethics with reference to evidential accuracy or explanatory power. There are, then, deep 
issues about the nature of scientific inquiry and other inquiries, issues which I am 
unfortunately not in a position to resolve here. However, given that I use explication as a 
tool in providing a philosophical account of assertion, I am obliged to say something about 
its use in philosophical inquiry, or at least its use in my particular philosophical inquiry. I 
have three comments to make on this score. First, I do in fact think of philosophy as broadly 
continuous with science and so think that at least some of the traditional theoretical values 
of science apply mutatis mutandis in philosophy. Second, although my account of assertion 
does draw on some normative notions, it is not obvious that this is problematic from the 
outset, which leads to my next point. Third, I confess that I see my overall project as 
something of a trial run for the (de)merits of the application of explication in philosophical 
inquiry. It might be argued by some that it would be preferable to have an account of 
explication for philosophical inquiry set out in detail before undertaking the project I plan to 
undertake. However, we might think instead that the best account of explication is guided 
by what results we get if try to do something like we would in the scientific case. To rally 
some support on this, I call on Pinder, once more: 
 
[F]or the method of explication to be of practical value, it must simplify to some 
extent. A method that explicitly takes into account all of the complexities of inquiry 
would itself be too complex to provide helpful guidance. A simpler method, an 
idealisation that can be adapted on the fly to the situation at hand, is likely to be 
preferable. By analogy, speaking to a new driver in the UK, one might recommend 
that she drive on the left-hand side of the road. The driver can then adapt this advice 
as need be – for example, when navigating narrow lanes on which she is forced to 
drive in the middle of the road, when driving past parked cars which require her to 
move over to the right-hand side, when driving down multiple-lane one-way streets 
at the end of which she wants to turn right, and so on. It would not be helpful, so 
much as overwhelming, to try to take all of these complexities into account when 





With that, let us begin. 
 
2.5. Explicating ASSERTION 
 
Even though there is disagreement in the philosophy of language about what the speech act 
of assertion essentially is, and even though there is a lack of clarity in the epistemology of 
testimony about which (if any) of the four broad accounts of assertion is being employed at 
any one time and what the relation is between testimony and assertion, there is a point at 
which these two areas of philosophy intersect in a significant way on the topic of assertion. 
In the philosophy of language, there is a paradigmatic case of assertion. Similarly, in the 
epistemology of testimony, there is a paradigmatic case of testimony. Significantly, though, 
philosophers of language and epistemologists of testimony mutually agree that the 
paradigm case of assertion and the paradigm case of testimony are co-extensive. What, then, 
is a paradigm case of assertion? It might be thought that it is one in which a speaker says 
that p and intends that the hearer acquire a belief that the speaker believes that p.36 However, 
as McDowell (1998) demonstrates, this cannot be correct. He asks us to consider the 
corresponding thesis about questions, namely, that the intention of an inquirer, in paradigm 
cases of inquiring, is to induce a hearer to induce in the inquirer a belief about the hearer’s 
belief. Such a thesis, as McDowell points out, would be absurd. Why? Because the primary 
point of asking questions is not to find out what someone else believes but to find out how 
things are. As such, the primary point of making assertions is not for the speaker to instil in 
the hearer a belief about the speaker’s own belief, but to inform the hearer about the subject 







36 See Williams (2002). 






Shannon is new in town and does not know where the bank is, so she asks a passing 
stranger, Sylvester, who informs her.  
 
Shannon: Excuse me, is the bank on the East- or West-side of town? 
Sylvester: It’s on the East-side of town. 
Shannon: Thank you.  
 
More formally, then: 
 
(AP) Paradigmatically, assertion is a communicative act which involves a speaker 
saying that p with the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p, addressing the 
hearer’s perceived need/desire for knowledge that p.38 
 
Although the concept ASSERTION has one canonical or paradigmatic instance, philosophers 
of language and epistemologists of testimony respectively have introduced apparent 
borderline cases of assertion into the literature, cases which are similar in certain respects to 
the paradigm case but seemingly do not involve any intention on behalf of the speaker that a 
hearer acquire a belief.39 To illustrate, here are three different types of apparent borderline 







38 Unlike Lackey, I use ‘communicative’ (and ‘communication’) as we might typically expect, namely, as 
involving an interpersonal relation between a speaker and a hearer. In §4.2, I flesh this out using Grice’s (1957; 
1969; 1975; 1989) framework of communication. 






A Dean catches a student red-handed cheating during an exam. However, there is no 
direct confession from the student. The Dean has a strict policy by which she refuses 
to punish any student for cheating in the absence of a confession from that very 
student – which is well-known by all students. The Dean calls the student into her 
office and plays video footage of the incident. She then asks, ‘Did you cheat?’ The 
student says, ‘No, I did not cheat’. The Dean sends the student away unpunished.40 
 
Cases of this sort are known as ‘bald-faced lies’. This type of case is described as one in 
which the speaker asserts that p even though it is common knowledge (between the speaker 
and the hearer) that the speaker does not believe that p. That is, the speaker and the hearer 
each know that the speaker does not believe that p, and each know that each know that the 
speaker does not believe that p, and each know that each know that each know that the 
speaker does not believe that p, and so on. It is this last point specifically, i.e., it being 
common knowledge (between the speaker and the hearer) that the speaker does not believe 
that p, which supposedly determines why the speaker does not – because they cannot – 




Suppose a spy, Natasha, asserts to her foreign counterpart that her partner is dead, 
yet she knows full well that he knows that her partner is alive and is being held by 
him in a nearby facility. Suppose, though, that the reason she asserts to him that her 





40 Adapted from Carson (2006).  




Let us call cases of this sort ‘double bluffs’. This type of case is described as one in which the 
speaker asserts that p, the speaker believes that not-p, and the speaker knows that the hearer 
knows that not-p. (Note, unlike cases of so-called ‘bare-faced lies’, it is not common 
knowledge (between the speaker and the hearer) that the speaker believes that not-p, since it 
is not the case that the speaker and the hearer know that the speaker knows that not-p.) It is 
this last point, i.e., that the speaker knows that the hearer knows that not-p, which 
supposedly determines why the speaker does not – because they cannot – intend that the 




In the course of their interrogation by the police, it must have become clear very 
quickly to the members of the Birmingham Six that nothing they could say or do 
would persuade their interlocutors either that they (the suspects) had not planted the 
bombs or that they (the suspects again) believed that they had not planted the 
bombs. For all that, when they uttered the words ‘We did not plant the bombs’, the 
suspects certainly asserted as much.42  
 
Let us call cases of this sort ‘resolute assertions’. This type of case is described as one in 
which the speaker asserts that p whilst at the same time knowing that the hearer will not 
believe what they assert. It is this last point, i.e., that the speaker knows that the hearer will 
not believe what they assert, which supposedly determines why the speaker does not – 
because they cannot – intend that the hearer acquire a belief that p. 
 
Now, in order to conduct my explication, relevant theoretical goals must first be provided. 









a) To provide a principled extension of the term ‘assertion’ for the philosophy of 
language and epistemology – indeed, for philosophy generally (and further field as 
well, if possible). 
b) To facilitate the development of a taxonomy of philosophically interesting 
illocutionary acts for the broader theory of speech acts.43 
 
As with scientific theories, a notable feature of such theoretical goals is that, if achieved, they 
might genuinely lead to better philosophical theories. That is, if phenomenon P falls within 
the scope of some philosophical theory, then that theory is ceteris paribus better if it explains 
P. As I see it, all else being equal, the philosophical theory that best balances simplicity (i.e., 
the least amount of complexity) with strength (i.e., the highest and most varied number of 
accurate predictions) is better than any other.44 Thus, similar to scientific theories, we may 
understand theoretical goals in terms of theoretical values, where theoretical values for 
philosophical inquiry are general characteristics of good philosophical theories.45  
 
 
43 Two things. First, although these are my own personal theoretical goals, it seems they would apply to all 
proponents of the saying+ view. Second, although I have explicitly stated my personal theoretical goals from the 
outset, that is not to suggest that personal theoretical goals cannot be added, subtracted, replaced, or refined 
along the way. It would be artificial to think that explication does not have this dynamic nature. That said, even 
though I acknowledge this flexibility in explication, the reader should not expect a change in my personal 
theoretical goals.  
44 This thought is inspired by Lewis’s (1973; 1980; 1994) ‘best-system’ theory for natural laws, according to which 
laws are the winners of a ‘competition’ among all collections of truths. Some truths are simple, e.g., the truth that 
grass is green. Some truths are strong, in that, they tell us a lot about the world. Typically, these are exclusive 
categories: simple truths are not strong, and strong truths are not simple. But there are some exceptions. For 
instance, the truth that any two objects are attracted to one another, with a force proportional to the product of 
their masses and inversely proportional to the distance between them, is relatively simple, but also quite strong 
in that it tells us a lot about the forces between many distinct objects. The laws, says Lewis, are these simple but 
strong truths. 
45 As Pinder notes, like scientific inquiries, this also includes internal consistency, coherence (with other accepted 
(or plausible) theories), evidential accuracy (i.e., fit with the evidence), scope (i.e., applicability to a wide range of 
phenomena and/or cases), explanatory power, simplicity, and so on. As we saw above (§2.4), evidential accuracy 




With this set out, what we need now is to select and put forward a candidate explicatum. 
My strategy, here, is to use (AP) to help us do this. Why this strategy? Because not only must 
any plausible explication of the concept ASSERTION classify the paradigm case, but the 
paradigm case is the point of least contention for gaining at least some understanding about 
what the term ‘assertion’ denotes in the philosophy literature. Moreover, by reflecting on the 
paradigm case, we can draw out the philosophically interesting phenomena related to it, 
phenomena which any plausible account of assertion must be able to account for. The 
significance of this last point will become clear shortly. Let us start, then, by reflecting on 
(AP) and making an initial list of features associated with it, as follows: 
 
• Assertion involves the expression of a proposition, p.  
• Assertion involves an interpersonal relation between a speaker and a hearer, 
whereby the speaker intends that the hearer acquire a belief that p. 
• The general purpose of assertion is to inform the hearer (i.e., for the hearer to acquire 
knowledge that p).46 
• Assertion is not essentially institutional (i.e., its performance does not depend on the 
existence of institutional positions or titles, e.g., like entering a plea in a court of law 
or sanctioning a marriage).47 
 
What this initial list shows is that in order to provide an account of the paradigm case of 
assertion not only must we have one foot firmly in the philosophy of language, but we must 
have another foot firmly in epistemology, especially the epistemology of testimony. With 
that, let us build a more substantive list of the philosophically interesting phenomena 
 
 
that the evidential accuracy and explanatory power apply to at least some (if not most) philosophical theories. As 
such, it is appropriate to include both here. 
46 Note, I say ‘general purpose’ because the speaker might of course be deliberately deceptive or simply 
unreliable. (Speaker (in)sincerity and speaker (un)reliability is discussed in §4.3.4.) 
47 Indeed, it seems that institutions and their practices are (at least in part) established by and sustained by means 




related to these features, i.e., a list which pertains to its role in communication and the 
spread of knowledge:48 
 
1) How assertion puts a hearer in a position to know the truth of what is asserted. 
2) The conditions under which assertion puts a hearer in a position to know the truth of 
what is asserted. 
3) Speaker sincerity and insincerity (i.e., the sense in which assertion relates to 
speakers’ beliefs). 
4) Speaker reliability and unreliability (i.e., the sense in which sincere assertion relates 
to the reliability of speakers’ beliefs). 
5) Expressing belief (i.e., the sense in which assertion expresses or manifests speakers’ 
beliefs). 
6) Representing oneself as knowledgeable (i.e., the sense in which speakers are typically 
thought to implicitly represent themselves has having knowledge in what they 
assert). 
7) Commitment (i.e., the sense in which a speaker confers a commitment upon 
themselves to the truth of the proposition they assert). 
8) Responsibility (i.e., the sense in which speakers incur a responsibility for the belief 
that the hearer is intended to acquire). 
9) Challenges (i.e., the sense in which assertions can be contested by querying the 
speaker’s epistemic standing on the proposition they have asserted). 
10) Retractions (i.e., the sense in which a speaker can retract an assertion when they 
regard themselves as no longer in a position to believe or vindicate what they have 
asserted). 
11) Moore’s paradox (i.e., the apparent absurdity in attempting to assert ‘p but I do not 
believe that p’). 
 
 
48 Note, Goldberg (2015) constructs a similar list when discussing what he thinks an account of assertion should 
be able to provide a vocabulary for. However, he does not explicitly construct his list in light of the paradigm 




At this juncture, we should ask the following question: is this everything philosophers talk 
about when they talk about assertion? Answer: pretty much. Admittedly, there are other 
philosophically interesting phenomena associated with assertion, but compared to the 
phenomena on the substantive list they are peripheral in the study of the speech act. These 
include truth, semantics (i.e., the specification of meanings in linguistic expressions within a 
context), meta-semantics (i.e., the determination of semantic facts), implicature, 
presupposition, lying, so-called ‘epistemic normativity’, knowledge ascriptions, expert 
disagreement, testimonial injustice, radical interpretation, etc. Nonetheless, philosophers 
who work on assertion directly spend the majority of their time arguing about how 
assertion’s core phenomena, i.e., the items on this substantive list, are best understood, while 
the list itself holds fixed.  
 
Earlier, I said my strategy was to use (AP) to help us select and put forward a candidate 
explicatum. As mentioned above, I use this strategy not only because any plausible 
explication of the concept ASSERTION must classify the paradigm case, but because the 
paradigm case is the point of least contention for gaining at least some understanding about 
what the term ‘assertion’ denotes in the literature. Moreover, recall that I said by reflecting 
on the paradigm case, we can draw out the philosophically interesting phenomena related to 
it, phenomena which any plausible account of assertion must be able to account for. The 
reason why this last point is significant is because, as we have seen, almost all the 
philosophically interesting phenomena related to the speech act generally can be established 
solely in terms of the paradigm case. What I propose, then, is that our candidate explicatum 
for the concept ASSERTION should be nothing more than what the paradigm case denotes. 
In other words, we should shift from (AP) to (AE): 
 
(AE): Essentially, assertion is a communicative act which involves a speaker 
saying that p with the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p.49 
 
 
49 Notice that in the shift from (AP) to (AE) I have dropped the following condition: ‘addressing the hearer’s 




I suspect some readers will find discomfort with my proposal given apparent borderline 
cases of assertion (like those above), cases (at least some of which) it might be felt are best 
understood as cases of assertion, but which do not fit (AE). Here, I would like to make a 
plea: since there is no accepted definition of the concept ASSERTION, but only an agreed 
paradigm case, let us not put our confidence in apparent borderline cases of assertion so 
hastily and wholeheartedly to guide our inquiry. As mentioned earlier, the literature on 
assertion within the philosophy of language developed from interests in a variety of 
different language-based issues, mainly by means of a variety of different apparent cases of 
the speech act. And, in addition to that, though largely detached from it, the literature on 
assertion within epistemology developed from interests in a variety of different 
epistemological issues, again, mainly by means of a variety of different apparent cases of the 
speech act. Due to this, the concept ASSERTION has become insipid (at best), if not defective 
(at worst). How, then, should we conduct our inquiry? Here, I would like to make a 
recommendation: our inquiry should be guided by, connected to, and framed within 
broader philosophical theories in order to provide a viable and principled account of the 
speech act.50  
 
Let me explain this plea and recommendation. The idea that our candidate explicatum for 
the concept ASSERTION should be nothing more than what the paradigm case denotes is 
only a proposal – I do not claim to have provided a proof for it in any way. However, with 
this principled proposal in place, we can provide a theoretical elaboration of (AE), one 
which will afford us a vocabulary to explain almost all the philosophically interesting 
phenomena related to the speech act. Plus, there is no immediate reason to think that a 
theoretical elaboration of (AE) will not afford us a vocabulary to help us explain the 
outstanding peripheral phenomena as well. More than this, though, by providing a 
 
 
asserts that p to a hearer who is not perceived by the speaker as needing/desiring to know that p (e.g., cases in 
which the hearer already knows that not-p and the speaker knows this but nonetheless asserts that p to the hearer 
to try and make the hearer lose or at least bring into question their knowledge that p). Thus, this condition does 
not capture an essential feature of assertion. 




theoretical elaboration of (AE), we will be well placed to make principled verdicts on 
whether apparent cases of assertion really are best understood as cases of assertion or not. 
Of course, it is possible that (AE) will, in the end, show itself to be too restrictive and thus 
implausible. But, until a theoretical elaboration of (AE) is provided and the apparent cases of 
assertion scrutinised in light of it, we have no immediate reason to think this.  
 
Notice that the preceding discussion draws out an important distinction at play in the 
methodology I employ here, namely, the distinction between a candidate explicatum and a 
theoretical elaboration of a candidate explicatum. This distinction is helpful because there can be 
agreement on a candidate explicatum but disagreement about how best to flesh out its finer 
details. With this in mind, consider again the four broad accounts of assertion above: the 
attitudinal account, the common ground account, the commitment account, and the 
constitutive rule (or norm) account. We might view these as theoretical elaborations of 
alternative candidate explicata for the concept ASSERTION. Notice, though, that one of 
them is not in competition with (AE), namely, the attitudinal account. That is, the idea that 
assertion essentially is when a speaker says that p and intends that their utterance be 
regarded by the hearer as a reason both to think that the speaker believes that p and that the 
speaker intends the hearer to believe that p also captures the paradigmatic instance of 
assertion and so is compatible with (AE). As I see it, this is a virtue, because it means the 
candidate explicatum I have suggested already has a history of independent plausibility. It 
might be thought, then, that my account of assertion should be labelled a defence of the 
attitudinal account. I have no serious qualms with such a label, but it is potentially 
misleading. Why? Two reasons. First, the theoretical elaboration of (AE) I develop 
throughout the subsequent chapters is different to any attitudinal account offered in the 
literature – at most, I put forward a type of attitudinal account, rather than a defence of any 
pre-existing attitudinal account. Second, my theoretical elaboration of (AE) in fact holds that 
all four broad accounts of assertion get something right, not just the attitudinal account. 
Specifically, the theoretical elaboration I develop for (AE) holds that assertion is best 
understood in terms of intentions, namely, an intention that the hearer acquire a belief (like 
the attitudinal account). But it is also consistent with the idea that the speech act counts as a 




of a commitment on the speaker (like the commitment account), and has a significant and 
defining relationship with the epistemic position of the speaker (like the constitutive norm 
(or rule) account). 
 
2.6. A Defence of the Saying+ View 
 
What I aim to provide in this thesis is a novel theoretical elaboration of our candidate 
explicatum, (AE). Admittedly, by restricting the concept of assertion in this way, it will 
delineate a more modest sub-set of sayings and, in turn, a more modest set of contexts in 
which the speech act occurs than is sometimes thought. However, equipped with my 
theoretical elaboration, I hope to show that it can fruitfully be applied to almost all the 
philosophically interesting phenomena related to the speech act (i.e., all of items (1) through 
(11) on the substantive list in §2.5), as well as leave open the possibility that it may also 
fruitfully be applied to any outstanding philosophically interesting phenomena peripheral 
in the study of the speech act. This should not only vindicate the restriction of the concept, 
but it should also restore confidence in the concept itself. 
 
Given that our inquiry will be guided by, connected to, and framed within broader 
philosophical theories, especially from the philosophy of language and the epistemology of 
testimony, I aim to be as transparent as possible with regard to the things that my theoretical 
elaboration of our candidate explicatum postulates, the nature of those things, and any other 
mechanisms involving them. Although our inquiry will be conducted in this way, that does 
not mean that apparent borderline cases from the philosophy literature will be entirely 
ignored. To be sure, proponents of the saying+ view must play the assertion counterexample 
game. However, if we prepare for the assertion counterexample game properly, i.e., by 
being equipped with a theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, playing it is not 
the daunting prospect it is sometimes made out to be. In fact, it can be a useful philosophical 
tool. To reiterate, though, whereas some philosophers might hastily and wholeheartedly rely 
on arguments which turn on apparent borderline cases or apparent counterexamples as a 
way of guiding their inquiry, I am sceptical of this strategy. Instead, I think that arguments 




occasion philosophers to scrutinise apparent borderline cases or apparent counterexamples 
more cautiously. That is, with a theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum in hand, 
we should feel comfortable to raise questions about the inherent plausibility of apparent 
borderline cases or apparent counterexamples, or at least be willing to entertain the 
possibility that they might be best understood in terms of something other than assertion, 
especially if not doing so might all too quickly cost us the theoretical elaboration of the 
concept and the fruit it bears. I appreciate that some might worry that this will lead to an 
unpalatable revisionism about certain apparent cases of assertion. However, I think such a 
worry is misplaced. Why? Because such a worry makes sense only if the apparent cases of 
assertion under consideration are sufficiently well-established in the philosophy literature as 
cases of assertion in the first place in order to make revising them unpalatable. Yet, as we 
have seen, what ‘assertion’ denotes in the philosophy literature, apart from the paradigm 
case, is unclear. 
 
Lastly, my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum is rooted in observations 
about the sorts of creatures that we are, our aims, interests, and expectations (especially of 
each other), as well as the social practices we engage in to fulfil these. As such, any modal 
claims I make regarding the essential feature(s) of assertion are intimately tied to such 
observations. This, I hope, will mitigate any worries concerning any lack of modal evidence 
for any modal claims I make. Why? Because, as I see it, any modal claims I make regarding 
the essential feature(s) of assertion, given they are rooted in such observations, do establish 
what happens in all relevant possible worlds, namely, ones which are inhabited by the same 
or relevantly similar creatures as us, with the same or relevantly similar aims, interests and 
expectations (especially of each other) as us, and who engage in the same or relevantly 
similar social practices to fulfil these as us. Thus, the observations that reinforce the modal 
components I postulate, and by extension the modal components postulated, should show 
themselves to be rich in explanatory power. 
 
In sum, with my explication, and indeed the theoretical elaboration which accompanies it, I 
hope to close the gap between the philosophy of language and the epistemology of 




assertion’s role in communication and the spread of knowledge, and provide principled 
verdicts on whether certain apparent cases of assertion really are best understood as cases of 
assertion or not. In doing so, I hope to reaffirm the concept of assertion and, in turn, 




Although my overarching aim in this thesis is to explicate ASSERTION with (AE), it is of 
course possible that I will, in the end, be unsuccessful – such a replacement may never come 
to pass.51 However, whether I am successful or not, one concession that the methodology I 
employ here affords us is, I hope, at least a plausible account of the paradigm case of 
assertion, which, in turn, I hope, will provide us with a unified set of plausible explanations 
for a litany of philosophically interesting phenomena pertaining to its role in communication 
and the spread of knowledge. In other words, even if my explication ultimately fails, my 
positions and arguments relating to this particular significant component of human 
behaviour will stand independently of that. 
 
2.8. Appendix A: outstanding questions for the conceptual engineer 
 
It would be disingenuous to proceed with our inquiry as if Carnapian explication itself does 
not have its own set of potential problems. As such, I deal with two objections typically 







51 Interestingly, this might happen for legitimate reasons (e.g., not satisfying Caranap’s requirements sufficiently, 
or not satisfying Carnap’s requirements as well as some other candidate explicatum). Alternatively, it might 




2.8.1. The Implementation Problem 
 
Suppose some term ‘T’ means M, but we attempt to conceptually engineer and in so doing 
attempt to revise the meaning of ‘T’, so that ‘T’ thereby means M*. The apparent issue is that 
such attempts are efforts to stipulate new semantic meanings and referents for terms whose 
semantic meanings and referents are already fixed when stipulation seemingly does not 
have this power.52  
 
Deutsch (2020) is the leading proponent of this position. He claims, for example, that no 
single speaker, nor large groups of speakers acting together, can simply stipulate that, 
henceforth, ‘dog’ shall mean cats. Why? He gives two reasons. First, he argues that a 
speaker’s stipulation that an existing term shall now have a different semantics does not 
suffice to give the term that new semantics. Second, he argues that everyone (including the 
conceptual engineers) is ignorant of what must be done, or what else must occur, in order to 
bring about such semantic changes, if it is even possible. Funnily enough, there is an air of 
stipulation in Deutsch’s position, since he only poses a challenge or question to the 
conceptual engineer regarding the mechanism for implementation, rather than a serious 
problem for them.53 In any case, I do not have a dog (or cat) in this fight, since Deutsch 
observes that there are certain cases in which a single speaker, or large groups of speakers 
acting together, can simply stipulate that some term ‘T’ means M* rather than M, namely, 
technical terms or terms of art. He writes: 
 
However, there is a class of important exceptions to the claim that the semantics of a 
term can’t be simply stipulated as one pleases […] Sometimes we really do need new 
terms for things for which we lack conveniently short strings of letters or words. And 
not just in philosophy – in science, logic, mathematics, and everyday life, we 
 
 
52 For a comprehensive list of objections (and responses) to the method of conceptual engineering (including the 
two I discuss here), see Cappelen (2020b).  




sometimes have use for convenient names, or predicates consisting of one or a few 
words, terms with which we can replace our clunkier descriptions […] There are 
countless cases like this in every theoretical context, cases in which something, or 
some property, important for theorizing, needs a convenient label. Stipulative 
introduction provides a straightforward way of introducing these labels and 
specifying their semantics. In other words, there are such things as “technical terms”. 
Technical vocabulary often has its semantics fixed by stipulative introduction. Like 
all other theoretical endeavors, philosophy has its share of technical terms 
introduced via stipulative introduction. (3945–3946) 
 
Given that ‘assertion’ is a philosophical term of art, we therefore need not worry about the 
power of stipulation in our effort to conceptually engineer it, for, by Deutsch’s own 
admission, that power is granted to us purely by virtue of the kind of term that it is. That 
said, two comments are in order here. First, Deutsch claims that the stipulation of technical 
terms is not conceptual engineering proper. He writes: 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, it seems that some of what its defenders describe as 
“conceptual engineering” amounts to no more than the stipulative introduction of 
new terminology. I say “surprisingly” because there is nothing especially remarkable 
about stipulative introduction. It is certainly not some new, particularly fertile 
method of philosophizing, one that might supplement or supplant philosophical 
conceptual analysis. (3946) 
 
I go some way with Deutsch on this point, in that, I think he is right to say that the 
stipulation of a technical term for the sake of philosophising is not remarkable. However, 
just because something is not remarkable does not mean that it is without value. When a 
technical term already exists in the literature which is vague in its reference and unclear in 
its application, either explication or elimination is a practical solution – ‘assertion’, as we 
have seen, is such a term. And if by stipulating a candidate explicatum we can regain some 
clarity in reference and application, and, in turn, reaffirm the concept and thus reinvigorate 




theoretical hygiene. Second, although ‘assertion’ is used as a term of art in philosophising, it 
is also used as an ordinary language term by the folk. This observation, however, is 
unproblematic. Why? For one, as Cappelen observes above, ‘assertion’ plays only a marginal 
role in common sense descriptions of human behaviour. For another, my proposal for what 
‘assertion’ should denote, i.e., (AE), not only picks out paradigmatic instances of assertion in 
philosophical circles, but it also picks out paradigmatic instances of assertion in folk circles. I 
appreciate that some of the folk might have some intuitions about what ‘assertion’ refers to 
beyond paradigmatic instances, but it is a stretch to think that they will have any strong 
commitments either way. Moreover, they would likely have no compelling basis for such 
commitments. Relatedly, it seems reasonable to think that if my explication (or any other 
explication, for that matter) were to prove fruitful for the folk as well as philosophers, we 
could be more prescriptive about what ‘assertion’ denotes in folk circles based on the 
explication of the technical term within philosophy.  
 
2.8.2. The Topic Changing Problem  
 
Suppose some term ‘T’ means M, but to solve a philosophical problem we explicate and in 
so doing revise the meaning of ‘T’, so that ‘T’ thereby means M*. The apparent issue is that 
explicating ‘T’ does not result in solving the philosophical problem, but instead results 
merely in changing the topic.54   
 
Strawson (1963) famously levels this objection against Carnapian explication. According to 
him, philosophical problems are solved by means of the philosophical clarification or 
illumination of concepts. The central philosophical problem he highlights is dealing with 




54 Again, for a comprehensive list of objections (and responses) to the method of conceptual engineering 




For it often happens that someone reflecting on a certain set of concepts finds himself 
driven to adopt views which seem […] paradoxical or unacceptably strange. (515) 
 
Pinder (2020b) provides a helpful illustration, here. Suppose I take myself to be sat at home 
in my armchair. However, since some dreams are indistinguishable from sensory 
experience, my experience is compatible with my being in such a dream. Therefore, I do not 
know that I am sat at home in my armchair – I might only be dreaming that I am, after all. 
When we reflect on the concepts involved in this philosophical problem, especially 
KNOWLEDGE, the argument seems to be sound, but the conclusion seems to be 
unacceptable. Pinder calls this a ‘conceptual imbalance’. For Strawson, then, we must do two 
things in order to solve such a conceptual imbalance. First, we must explain why a given 
step in the argument is in fact unsound, or why the conclusion is in fact acceptable. Second, 
we must explain why appearances are to the contrary. Thus, we solve the philosophical 
problem by resolving the corresponding conceptual imbalance. Enter Carnap, who writes: 
 
The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday 
life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or rather of replacing it 
by a newly constructed, more exact concept, belongs among the most important 
tasks of logical analysis and logical construction. (1947: 7–8) 
 
The reason why Strawson takes issue with Carnap’s approach is because he essentially sees 
it as turning your back on the philosophical problem – the old problems are stated in terms 
of the old concepts, after all. Strawson writes: 
 
[T]ypical philosophical problems about the concepts used in non-scientific discourse 
cannot be solved by laying down the rules of use of exact and fruitful concepts in 
science. To do this last is not to solve the typical philosophical problem, but to 





To be more precise, Strawson’s objection is essentially this.55 When we explicate a concept 
with an explicatum which is explicitly designed to be used for much narrower purposes, we 
reconstruct the conceptual imbalance. He concedes that this may result in the conceptual 
imbalance no longer arising: the argument no longer seems to be sound, or the conclusion 
no longer seems to be unacceptable. However, he argues that the explication will not tell us 
why the unsound step in the original argument seems to be sound, or else how or why the 
acceptable conclusion seems to be unacceptable, i.e., explication will not have told us why 
reflection on the concepts originally involved lead us astray in the first place. He concludes, 
therefore, that by explicating a concept in the way that Carnap suggests we merely block the 
conceptual imbalance, not resolve it.  
 
Now, there are various ways the conceptual engineer might respond to Strawson’s objection, 
but I flag only a few of them here, for two reasons.56 For one, I simply do not have space to 
do each response justice. For another, my particular case of explication bypasses Strawson’s 
objection in a way that other cases of explication perhaps do not, and so it is unnecessary for 
me to mount a full defence against it. In brief, here are three options for the conceptual 
engineer: 
 
(i) It is not entirely clear why Strawson thinks that the explication of a concept cannot 
tell us why use of the concepts originally involved in some philosophical problem 
lead us astray in the first place. If an explication can tell us this, his argument does 
not necessarily go through, at least not for all explications.57 
(ii) Strawson bases his objection on what is arguably a very narrow conception of 
philosophical problems. If we construe philosophical problems in a different or 
 
 
55 Adapted from Pinder’s (2020b) recent construal of Strawson’s critique of Carnapian explication. 
56 See Cappelen (2020b), Pinder (2020b), and Simion & Kelp (2020) for such responses.  




broader way, his argument does not necessarily go through, at least not for all 
explications.58  
(iii) We might think that turning our back on certain philosophical problems (whatever 
shape or form) is not such a bad thing – perhaps it is exactly what needs to be done 
in order to make progress. If so, his argument does not necessarily go through, at 
least not for all explications.59 
 
It should be clear, then, that although some explicators may have some explaining to do, 
Strawson has not sounded the death knell for explicators across the board. With that, let us 
turn to my particular case of explication and, more specifically, the way in which it bypasses 
Strawson’s objection. Frist, as Deutsch makes clear, my aim as a conceptual engineer is 
rather modest, for my aim is to explicate the term ‘assertion’ as a philosophical term of art, 
not to explicate it as a folk term. Thus, as mentioned above, I do not have to manage all the 
pre-theoretical concerns that arise with the explication of a concept like KNOWLEDGE. 
Second, I am not using my explication as such to solve a philosophical problem. Instead, it is 
the theoretical elaboration of my candidate explicatum which is designed to solve 
philosophical problems, and, strictly speaking, that is distinct from my stipulated candidate 
explicatum. In other words, my particular case of explication cannot be charged with 
blocking a conceptual imbalance instead of resolving one, since I do not profess to solve a 
conceptual imbalance qua explication. Third, it might be argued that I am turning my back 
on the philosophical problem of the nature of assertion, in that, I claim that what is needed is 
a proposal for how the term ‘assertion’ might fruitfully be applied, rather than asking, 
‘What is assertion?’, as though it is a difficult question about the underlying nature of some 
determinate philosophical category. If so, following a similar line to Simion & Kelp (2020), I 
would respond that I am merely turning my back on a pseudo-philosophical problem, 
which is no bad thing. Indeed, I think it is precisely what is needed in order to make 
progress on the topic of assertion. Fourth, I arrived at my candidate explicatum in a 
 
 
58 See e.g., Pinder (2000b) 




principled way, namely, by using as my starting point the paradigm case of assertion and 
considering the philosophically interesting phenomena that relate to it. As we have seen, 
almost all the philosophically interesting phenomena that relate to the speech act can be 
established solely in terms of the paradigm case. Plus, there is no immediate reason to think 
that any philosophically interesting phenomena that is peripheral in the study of assertion 
cannot be accounted for in terms of the paradigm case. Thus, it seems my explication could 






















60 Admittedly, whether certain apparent borderline cases of assertion are best understood as cases of assertion is 
yet to be seen. However, this simply means that there is room for the possibility that these borderline cases are 





































3. Putting the Epistemology of Testimony to Work 
 
In this chapter, following the recommendation from the previous chapter that our 
inquiry should be guided by, connected to, and framed within broader philosophical 
theories, I call upon the epistemology of testimony literature to consider the ways in 
which the speech act of assertion can put an individual in a position to know the truth of 
what is asserted. As I explain, such considerations are apt to guide us in our inquiry and 
thus lay the groundwork for constructing a theoretical elaboration of our candidate 
explicatum, (AE). Although there are various ways in which assertion can put an 
individual in a position to know the truth of what is asserted, there is one particular way 
in which assertion can put an individual in a position to know the truth of what is 
asserted which I think illuminates the speech act as I understand it: ‘knowledge 
transmission’. However, to fully understand this independently plausible notion from 
the epistemology of testimony literature, we must understand the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play between speakers and hearers in such cases. And, to 
understand this, we must understand the conversational dynamics which underpin 
communicative exchanges generally. Unfortunately, there is some confusion in the 
epistemology of testimony literature about how to understand these things. The result of 
this is that I find myself in a predicament. I intend to construct a theoretical elaboration 
of our candidate explicatum in light of the notion of knowledge transmission. But I do 
not have an accurate account of the conversational dynamics which underpin 
communicative exchanges generally. As such, I do not have an accurate account of the 
nature of the interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge transmission 
specifically. This, in turn, means that I do not have a fully developed view of knowledge 
transmission in light of which I can construct a theoretical elaboration of our candidate 








3.1. Untangling Assertion & Testimony 
 
‘Testimony’, as we saw in the previous chapter (§2.2), is a philosophical term of art, which is 
intended to capture the diverse array of cases in which an individual makes an utterance 
which may serve as a source of knowledge for another individual. Indeed, the term extends 
over different types of speech act, though it is unclear just how many different types of 
speech act it may extend over. Thus, the epistemology of testimony is concerned with the 
way in which testimony, in its various forms, facilitates the epistemic relationship between 
an individual and a fact (or true proposition). Specifically, it is concerned with the following 
two questions:  
 
• How does testimony put an individual in a position to know the truth of what is 
testified? 
• Under what conditions does testimony put an individual in a position to know the 
truth of what is testified?  
 
My focus, however, is on the speech act of assertion as I understand it: 
 
(AE): Essentially, assertion is a communicative act which involves a speaker saying 
that p with the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p.61 
 
Assertion so understood, as we saw in §2.5, is co-extensive with the paradigm case of 
testimony. As such, I am only concerned with the way in which assertion, as the paradigm 
case of testimony, facilitates the epistemic relationship between an individual and a fact (or 
true proposition). Specifically, I am only concerned with the following two questions:  
 
• How does assertion (as the paradigm case of testimony) put an individual in a 
position to know the truth of what is asserted? 
 
 




• Under what conditions does assertion (as the paradigm case of testimony) put an 
individual in a position to know the truth of what is asserted? 
 
Why begin our inquiry with such questions? The answer to this can be given in general 
terms: because to understand any particular thing it is helpful to know what that thing does, 
and how and under what condition it does it. Such questions, then, are apt to guide us in 
our inquiry and thus lay the groundwork for constructing a theoretical elaboration of our 
candidate explicatum. 
 
3.2. The Variability of Assertion as a Source of Knowledge 
 
Traditionally, epistemologists answer questions on the source of testimonial knowledge 
from the point of view of one of two general positions, namely, ‘reductionism’ or ‘anti-
reductionism’.62 According to reductionism, when a hearer acquires testimonial knowledge 
on the basis of a speaker’s assertion: (R1) it is nondistinctive, in that, it is acquired solely by 
means of other fundamental sources of knowledge (e.g., perception, memory, reasoning); 
(R2) it is reason-dependant, in that, on top of comprehending the speaker as having made an 
assertion, the hearer must depend on additional positive reasons for believing what is 
asserted; and (R3) the hearer does not enjoy defeasible entitlement to believe what is 
asserted as true by default.63 According to anti-reductionism, when a hearer acquires 
testimonial knowledge on the basis of a speaker’s assertion: (AR1) it is distinctive, in that, it 
is not acquired solely by means of other fundamental sources of knowledge, but is itself a 
fundamental source of knowledge in its own right, which stands alongside other 
fundamental sources of knowledge; (AR2) it is reason-independent, in that, it is not the case 
 
 
62 The first reductionist account of testimony is usually attributed to Hume (1748), whereas the first anti-
reductionist account of testimony is usually attributed to Reid (1764). 
63 (R2) may be disambiguated either in terms of ‘global reductionism’ or ‘local reductionism’. Global 
reductionism is the view that the hearer must have additional positive reasons for believing what is asserted by 
speakers in general, whereas local reductionism is the view that the hearer must have additional positive reasons 




that on top of comprehending the speaker as having made an assertion the hearer must also 
have additional positive reasons for believing what is asserted; and (AR3) the hearer enjoys 
defeasible entitlement to believe what is asserted as true by default.64 Although discussions 
about the (ir)reducibility of testimonial knowledge traditionally bundle these individual 
points together into these two general positions, they need not be bundled together in this 
way.65 As such, some defend hybrid positions which fall between reductionism and anti-
reductionism as they are traditionally construed.66 
 
Now, I hold the view that in order to provide a complete epistemology of testimony we 
should accept that there are various ways in which assertion can put an individual in a 
position to know the truth of what is asserted.67 This is different from adopting a hybrid 
view between reductionism and anti-reductionism, since the claim is not that there is only 
one way in which assertion can put an individual in a position to know the truth of what is 
asserted, one way which falls between reductionism and anti-reductionism. Rather, the 
claim is that there are various ways in which assertion can put an individual in a position to 
know the truth of what is asserted, some of which can be explained in reductionist terms 
and some of which can be explained in anti-reductionist terms, respectively.68 For instance, I 
think it is possible for a hearer to come to know what a speaker asserts by treating the 
speaker’s assertion in much the same way that we treat many other empirical findings as 
sources of knowledge. That is, I think that a hearer can observe the fact that a speaker made 
an assertion and, against their own background knowledge or beliefs, exercise their reason 
 
 
64 Note, there is an important difference between a hearer being psychologically disposed to believe what is 
asserted as true and a hearer enjoying defeasible entitlement to believe what is asserted as true by default. 
However, those who endorse anti-reductionism as it is traditionally construed generally endorse both positions. 
65 Greco (2012) provides a helpful exposition of the ways in which epistemologists of testimony answer questions 
on the source of testimonial knowledge.  
66 See, for example, Lackey (2008) and Faulkner (2011).  
67 See Wright (2018) for a similar view. 
68 I wish to stay neutral on the further claim that some cases might also be best explained in terms of some sort of 









I need a new tyre for my bike and I ask the person in the bike shop what type of tyre 
I should get. He says that the best bet for me is the Roadrage XT, because it is hard-
wearing and has good puncture-resistance. Should I believe him? Well, why did he 
recommend that tyre? Perhaps only because it would make him the most profit. Or 
perhaps he genuinely believes that it is my best bet, but he is incompetent to judge, 
having been brainwashed by the Roadrage sales representative. On reflection, I 
decide that neither of these possibilities […] supports a very good explanation of 
what he said. After all, I have gone to this person for my bicycling needs for years, 
and he has always treated me well. He has plenty of other brands of tyre in stock, 
and some of them are considerably more expensive than the Roadrage. So I infer that 
[…] what he said is true. (244) 
 
For another, I think it is possible for a hearer to come to know what a speaker asserts by 
treating the speaker themselves in much the same way that we treat mechanical instruments 
as sources of knowledge, such as thermometers or fuel gauges. That is, I think that a hearer 
can assume a speaker is reliable in what they assert given that the speaker is situated such 
that they would not easily have asserted a falsehood on that occasion. Here is an extreme 
case from Lackey (2008): 
 
Consistent Liar  
 
When Bertha was a teenager, she suffered a head injury while ice skating and, 
shortly afterwards, became quite prone to telling lies, especially about her perceptual 
experiences involving wild animals. After observing this behavior, her parents 
became increasingly distressed and, after consulting various psychologists and 




Jones noticed a lesion in Bertha's brain which appeared to be the cause of her 
behavior, and so it was decided that surgery would be the best option to pursue. 
Unfortunately, Dr Jones discovered during the surgery that he couldn't repair the 
lesion—instead, he decided to modify her current lesion and create another one so 
that her pattern of lying would be extremely consistent and would combine in a very 
precise way with a pattern of consistent perceptual unreliability. Not only did Dr 
Jones keep the procedure that he performed on Bertha completely to himself, he also 
did this with the best of intentions, wanting his patient to function as a healthy, 
happy, and well respected citizen. As a result of this procedure, Bertha is now—as a 
young adult—a radically unreliable, yet highly consistent, believer with respect to 
her perceptual experiences about wild animals. For instance, nearly every time she 
sees a deer, she believes that it is a horse; nearly every time she sees a giraffe, she 
believes that it is an elephant; nearly every time she sees an owl, she believes that it is 
a hawk, and so on. At the same time, however, Bertha is also a radically insincere, yet 
highly consistent, testifier of this information. For instance, nearly every time she 
sees a deer and believes that it is a horse, she insincerely reports to others that she 
saw a deer; nearly every time she sees a giraffe and believes that it is an elephant, she 
insincerely reports to others that she saw a giraffe, and so on.29 [B]ecause of her 
consistency as both a believer and a liar, those around her do not have any reason for 
doubting Bertha's reliability as a source of information. (53--54).  
 
Plus, I think that it is possible for a hearer to come to know what a speaker asserts in virtue 
of the modal profile of the case. That is, I think that a hearer can reliably form a belief based 
on a speaker’s assertion because said belief could not easily have been false under the 




Frank is a writer who spends his mornings in the kitchen, where he follows a mildly 
eccentric ritual. Every day after finishing his bowl of cereal at around dawn, he 




it remains until noon, when he takes out the trash. Today, his sister Mary and 
nephew Sonny are visiting. Having had a tiring journey, they sleep in and join Frank 
in the kitchen in the late morning. Mary sees the milk carton in the fridge, assumes it 
is full, and on that basis tells Sonny that there is milk in the fridge. As it happens, 
there is indeed milk in the carton this morning, since Frank forgot to perform his 
ritual. Upon overhearing Mary’s testimony, Frank is reminded of his blunder and 
realizes that he forgot to discard the milk this morning; at the same moment, Sonny, 
on the basis of his mother’s testimony, forms the belief that there is milk in the 
fridge. Had Frank performed his ritual, he would have immediately corrected Mary 
and would have informed his visitors that the carton was empty. (Gelfert 2014: 156, 
which paraphrases and simplifies Goldberg 2005: 302) 
 
Of course, in order to provide a complete epistemology of testimony, we would need to 
explain how and under what conditions assertion can put an individual in a position to 
know the truth of what is asserted in each different way. However, I am not in the business 
of providing a complete epistemology of testimony.69 Instead, I am in the business of 
providing a theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, (AE). As such, I am 
concerned with just one particular way – a way we have not yet addressed – in which 
assertion can put an individual in a position to know the truth of what is asserted: 
‘knowledge transmission’.70 Why knowledge transmission? Because I think it is in light of 
this independently plausible notion from the epistemology of testimony literature in 






69 See Wright (2018) who attempts to provide a complete epistemology of testimony along these lines.  
70 Although their individual views take varying forms, advocates of knowledge transmission include Welbourne 
(1986), Burge (1993), Dummett (1994), Moran (2005; 2018), Hinchman (2005), Audi (2006), Faulkner (2011), and 




3.3. Knowledge Transmission  
 
Knowledge transmission is perhaps most helpfully introduced by analogy. Consider a chain 
of people who have been infected with a virus. Each person must have the virus in order to 
pass it to the next person, and moreover there must be at least one person who ultimately 
acquired the virus from another source. Analogously, each person in the chain of 
transmitting knowledge that p must know that p in order to pass it to the next person, and 
moreover there must be at least one person in the chain who ultimately acquired knowledge 
that p from another source (e.g., perception, memory, reasoning).71 The central idea behind 
knowledge transmission, then, is that when a knowledgeable speaker makes an assertion 
that p, the hearer does not merely come to know what the speaker knows, but acquires the 
speaker’s knowledge that p, in that, their knowledge that p is grounded upon the speaker’s 
knowledge that p. Crucially, this idea is bound up with the further idea that a certain 
interpersonal relation must hold between the speaker and the hearer in order to successfully 
transmit knowledge. More specifically, the hearer must believe the speaker themselves, and 
thus rely on them to be knowledgeable in what they assert, in order to acquire the 
knowledge in question.72 We might say, then, that knowledge transmission is the process by 
which a speaker’s knowledge that p becomes a hearer’s knowledge that p (i.e., the hearer’s 
knowledge that p is grounded upon the speaker’s knowledge that p), in virtue of the fact that 
the reason why the speaker asserted that p is that the speaker knows that p, and whereby the 
content so asserted, p, comes to be known by the hearer by way of the hearer believing the 
speaker themselves. To be clear, when a hearer acquires testimonial knowledge by means of 
 
 
71 This analogy is developed from Lackey (2008: 47), who describes knowledge transmission in terms of buckets 
of water being passed down a chain of people. I use the notion of a viral infection instead because it captures 
more accurately the notion of knowledge transmission, since when an individual passes on a viral infection, they 
do not lose the viral infection themselves, whereas when an individual passes on a bucketful of water, they lose 
the water they originally had in their possession. Accordingly, when a speaker transmits knowledge, they do not 
lose their knowledge. 
72 Anscombe (1979) provides what is arguably the first philosophical treatment of what it is to believe someone, 




a speaker’s assertion in this particular way, it is distinctive, in that, it is not acquired solely 
by means of other fundamental sources of knowledge but is itself a fundamental source of 
knowledge in its own right, which stands alongside other fundamental sources of 
knowledge. In other words, it satisfies at least (AR1) of the anti-reductionist position as it is 
traditionally construed.73  
 
Now, as I say, I think it is this independently plausible notion from the epistemology of 
testimony literature in particular that can illuminate the speech act of assertion as I 
understand it. However, to fully understand knowledge transmission we must understand 
the nature of the interpersonal relation at play between speakers and hearers in such cases. 
To understand this, though, we must understand the conversational dynamics which 
underpin communicative exchanges generally. 
 
3.4. The So-called ‘Problem of Cooperation’ 
 
According to Faulkner (2011), the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative 
exchanges generally institute a unique practical and theoretical difficulty for communicative 
exchanges the purpose or direction of which is to transmit knowledge specifically. He calls it 
the ‘problem of cooperation’. This, for him, means that the nature of the interpersonal 
relation at play between speakers and hearers in cases of knowledge transmission must be 
understood in a certain way. Let me explain. 
 
The apparent practical and theoretical difficulty the so-called ‘problem of cooperation’ is 
supposed to capture is this. When speakers and hearers enter into communicative exchanges 
 
 
73 As we will see below in §3.4, some think that it is possible to adopt a view of knowledge transmission which 
satisfies condition (AR1) of the anti-reductionist position as it is traditionally construed, but yet does not satisfy 
conditions (AR2) or (AR3). Instead, they adopt a view of knowledge transmission which satisfies condition (AR1) 
but which also satisfies conditions (R2) and (R3) of the reductionist position as it is traditionally construed. Thus, 
they adopt a view of knowledge transmission which falls between reductionism and ant-reductionism – a hybrid 




generally, they normally do so with conflicting practical interests. Plus, the hearer may be 
aware of the speaker’s practical interests and how they conflict with their own. In 
communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of which is to transmit knowledge 
specifically, speakers want to be believed whether they assert the truth or whether they are 
insincere (e.g., lying), whereas listeners want to believe speakers only if they assert the truth. 
This can be put in game-theoretic terms, as follows: the best outcome for the speaker is one 
in which they assert the truth in some situations and are insincere in others, but the hearer 
believes what they assert in all of them; the best outcome for the hearer is one in which the 
speaker always asserts the truth, and the hearer believes them only if they do so. Of course, 
it is possible that a speaker’s practical interests and a hearer’s practical interests might align 
in some cases. However, this is beside the point. Why? Because the point of the so-called 
‘problem of cooperation’ is that there normally is a conflict. In other words, the idea is that 
asserting the truth is not the default position for speakers and thus it cannot be the case that 
the default position for hearers is to believe speakers. Given the conflicting practical interests 
between speakers and hearers in communicative exchanges generally, and thus in 
communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of which are to transmit knowledge 
specifically, for a hearer to believe what a speaker asserts without being aware of additional 
positive reasons for doing so is irrational and thus incompatible with acquiring knowledge. 
This is Faulkner’s so-called ‘problem of cooperation’. He maintains, however, that this 
practical and theoretical difficulty can be overcome if we concede that the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play between speakers and hearers in cases of knowledge 
transmission is such that hearers, on top of comprehending speakers as having made an 
assertion, must be aware of additional positive reasons for believing what is asserted. 
 
Since Faulkner is a proponent of knowledge transmission, he holds the view that testimonial 
knowledge acquired by means of a speaker’s assertion in this particular way is distinctive, 
i.e., not acquired solely by means of other fundamental sources of knowledge but itself a 
fundamental source of knowledge in its own right, which stands alongside other 
fundamental sources of knowledge. However, as his proposed solution to the so-called 
‘problem of cooperation’ shows, he also holds the view that testimonial knowledge acquired 




comprehending the speaker as having made an assertion, the hearer must have additional 
positive reasons for believing what is asserted. As such, he holds the view that the hearer 
does not enjoy defeasible entitlement to believe what is asserted as true by default. In other 
words, he holds a view of knowledge transmission which satisfies (AR1) of the anti-
reductionist position as it is traditionally construed yet does not satisfy (AR2) or (AR3) of the 
anti-reductionist position as it is traditionally construed. Instead, he adopts a view of 
knowledge transmission which satisfies (AR1) but also (R2) and (R3) of the reductionist 
position as it is traditionally construed. Thus, he adopts a view of knowledge transmission 
which falls between reductionism and ant-reductionism – a hybrid position. 
 
3.5. Against the So-called ‘Problem of Cooperation’ 
 
Wright (2018), however, argues that those who, like Faulkner, operate on the assumption 
that they are at liberty to adopt a view of knowledge transmission which is inconsistent with 
anti-reductionism as it is traditionally construed are in fact mistaken.74 According to him, 
proponents of knowledge transmission should subscribe to a view of knowledge 
transmission which is consistent with anti-reductionism as it is traditionally construed 
simply in virtue of being proponents of knowledge transmission, i.e., a view of knowledge 
transmission which satisfies (AR1), (AR2), and (AR3). His argument takes the form of the 
following dilemma: 
 
Premise 1: There are proponents of knowledge transmission who adopt a view of 
knowledge transmission which is inconsistent with anti-reductionism 
as it is traditionally construed. They must either endorse or deny the 
claim that a listener can acquire knowledge via knowledge 
 
 
74 I should note that Wright does not use the term ‘anti-reductionism’ when he presents his position or argument. 
However, he nonetheless talks in terms of the content set out in conditions (AR1), (AR2), and (AR3). Thus, re-
phrasing his position and argument in terms of anti-reductionism is unproblematic. In fact, it makes his position 




transmission only if the explanation for why the hearer believes what 
the speaker asserts is the fact that they have additional positive 
reasons for doing so. 
Premise 2:  If the claim is true, then the acquisition of knowledge via knowledge 
transmission is impossible.  
Premise 3:  If the claim is false, then the claim that a hearer’s acquisition of 
knowledge via knowledge transmission depends on the fact that they 
have additional positive reasons for believing what the speaker asserts 
is itself a false claim. 
Conclusion:  Adopting a view of knowledge transmission which is inconsistent 
with anti-reductionism as it is traditionally construed is incompatible 
with the claim that assertion transmits knowledge.75  
 
Taking premise 1 as given, Wright provides specific arguments in support of premise 2 and 
premise 3. Let us take them in turn. In support of premise 2, he argues that when a 
knowledgeable speaker makes an assertion, but the hearer believes what the speaker asserts 
on the basis of additional positive reasons for doing so, strictly speaking the hearer does not 
rely on the speaker’s assertion. Why? Because, he claims, when the explanation for why the 
hearer believes what the speaker asserts is the fact that they are aware of positive reasons for 
doing so, the explanation for why the hearer believes what the speaker asserts cannot also be 
the fact that the speaker asserted it. In that case, the hearer does not acquire the speaker’s 
knowledge (i.e., the hearer’s knowledge is not grounded upon the speaker’s knowledge) in 
the appropriate way. At best, the hearer merely comes to know what the speaker knows. 
Why is it, though, that a hearer who forms a belief on the basis of additional positive reasons 
is not related to the speaker’s assertion in the appropriate way necessary for knowledge 
transmission? Because, according to Wright, for a fact to be an explanation for why an 
individual believes something involves that individual being responsive to that fact in their 
 
 
75 See Wright (2018: 35). Note, further to what was said in fn.74, I have changed some of the wording for our 




believing it. As such, a hearer cannot be guided by both the fact that the speaker made an 
assertion and the fact that they have positive reasons for believing what the speaker asserts. 
If, he says, one of the facts had been otherwise – if either the hearer had been aware of 
reasons against believing what the speaker asserts, or if the speaker had lacked knowledge 
of what is asserted – then the hearer would have either believed or not believed what is 
asserted, being guided by one fact or the other. Wright notes that this is so even in a case 
where both facts are such that they each guide the hearer in the direction of believing what 
is asserted, respectively.76 He maintains, therefore, that proponents of knowledge 
transmission who adopt a view of knowledge transmission which is inconsistent with anti-
reductionism as it is traditionally construed must claim that a hearer acquiring knowledge 
via knowledge transmission depends on them being aware of positive reasons for doing so, 
but where the fact that they are aware of positive reasons must not be the explanation for 
why they believe what the speaker asserts. This, he claims, is an untenable position, which 
brings us to his argument in support of premise 3.  
 
Recall that Faulkner’s concern is that believing what a speaker asserts without being aware 
of additional positive reasons for doing so is irrational and thus incompatible with acquiring 
knowledge. Wright, however, makes the intuitive observation that there is no difference in 
terms of rationality between someone who believes something whilst being aware of 
positive reasons for doing so, but where these positive reasons do not explain why they 
 
 
76 Note, one of Wright’s main sources of inspiration for this argument is Hinchman (2014), who holds that there is 
a sense in which knowledge transmission involves the speaker issuing the hearer with an invitation to trust, not 
only for the truth of what is asserted but to be knowledgeable on the topic in question, so that the hearer can 
close further inquiries into the matter. Accordingly, if the hearer refuses the speaker’s invitation to trust, the 
hearer fails to acquire the speaker’s knowledge. Wright’s idea, then, is that when the explanation for why the 
hearer believes what is asserted is the fact that the speaker is aware of positive reasons for doing so, this is 
tantamount to refusing the speaker’s invitation to trust, for the hearer does not believe what the speaker asserts 
in the way that the speaker intends. (I say more about the way that I understand the notions of trust and the 





believe that thing, on the one hand, and someone who believes something but is not aware 
of positive reasons for doing so, on the other. On the assumption that this intuitive 
observation is correct, he argues that if a hearer is aware of positive reasons for believing 
what a speaker asserts – but where these positive reasons are not the explanation for why 
the hearer believes what is asserted – then so too is a hearer who is not aware of positive 
reasons for believing what is asserted. He maintains, therefore, that it cannot plausibly be 
claimed that a hearer being aware of additional positive reasons is a necessary condition for 
them to acquire knowledge via knowledge transmission. 
 
Intuitions notwithstanding, Wright concludes that proponents of knowledge transmission 
who operate on the assumption that they are at liberty to adopt a view of knowledge 
transmission which is inconsistent with anti-reductionism as it is traditionally construed are 
in fact mistaken. Instead, proponents of knowledge transmission should subscribe to a view 
of knowledge transmission which is consistent with anti-reductionism as it is traditionally 
construed simply in virtue of being proponents of knowledge transmission. 
 
3.6. Where Do We Go from Here? 
 
Given Wright’s dilemma, I submit that Faulkner’s so-called ‘problem of cooperation’ 
misconstrues the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges 
generally, and thus misconstrues the nature of the interpersonal relation at play in cases of 
knowledge transmission specifically. As I see it, the conversational dynamics which 
underpin communicative exchanges generally must be such that the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge transmission specifically is such that the 
default position for speakers is to assert the truth. In that case, hearers do enjoy a defeasible 
entitlement to believe speakers, and thus what is asserted as true, by default. Accordingly, it 
is not the case that on top of comprehending the speaker as having made an assertion the 
hearer need be aware of additional positive reasons for believing what is asserted. In other 
words, I think the so-called ‘problem of cooperation’ should be dissolved in such a way that 




is traditionally construed (i.e., a view of knowledge transmission which satisfies (AR1), 
(AR2), and (AR3)).  
 
This, however, puts me in a predicament. I intend to construct a theoretical elaboration of 
our candidate explicatum in light of the notion of knowledge transmission. But I do not yet 
have an accurate account of the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative 
exchanges generally. Thus, I do not have an accurate account of the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge transmission specifically. This means 
that I do not have a fully developed view of knowledge transmission in light of which I can 
construct a theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum. What I need to do, then, is 
construct my own account of the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative 
exchanges generally. I can then use this to construct my own account of the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge transmission specifically. This, in turn, 
will provide us with a fully developed view of knowledge transmission in light of which I 
can construct my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum. Indeed, this is the 
ambitious task I take up in the next chapter. 
 
3.7. Appendix B: safeguarding knowledge transmission 
 
It would be remiss of me not to mention that the notion of knowledge transmission has 
come under attack in the epistemology of testimony literature, most famously from Lackey 
(2008). Arguably, her most serious attack takes the form of her cases of so-called ‘selfless 
assertions’, the definition for which is as follows:  
 
A speaker’s assertion is ‘selfless’ iff: 
 
(i) for purely non-epistemic reasons, the speaker does not believe that p 
(ii) despite this lack of belief, the speaker is aware that p is very well supported by all 
of the available evidence 
(iii) because the speaker is aware that p is very well supported by all of the available 




Here is her most well-known case of a so-called ‘selfless assertion’: 
 
Creationist Teacher   
 
Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth‐grade teacher, and her religious beliefs are 
grounded in a deep faith that she has had since she was a very young child. Part of 
this faith includes a belief in the truth of creationism and, accordingly, a belief in the 
falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite this, she fully recognizes that there is an 
overwhelming amount of scientific evidence against both of these beliefs. Indeed, she 
readily admits that she is not basing her own commitment to creationism on 
evidence at all but, rather, on the personal faith that she has in an all‐powerful 
Creator. Because of this, Stella does not think that religion is something that she 
should impose on those around her, and this is especially true with respect to her 
fourth‐grade students. Instead, she regards her duty as a teacher to involve 
presenting material that is best supported by the available evidence, which clearly 
includes the truth of evolutionary theory. As a result, after consulting reliable 
sources in the library and developing reliable lecture notes, Stella asserts to her 
students, “Modern‐day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus,” while presenting 
her biology lesson today. Though Stella herself neither believes nor knows this 
proposition, she never shares her own personal faith‐based views with her students, 
and so they form the corresponding true belief solely on the basis of her reliable 
testimony. (48). 
 
Lackey’s argument takes the following form: 
 
Premise 1:  In cases of so-called ‘selfless assertion’ (in this instance, Creationist 
Teacher specifically), the hearers come to know what the speaker 
asserts by believing the speaker’s assertion. 
Premise 2:  If the knowledge that the hearers acquire by believing the speaker’s 
assertion cannot be accounted for in terms of knowledge transmission, 




Premise 3: The knowledge that the hearers acquire by believing the speaker’s 
assertion cannot be accounted for in terms of knowledge transmission. 
Conclusion: Knowledge transmission is false.  
 
Now, there have been various responses to Creationist Teacher and other such cases of so-
called ‘selfless assertions’ in the epistemology of testimony literature in defence of 
knowledge transmission, and I am afraid I do not have anything particularly novel to add. 
However, I will make a few comments.  
 
First, since I think there are various ways (other than knowledge transmission) in which the 
speech act of assertion can put an individual in a position to know the truth of what is 
asserted, it is an open possibility (for me, at least) that Creationist Teacher can be explained in 
terms of one of these instead. For instance, perhaps the case is best understood as one in 
which the students treat Stella in much the same way that they treat mechanical instruments 
as sources of knowledge, merely as a reliable gauge of the truth. On this interpretation, 
premise 2 of Lackey’s argument is false. (Thank you to Stephen Wright (personal 
correspondence) for a helpful conversation about this.)  
 
Second, although Lackey claims that Stella makes an assertion to her students, this is 
perhaps not an entirely plausible claim. Pedagogically speaking, it certainly sounds odd (if 
not worrying) to claim that schoolteachers are in the business of asserting truths to their 
students, rather than, say, presenting them with content from a syllabus which has been 
deemed appropriate/correct by the institution (i.e., the school and its governing bodies) 
rather than strictly speaking true. Indeed, institutions and their schoolteachers are usually 
rather sensitive to the way in which they present content to students given that students 
come from various cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds. The role of a schoolteacher is 
not to indoctrinate, after all. Moreover, since students are often taught about conflicting 
views and positions during the course a lecture/seminar (let alone the course of a module), it 
is not at all obvious how students would be expected to respond epistemically or otherwise 
to a teacher who is making so many conflicting assertions to them. The speech act Stella 




‘presenting’. On this interpretation, premise 1 of Lackey’s argument is false. (See Bourne, 
Caddick Bourne, & Jarmy (2016) and Milić (2017) for the view that teaching does not involve 
asserting truths.)  
 
Third, even if we do accept Lackey’s claim that an assertion that modern day Homo sapiens 
evolved from Homo erectus has been made, this assertion is perhaps best described as being 
made by the institution (i.e., the school and its governing bodies), not Stella. Stella may thus 
be seen as an appendage of the institution – a ‘mouthpiece’, if you will. As such, it does not 
matter whether she knows that modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus or 
not, because the institution knows and asserts this, the students believe the institution, and 
thus knowledge is transmitted (albeit by proxy through Stella). On this interpretation, 
premise 3 of Lackey’s argument is false. (See Faulkner (2011) and Burge (2013) for a similar 
sort of view.) (Note, I see no reason to worry about the suggestion that institutions can have 
knowledge and make assertions, even when certain individuals who make up those 
institutions have conflicting beliefs. Indeed, we regularly talk about institutions having 
beliefs, knowledge, values, etc., as well as performing speech acts. Consider, for instance, 
BP’s apology for the oil spill which polluted the Gulf of Mexico. For more on assertions 
made by institutions (or ‘group assertions’), see Hughes (1984), Meijers (2007), Tollefsen 
(2007; 2009; 2011; 2020), (Miranda) Fricker (2012), Lackey (2015; 2018), and Faulkner (2018).) 
 
Fourth – and certainly the most bullet-biting response I can think of in response to so-called 
‘selfless assertions’ generally – since such assertors are so bizarre in their epistemic profile, 
we might simply hold that hearers at best merely come to acquire a (true) belief on the basis 
of such assertions, not knowledge. Why? Because even though what the speaker asserts is 
supposedly very well supported by all the available evidence, we have the complicating 
factor that they themselves do not believe what they assert, which (even by Lackey’s 
standards) acts as a defeater against all the available evidence that the speaker supposedly 






In sum, whether or not we want to say that Creationist Teacher (or indeed any case of so-
called ‘selfless assertion’) can be explained in terms of knowledge transmission, it is not 

































































4. A Gricean Account of Assertion 
 
In this chapter, I construct my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, (AE). 
In order to do this, I construct my own account of the conversational dynamics which 
underpin communicative exchanges generally. I then use this to construct my own 
account of the interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge transmission 
specifically. This, in turn, will provide us with a fully developed view of knowledge 
transmission – a view of knowledge transmission which satisfies (AR1), (AR2), and 
(AR3) of the anti-reductionist position as it is traditionally construed – in light of which I 
can construct my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum. As I see it, Grice’s 
(1957; 1969; 1975; 1989) framework of communication is best placed to help undertake 
this ambitious task, so I draw on it liberally, as well as revise and develop elements of it. 
I should add that my approach in this chapter is programmatic, and so I do not shy away 
from showing my working or flagging areas of uncertainty. Nonetheless, by the end of 
the chapter, I hope to have shown that (AE), and indeed my theoretical elaboration of it, 
can fruitfully be applied to almost all the philosophically interesting phenomena related 
to the speech act (i.e., items (1) through to (10) on the substantive list – I save the final 
item on the substantive list, item (11), for the subsequent chapter), as well as leave open 
the possibility that it may also fruitfully be applied to any outstanding philosophically 
interesting phenomena peripheral in the study of the speech act. I start by setting out my 
general epistemological commitments. 
 
4.1. Epistemological Framework  
 
Williams (1973) famously claims that belief aims at truth. He bases this claim on the 
following observations:  
 
• Truth and falsehood are appropriate dimensions of assessment of beliefs (as opposed 
to other psychological states and dispositions) 




How, though, should the thought that belief aims at truth be understood? An increasingly 
popular view is that beliefs are governed by a so-called ‘epistemic norm’, namely, a so-called 
‘truth norm’, according to which the very nature of belief is that it is, in some sense, 
constituted by its being so governed, or that its being so governed is, in some sense, essential 
to it.77 The central idea behind this view is that the so-called ‘truth norm’ has prescriptive 
force. That is, it indicates what ought to be done. However, this is not the only way of 
understanding the thought that ‘belief aims at truth’. Although I agree that belief aims at the 
truth in a way that other attitudes do not, I understand this in terms of biological 
design rather than so-called ‘epistemic norms’. From the point of view of biological design, 
belief has a different and specialised function from, say, desire. Papineau (2013) is 
instructive here: 
 
Desires relate to results. Each desire type has the function of generating actions that 
will lead to some specific outcome, such as food, or fine wine, or watching 
Tottenham Hotspur play football. By contrast, beliefs have no results to call their 
own. Their function is not to produce specific results, but to help whichever desires 
are active to select those actions that will conduce to their satisfaction. To do this, 
beliefs need to carry [true] information about the environment, [true] information 
that is relevant to which actions will produce which results. (72–74) 
 
Of course, some might wish to talk in terms of biological ‘norms’, but it is important that we 
do not misconstrue such biological ‘norms’ as having genuinely prescriptive force. How, 
though, do we acquire true beliefs while also avoiding error? My answer to this is reliabilist 
in nature, namely, by bringing it about that the processes by which we acquire beliefs are 
truth conducive.78 Indeed, I think that knowledge in general is the product of forming true 
beliefs in this way. That said, it seems somewhat artificial to talk purely in terms of reliable 
 
 
77 For views in this vicinity see Railton (1994), Wedgwood (2000; 2007), Velleman (2000), Brandom (2001), and 
Whiting (2010).  




processes without mentioning the role that evidence plays in such processes.79 As such, I 
hold the general view that an individual’s beliefs must accord with their evidence in a 
reliable way to amount to knowledge, i.e., where an individual’s beliefs accord with their 
evidence if and only if that evidence is reliably connected to the truth of those beliefs.80 
Furthermore, I incorporate into my reliabilism a brand of contextualism based on Lewis 
(1996), who writes: 
 
We have all sorts of everyday knowledge, and we have it in abundance […] Besides 
knowing a lot that is everyday and trite, I myself think that we know a lot that is 
interesting and esoteric and controversial. We know a lot about things unseen: tiny 
particles and pervasive fields, not to mention one another’s underwear […] But on 
these questions, let us agree to disagree peacefully with the champions of ‘post-
knowledgeism’. The most trite and ordinary parts of our knowledge will be problem 
enough. For no sooner do we engage in epistemology – the systematic philosophical 
examination of knowledge – than we meet a compelling argument that we know 
next to nothing. (549) 
 
The ‘compelling argument’ Lewis is referring to is the well-known sceptical argument, 
which may take the following form: 
 
Premise 1: If I know that I have hands, then I know that I am not a brain in a vat. 
Premise 2: I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. 




79 I use ‘evidence’ very broadly here, where anything from everyday perceptual experiences to comprehending 
speakers as making assertions may be understood as a form of evidence. (I am aware that some (e.g., Moran 
2005; 2018) think that assertions should not strictly speaking be understood in terms of evidence. But I take it that 
their use of the term ‘evidence’ is considerably narrower than mine. As such, in real terms, I am not in opposition 
to such positions.) Anyway, my meaning should become clear as we work through the chapter. 




Essentially, the problem is this. It seems that knowledge must be by definition infallible. 
However, if it is claimed that an individual knows that p, and yet it is also granted that said 
individual cannot eliminate a certain possibility in which not-p, it seems that individual does 
not know that p, after all. In other words, speaking of fallible knowledge, of knowledge 
despite uneliminated possibilities of error, sounds contradictory. Lewis pitches this as a 
dilemma: 
 
[W]e know a lot; knowledge must be infallible; yet we have fallible knowledge or 
none (or next to none). We are caught between the rock of fallibilism and the 
whirlpool of skepticism. Both are mad! (550) 
 
He attempts to resolve this dilemma by employing both relevant alternatives theory and 
contextualism, granting the infallibilist the condition that knowledge requires the 
elimination of every relevant alternative but construing this condition in a context-sensitive 
way, whereby sceptical possibilities are ordinarily irrelevant. The idea behind this is that, in 
‘ordinary contexts’, we do not consider sceptical possibilities and so these possibilities are 
‘properly ignored’, and, as such, we have knowledge. But, in ‘extraordinary contexts’, when 
sceptical possibilities come to our attention and so are not ‘properly ignored’, we do not 
have knowledge. He writes: 
 
Maybe epistemology is the culprit. Maybe this extraordinary pastime robs us of our 
knowledge. Maybe we do know a lot in daily life; but maybe when we look hard at 
our knowledge, it goes away. But only when we look at it harder than the sane ever 
do in daily life; only when we let our paranoid fantasies rip. That is when we are 
forced to admit that there always are uneliminated possibilities of error, so that we 
have fallible knowledge or none. (Ibid.) 
 
Strictly speaking, then, Lewis offers an account of knowledge ascriptions. That is, he does not 
offer an account of knowledge as such, i.e., when S knows that p, but rather an account of 
sentences that ascribe knowledge, i.e., when ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are true. 




sensitive term, such that a sentence containing it will express distinct propositions in 
different conversational contexts. So, when he says that epistemology robs us of our 
knowledge, what he means is that engagement in epistemology can create a type of 
extraordinary context in which ‘S knows that p’ is false when it would otherwise be true in 
an ordinary context. With this, Lewis offers his relevant alternatives theory for knowledge 
ascriptions: 
 
A subject S satisfies ‘S knows that p’ in context C if and only if S’s evidence 
eliminates every not-p possibility, except for those that are properly ignored in C.81 
 
He then combines his relevant alternatives theory with a detailed account of contextualism, 
which consists of a set of rules designed to show when a possibility in a context is or is not 
‘properly ignored’, and thus determine the relevant possibilities in that context. His rules are 
as follows: 
 
Rule of actuality: a possibility that actually obtains for the subject is always relevant 
and thus not properly ignored. 
 
Rule of belief: a possibility that the subject believes or should believe obtains is 
always relevant and thus not properly ignored. 
 
Rule of resemblance: any possibility that saliently resembles a relevant possibility 
(made relevant by any rule other than the rule of resemblance itself) is always 
relevant and thus not properly ignored. 
 
Rule of attention: any possibility that is being attended to is always relevant and thus 








Rule of reliability: possibilities concerning errors in reliable processes are defeasibly 
irrelevant and thus (properly) ignorable. 
 
Rule of method: possibilities concerning errors in inference are defeasibly irrelevant 
and thus (properly) ignorable. 
 
Rule of conservatism: possibilities that are normally ignored are defeasibly irrelevant 
and thus (properly) ignorable. (554–560)82 
 
To clarify, the idea behind the distinction between eliminating a possibility and (properly) 
ignoring a possibility is this. Although an individual’s evidence may not eliminate a certain 
possibility, the context may still make such a possibility ignorable. That is, although a certain 
possibility will be left uneliminated by an individual’s evidence, it does not need to be 
eliminated by their evidence, because the context is such that it never really figures as a 
possibility in the first place. Indeed, some possibilities never can be eliminated by an 
individual’s evidence, only ignored. Notice that the notion of eliminating, unlike the notion 
of ignoring, is conceptually tied to the notion of evidence. That is, it is in virtue of an 
individual’s evidence that possibilities are eliminated, whereas no evidence is needed to 
ignore possibilities. Cases of properly ignoring, then, are those cases in which a possibility is 
ignored in line with Lewis’s rules. As an illustration, consider the following from Lewis: 
 
What (non-circular) argument supports our reliance on perception […]? My visual 
experience, for instance, depends causally on the scene before my eyes, and what I 
believe about the scene before my eyes depends in turn on my visual experience. 
Each dependence covers a wide and varied range of alternatives. Of course, it is 
possible to hallucinate – even to hallucinate in such a way that all my perceptual 
 
 
82 Admittedly, there may be questions and apparent problems which arise for Lewis’s rules, but I do not address 





experience and memory would be just as they actually are. That possibility never can 
be eliminated. But it can be ignored. And if it is properly ignored – as it mostly is – 
then vision gives me knowledge. (558) 
 
Lewis is referring here to the well-known idea that there can be no non-circular confirmation 
of reliability. However, he does not view this as a vicious circularity, but rather as a 
legitimate form of epistemic bootstrapping. Thus, we can see his thinking behind the rule of 
reliability and the rule of method: 
 
Within limits, we are entitled to take [reliable processes] for granted. We may 
properly presuppose that they work without a glitch in the case under consideration. 
Defeasibly – very defeasibly! – a possibility in which they fail may properly be 
ignored […] We do not, of course, presuppose that nowhere ever is there a failure of, 
say, vision. The general presupposition that vision is reliable consists, rather, of a 
standing disposition to presuppose, concerning whatever particular case may be 
under consideration, that we have no failure in that case. (Ibid.) 
 
In sum, Lewis’s account of knowledge ascriptions is the result of conjoining his relevant 
alternatives theory with his contextualism, as follows: 
 
A subject S satisfies ‘S knows that p’ in context C if and only if S’s evidence 
eliminates every not-p possibility, except for those that are properly ignored in C, 
where the relevance of a possibility in C is determined by all and only the rules of 
actuality, belief, resemblance, reliability, method, conservatism, and attention.  
 
I think that Lewis’s picture is fundamentally correct. However, two brief comments are in 
order. First, Lewis does not think that belief is required to satisfy ‘S knows that p’. His 
reason for this is based on a case which purports to show that a timid student who knows 
the answer to a teacher’s question but has no confidence that they are right does not believe 
what they know. Armstrong (1973), however, suggests a different interpretation of the case, 




do not know or believe that they know and believe the answer to the teacher’s question. 
Armstrong’s interpretation not only makes better sense of the timid student case but also 
safeguards the intuitive thought that belief is required to satisfy ‘S knows that p’. 
Accordingly, I amend Lewis’s picture to include a belief condition.83 Second, Lewis does not 
think that justification is required to satisfy ‘S knows that p’. The notion of justification he 
rejects, however, is that of an internalist nature, according to which an individual must have 
access to what supports their belief in order to have knowledge, which may involve the 
individual being aware (or capable of being aware) of positive reasons that make their belief 
rational or being able to provide positive reasons for their belief. Given my reliabilist 
sensibilities, I agree with Lewis that justification of this nature is not necessary for 
knowledge. Nonetheless, we may still understand Lewis as thinking that a reliabilist 
conception of justification, or ‘warrant’, is the mark of knowledge, since this does not 
necessarily involve the individual being aware (or capable of being aware) of certain facts 
that make their belief that p rational or being able to provide reasons for their belief that p.84 
With this laid out, I propose the following:  
 
‘S knows that p’ is true in context C iff: 
 
(i) S believes that p 
(ii) S’s belief that p is formed in a reliable way, and 
(iii) S’s evidence eliminates every not-p possibility, except for those not-p possibilities 
that are properly ignored in C, where the relevance of a possibility in C is determined 
by all and only the rules of actuality, belief, resemblance, reliability, method, 
conservatism, and attention.85 
 
 
83 Note, Blome-Tilman (2014) and Ichikawa (2017) both add a belief condition to their respective versions of 
Lewis’s contextualism. 
84 Following Mellor (1988), I use ‘warrant’ instead of ‘justification’. ‘Warrant’, unlike ‘justification’, does not have 
strong internalist connotations, which fits better with my externalist sensibilities.  
85 Although I think that Lewis’s contextualism is fundamentally correct, my account of assertion does not depend 




Now, there is of course a lot more to say in filling out and defending my general 
epistemological framework. However, that is not my aim here. I am merely marking out in 
broad strokes my general epistemological commitments. What is important to note, though, 
is that since I think knowledge in general is the product of forming beliefs through reliable 
processes, I take assertion to be just another instance of that. And I think there are 
epistemologically significant differences in the ways in which that reliability can be realised 
by means of assertion alone, as I mentioned n the previous chapter (§3.2): 
 
• It is possible for a hearer to come to know what a speaker asserts by treating the 
speaker’s assertion in much the same way that we treat many other empirical 
findings as sources of knowledge. That is, a hearer can observe the fact that a speaker 
made an assertion and, against their own background knowledge or beliefs, exercise 
their reason to make inferences as to whether what is asserted is true reliably. 
 
• It is possible for a hearer to come to know what a speaker asserts by treating the 
speaker themselves in much the same way that we treat mechanical instruments as 
sources of knowledge, such as thermometers or fuel gauges. That is, a hearer can 
assume a speaker is reliable in what they assert given that the speaker is situated 
such that they would not easily have asserted a falsehood on that occasion. 
 
• It is possible for a hearer to come to know what a speaker asserts in virtue of the 
modal profile of the case. That is, a hearer can reliably form a belief based on a 
 
 
argument for Lewis’s contextualism as such, though if it can be shown to function as one, that is fine with me. 
The key point is this: thinking in terms of Lewis’s notions of eliminating possibilities and (properly) ignoring 
possibilities – and understanding these notions in terms of the rules that he provides – is helpful for articulating 
my account of assertion. It is of course possible, however, to adopt Lewis’s notions of eliminating possibilities 
and (properly) ignoring possibilities – and understanding these notions in terms of the rules (or at least most of 
the rules) that he provides – without endorsing his contextualism. In other words, they are in principle available 
to the subject-sensitive invariantist and the classical invariantist as well. So, if someone wishes to endorse my 




speaker’s assertion because said belief could not easily have been false under the 
circumstances the hearer happens to be in. 
 
However, as I said, there is one particular way in which that reliability can be realised by 
means of assertion alone which I think illuminates the speech act, as follows:86   
 
• It is possible for a hearer to come to know what a speaker asserts by means of 
knowledge transmission. That is, a speaker’s knowledge that p may become a 
hearer’s knowledge that p (i.e., the hearer’s knowledge that p may be grounded upon 
the speaker’s knowledge that p), in virtue of the fact that the reason why the speaker 
asserted that p is that the speaker knows that p, and whereby the content so asserted, 
p, comes to be known by the hearer by way of the hearer believing the speaker 
themselves. 
 
With my general epistemological framework set out, I am now ready to introduce Grice’s 
framework of communication, with which I will construct my account of the conversational 
dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges generally. I will then use this to 
construct my account of the nature of the interpersonal relation at play in cases of 
knowledge transmission specifically. This, in turn, will provide us with a fully developed 
view of knowledge transmission – a view of knowledge transmission which is consistent 
with anti-reductionism as the position is traditionally construed – in light of which I can 







86 Although I do not pursue it here, by constructing a theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum in light 
of knowledge transmission, it is likely that we will come to better understand cases in which reliability is realised 




4.2. Grice’s Framework of Communication  
 
Grice’s (1957; 1969; 1975; 1989) work in the philosophy of language may be seen as 
comprising two unrelated theories: the ‘theory of meaning’ and the ‘theory of conversation’. 
The former traditionally concerns whether sentence-meaning and word-meaning within a 
language can be analysed in terms of what a speaker means on an occasion of use, where 
what a speaker means on an occasion of use is analysed in terms of the speaker’s intentions 
(what Grice calls ‘non-natural meaning’). The latter traditionally concerns the way in which 
a speaker may mean something over and above what they have uttered in virtue of 
exploiting certain communicative standards (what Grice calls ‘implicature’). I, however, do 
not align myself with the view that these two theories are unrelated. My sympathies lie with 
Neale (1992) on this point: 
 
It is at least arguable that the Theory of Conversation is a component of the Theory of 
Meaning. And even if this interpretation is resisted, it is undeniable that the theories 
are mutually informative and supportive, and that they are of more philosophical, 
linguistic, and historical interest if the temptation is resisted to discuss them in 
isolation from one another. (512) 
 
As I see it, although Grice’s theory of meaning is traditionally concerned with developing a 
so-called ‘intention-based semantics’, and although his theory of conversation is 
traditionally concerned with elucidating the so-called ‘semantic/pragmatic distinction’, the 
interest and importance of these theories is not exhausted by such concerns. What Grice 
provides us with, when we unite his theory of meaning with his theory of conversation, is a 
framework of communication.  
 
The mark of successful communication is a reciprocal relationship between the speaker and 
the hearer, where each are aware of certain psychological states in the other. Grice’s 




of case, one in which a speaker informs a hearer of the facts, namely, ‘telling’.87 According to 
him, the relevant psychological states, in cases of telling, are beliefs and intentions. 
Specifically, the speaker exercises intentions to influence the hearer’s beliefs in a certain way. 
He illustrates this with what I will call the ‘telling mechanism’: 
 
Telling mechanism: A intends that B acquire a belief that p on the basis of B 
recognising A’s intention that B acquire a belief that p.88 
 
The idea is that in order to comprehend a speaker’s act of telling the hearer must assume 
that the speaker satisfies this mechanism. Furthermore, assuming that the speaker satisfies 
this mechanism involves employing the expectation that the speaker adheres to certain 
standards which hold during our communicative exchanges generally.89 Grice calls this the 
‘co-operative principle’: 
 
Co-operative principle: Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 




87 Grice (1957: 44) writes: ‘What we want to find is the difference between, for example, ‘deliberately and openly 
letting someone know’ and ‘telling’ and between ‘getting someone to think’ and ‘telling’’. 
88 See Grice (1957). Note, Grice later changes his mind about the aim of the intention. He writes:  
 
I wish to regard the M-intended effect common to indicative-type utterances as being, not that the 
hearer should believe something (though there is frequently an ulterior intention to that effect) but that 
the hearer should think that the utterer believes something. (1989: 123) 
 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter (§2.5), I think this is the wrong way to go. 
89 For a helpful exposition of Grice’s framework of communication as well an interesting philosophical treatment 
of the ways in which speakers deliberately engage in unsuccessful communication, see Bourne and Caddick 





He proposes that four categories of maxims fall within this general principle – ‘quality’, 
‘quantity’, ‘relation’, and ‘manner’ – under which fall certain maxims: 
 








• Do not say what you believe to be false. 
• Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
 
Maxims of quantity 
 
• Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). 
• Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
 
Maxims of relation 
 
• Be relevant. 
 












• Avoid obscurity of expression. 
• Avoid ambiguity. 
• Be brief. 
• Be orderly. (26–27) 
 
Although the co-operative principle and maxim categories hold during our communicative 
exchanges generally, the maxims themselves do not, since Grice formulates these with a 
specific type of communicative exchange in mind: 
 
The conversational maxims […] are specially connected (I hope) with the particular 
purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange) is adapted to serve and is primarily 
employed to serve. I have stated my maxims as if this purpose were a maximally 
effective exchange of information; this specification is, of course, too narrow, and the 
scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or 
directing the actions of others. (Grice 1989: 28 – emphasis added) 
 
A maximally effective exchange of information is a communicative exchange the purpose or 
direction of which is to inform each other of the facts, by means of the telling mechanism. 
This reveals itself when we look more closely at the maxims of quality in particular: 
 












• Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
 
Notice that the supermaxim features the term ‘contribution’, and the specific maxims feature 
the term ‘say’. (By unpacking Grice’s notion of ‘saying’ first, his notion of a ‘contribution’ 
will become clearer.) For Grice, ‘saying’ is a technical term: 
 
In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be 
closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has 
uttered. (25) 
 
Importantly, however, he adds:  
 
I want to say that (1) “U (utterer) said that p” entails (2) “U did something x by which 
U [non-naturally] meant that p”. (87) 
 
For Grice, then, when a speaker says that p, not only do they make an utterance which 
expresses p, but, in virtue of making said utterance, they intend that the hearer acquire a 
belief that p on the basis of the hearer recognising the speaker’s intention that the hearer 
acquire a belief that p. In other words, his notion of saying incorporates his telling 
mechanism. His notion of saying, therefore, is more complex than Austin’s, in that, it does 
not merely denote a locution but denotes an illocution built on top of a locution.90 Neale 
(1992) is instructive here: 
 
Anyone who reads 'Logic and Conversation' and 'Further Notes' in isolation from the 
rest of the William James Lectures, is almost certain to miss the relationship that 
 
 
90 Much has been said about Grice’s notion of ‘saying’, both with respect to his account of proposition expression 
and his claim that saying necessarily involves telling. The former is generally criticised for being insufficient, 
with the issue being that ‘what is said’ cannot alone be established by reference to the conventional meaning of 
the words (the sentence) uttered. The latter is generally criticised for being unnecessarily strong, with the issue 




Grice sees between utterers' intentions and what is said. For something to be (part of) 
what U says on a particular occasion, it must also be (part of) what U meant, i.e., it 
must be backed by a complex intention of the sort that forms the backbone of Grice's 
Theory of Meaning. If U utters the sentence “Bill is an honest man” ironically, on 
Grice's account U will not have said that Bill is an honest man: U will have made as if 
to say that Bill is an honest man. (523) 
 
Following this, Grice claims that, if a speaker makes an utterance which is seemingly 
uncooperative and does so openly (i.e., by ‘exploiting’ the conversational maxims), then the 
speaker may be understood as telling the hearer something (i.e., satisfying the telling 
mechanism) without actually ‘saying’ it, but rather by ‘implicating’ it. The idea is that what a 
speaker implicates is whatever is needed to reconcile the speaker’s apparent 
uncooperativeness with the expectation that they are in fact cooperative. This can be 
illustrated using Grice’s well-known referee example. Suppose a referee writes a reference 
for a candidate for an academic position but only utters, ‘He has very neat handwriting’. 
Given that the reference is supposed to focus on academic expertise, the information that the 
referee provides seems to be irrelevant, as well uninformative. In order to reconcile the 
speaker’s utterance with the maxims of relation and the maxims of quantity, the hearer 
expects that the referee is being as relevant and as informative as it is possible to be within 
the remit of the task, which, in this case, is to provide positive information about the 
candidate. So, the hearer calculates that the referee has used their utterance of ‘He has very 
neat handwriting’ to implicate that the candidate is not suitable for the position.91 Notice, 
 
 
91 Grice introduces three different types of implicature as part of his framework of communication: 
‘conversational implicature’, ‘conventional implicature’, and ‘scalar implicature’. In this thesis, I only discuss 
conversational implicature. (Thus, from now on, whenever I use the term ‘implicature’, I should be understood 
as referring to conversational implicatures only.) Note, one of the key features of conversational implicatures is 
that they can be ‘cancelled’. This is best explained by example. Suppose again that the referee writes, ‘He has 
very neat handwriting’. However, suppose further that the referee goes on to add, ‘which aids engagement with 
his innovative philosophical ideas’. In this case, the implicature that the candidate is not suitable is cancelled, 




that both Grice’s notion of ‘saying’ and his notion of ‘implicating’ incorporate his telling 
mechanism, as Neale observes: 
 
A necessary condition on conversational implicatures […] is that they are intended. 
[W]hat U implicates is part of what U means, and […] what U means is determined 
by U's communicative intentions. A hearer may think that, by saying that p, U has 
conversationally implicated that q […] But if U did not intend the implication in 
question it will not count as a conversational implicature. Grice himself was explicit 
about it as far back as ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’ at p. 130 of the 1961 version. 
(1992: 528) 
 
As such, the co-operative principle, along with the maxims that fall within it, represent the 
standards that hearers expect of speakers when in engaged in a maximally effective 
exchange of information, whether their ‘contribution’ is one of saying or implicating. As 
Grice says: 
 
[W]hat is implicated is what it is required that one assume a speaker to think in order 
to preserve the assumption that that he is observing the Cooperative Principle (and 
perhaps some conversational maxims as well), if not at the level of what is said, at least 
at the level of what is implicated. (1989: 86 – emphasis added) 
 
Now, although I think Grice’s framework of communication is best placed to help undertake 
our ambitious task, there are three immediate problems that arise for Grice’s framework of 
communication. I call them the ‘inaccurateness problem’, the ‘incompleteness problem’, and 
the ‘obscureness problem’. 92 I offer solutions to each of these problems in §4.3.1, §4.3.2, and 
 
 
referee has provided information as to why the candidate’s handwriting is relevant. (Note, this creative example 
of the way in which the referee may cancel their implicature is borrowed from Bourne & Caddick Bourne (2018: 
154).) For more on Grice’s account of cancelling, see his (1975: 39). 
92 I appreciate there may be other potential problems with Grice’s framework of communication, but I do not 




§4.3.3., respectively. But let us take a moment to acquaint ourselves with these three 
problems, in anticipation of the solutions to come. 
 
4.2.1. The Inaccurateness Problem 
 
Although the maxims of quality are formulated in light of the telling mechanism, they seem 
to capture inaccurately the standards that hearers expect of speakers when engaged in a 
communicative exchange the purpose and direction of which is to inform each other of the 
facts. The super maxim does not require truth of the speaker but requires merely that the 
speaker only try to contribute the truth, which is consistent with the contribution being false. 
The first specific maxim requires merely that the speaker only not disbelieve what they say, 
which is consistent with the speaker being agnostic about what they say. And the second 
specific maxim requires that the speaker only say what they have adequate evidence for, which 
is rather vague. Gazdar (1979), dissatisfied with Grice’s formulation of the maxims of 
quality, writes: 
 
Any attempt to formalise this maxim as it stands runs into three sets of problems. 
Those connected with the notion of “truth,” those connected with the logic of belief, 
and those involved in the nature of “adequate evidence.” Note, however, that these 
three sets of problems are just those that crop up in the philosophical debate over the 
status of knowledge and the possibility of equating knowledge with justified true 
belief. (47) 
 
Not wishing to engage with the debate over the status of knowledge and the possibility of 
equating knowledge with justified true belief, Gazdar simply stipulates that Grice’s maxims 
of quality should be reformulated into the following single maxim: 
 
The Maxim of Quality: Say only that which you know. (48) 
 
Benton (2016), however, argues that Grice makes important connections between the 




core requirement. He attempts to show this by drawing on the following example from 
Grice: 
 
A: Where does C live? 
B: Somewhere in the south of France. 
 
This infringement of the first maxim of Quantity [make your contribution as 
informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)] can be 
explained only by the supposition that B is aware that to be more informative would 
be to say something that infringed the second maxim of Quality, “Don’t say what 
you lack adequate evidence for,” so B implicates that he does not know in which town 
C lives. (Grice 1989: 32–33 – emphasis Benton’s) 
 
According to Benton, B’s response is best explained by B’s sensitivity to a requirement of 
knowledge. That is, he thinks it is because B does not know exactly where C lives, and 
realises this, that C opts for the hedged claim. He maintains that by invoking B’s lack-of-
knowledge implicature, Grice really suggests that knowledge, and not some weaker 
epistemic position, is intimately connected to whether a speaker is in a position to make a 
contribution.  
 
Benton raises a further clash between the maxims of quantity and the maxims of quality in 
another attempt to show that knowledge is the core requirement of the maxims of quality. 
He invites us to consider cases in which a question is asked directly about whether a certain 
proposition, p, is true. As he observes, if an individual feels that they cannot answer directly 
in such circumstances, they will often reply, ‘I do not know’. Benton then appeals to a series 
of unpublished papers by Grice in which he regards the ‘I do not know’ response as 
conforming to the maxims of quality at the expense of violating the maxims of quantity, due 
to providing too little information.93 Benton argues that if the maxims of quality do not 
 
 




demand knowledge, it is hard to see how the ‘I do not know’ response could be perceived to 
be a clash between the requirements of the maxims of quantity and the maxims of quality. 
Moreover, he argues that if we took the maxims of quality to be lax enough to permit non-
known contributions, then the ‘I do not know’ reply would seem to flout the maxims of 
relation as well, since it would be irrelevant and unhelpful for an individual to reply that 
they do not know. But, as he points out, when prompted by questions the answer to which 
an individual does not know (or takes themselves not to know), we do not judge the ‘I do 
not know’ response as irrelevant or unhelpful. Benton expands on this point by drawing on 
Turri (2010), who maintains that prompting questions, ‘Do you know whether p?’ and ‘is p?’, 
are taken to be practically interchangeable in everyday conversation. According to Benton, 
this suggests something important about the relation of the maxims of quality to our 
standard expectations of what counts as an appropriate response to a prompting question. 
Specifically, he claims that if the maxims of quality enjoin us to contribute only what we 
know, we would expect asking whether p, and asking whether someone knows that p, to be 
practically interchangeable, since individuals answer each question appropriately, and 
felicitously, with a contribution that p just in case they know that p. Relatedly, he argues that 
weaker prompts, ‘Do you have good reason to think p?’ and ‘Do you have any idea whether 
p?’, are not practically interchangeable with ‘Is p?’, which, he thinks, suggests that the 
maxims of quality demand something stronger than merely having good reasons or some 
evidence to believe that p. He concludes once more that knowledge, and not some weaker 
epistemic standard, is intimately connected to whether a speaker is in a position to 
contribute.  
 
Benton’s arguments go some way towards providing evidence that the most plausible 
interpretation of Grice’s maxims of quality is that they require knowledge, even if Grice does 
not explicitly endorse this himself. However, such evidence is hardly definitive, nor does it 
take us much further than what Grice thought. What we need is a principled explanation – a 
rationale – for why the maxims of quality are best understood in terms of requiring 






4.2.2. The Incompleteness Problem 
 
According to Grice, in cases of telling, the speaker exercises intentions to influence the 
hearer’s beliefs in a certain way, namely, the speaker intends that the hearer acquire a belief 
that p on the basis of the hearer recognising the speaker’s intention that the hearer acquire a 
belief that p. But how exactly does the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s intention 
influence the hearer’s beliefs? Grice writes: 
 
[T]he intended effect must be something which in some sense is within the control of 
the audience, or that in some sense of ‘reason’ the recognition of intention behind 
[the utterance] is for the audience a reason and not merely a cause. (1957: 385) 
 
As Ross (1986) explains, Grice wants us to think of the hearer as having been furnished with 
a ‘reason’ in something more like the sense in which an individual has been provided with a 
motive for adopting a certain course of action. However, since Grice does not elaborate on 
this point, it is not easy to see what exactly he has in mind. Ross agrees with Grice that a 
hearer’s response to what is communicated reflects a sensitivity to the speaker’s intentions, 
but he suggests that the real motivation a hearer possesses for believing what is told stems 
from the speaker assuming responsibility for the truth of what is told.94 Unfortunately, it is 
not clear how exactly this solves the problem. To see why, consider the following from 
Lackey (2008): 
 
[S]uppose that I walk up to an airplane mechanic and say, “I will take responsibility 
for the proper functioning of this aircraft.” Given that I know nothing about the 
mechanics of aircrafts, my words would rightly be regarded as hollow even if said 








Lackey’s point is not how an assumption of responsibility for the truth is connected to the 
truth, but whether it has a proper connection to the truth at all. If, as Ross suggests, the 
motivation a hearer possesses for believing what is told stems directly from the speaker’s 
responsibility for the truth of what is told, then when a speaker takes responsibility for the 
truth of what is told, even when a speaker communicates something false and the hearer 
knows this, the hearer nevertheless possesses a motivation for believing what they are told. 
Not only is this an unattractive result, but it also raises another question: in virtue of what 
precisely does the speaker assume responsibility for the truth of what is told? A solution to 
the incompleteness problem is still needed.  
 
4.2.3. The Obscureness Problem 
 
For convenience, Grice proposes that the conversational maxims which fall within the 
cooperative principle hold an equal status among one another. However, he acknowledges 
that the maxims of quality may have a special status: 
 
It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency 
than is the observance of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue 
prolixity would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has 
something he believes to be false. Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at 
least the first [specific] maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a 
scheme of the kind I am constructing; other maxims come into operation only on the 
assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied. While this may be correct, so far 
as the generation of implicatures is concerned it seems to play a role not totally 
different from the other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to 
treat it as a member of the list of maxims. (Grice 1989: 27) 
 
Grice’s claim is not that the first specific maxim of quality is merely more important than the 




the status of the first specific maxim of quality? Grice does not offer an answer. However, 
Benton attempts to provide us with one.95  
 
Benton agrees with Grice that the cooperative principle is a general principle, whereas the 
first specific maxim of quality enjoys a distinctive status among the other conversational 
maxims that fall within it.96 For him, the fact that Grice claims that the first specific maxim of 
quality might best be given a class by itself, and that the other conversational maxims 
operate only on the assumption that it is satisfied, is the first step toward realising that it is 
the ‘epistemic demands’ of the first specific maxim of quality in particular that explain why 
it takes priority over the demands of other conversational maxims. Moreover, he observes 
that there is a prima facie irrelevance of the first specific maxim of quality with respect to 
speech acts such as questions and imperatives. Taking these two points together, he claims 
that the first specific maxim of quality is applicable to only a certain type of speech act, 
namely, assertion.97 He draws on the following passage from Grice to bolster this idea: 
 
The maxims do not seem to be coordinate. The [first specific] maxim of Quality, 
enjoining the provision of contributions which are genuine rather than spurious 
(truthful rather than mendacious), does not seem to be just one among a number of 
recipes for producing contributions; it seems rather to spell out the difference 
between something’s being, and (strictly speaking) failing to be, any kind of 
 
 
95 Benton, like many others, seems to treat Grice’s work in the philosophy of language as comprising two 
unrelated theories (i.e., the ‘theory of meaning’ and the ‘theory of conversation’), since he talks about the co-
operative principle and conversational maxims with no mention of the telling mechanism. 
96 Benton does not always make it entirely clear whether he is talking about the super-maxim of quality, the first 
or second specific maxim of quality, or some combination. I do my best to clarify this for the reader.  
97 Reformulated for clarity from Benton (2016: 686– 687). Note, Benton thinks that the first specific maxim of 




contribution at all. False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is 
not information. (1989: 371) 98 
 
Benton maintains that we need not take the last line of Grice’s passage literally but that we 
can nonetheless appreciate Grice’s key point, which, according to him, is not only that the 
first specific maxim of quality is applicable to only a certain type of speech act (i.e., 
assertion), but that when a speaker makes as if to adhere to the first specific maxim of 
quality, when they in fact do not, they are thereby not being cooperative.99 Here, Benton 
introduces his own technical term, ‘respect’: 
 
[O]ne […] respects a maxim when exploiting it to conversationally implicate, and one 
also trivially respects it when engaging in other speech acts, such as asking a 
question’. (2016: 12) 
 
His rationale for introducing the notion of ‘respect’ is due to Grice’s remark that the other 
conversational maxims come into operation only on the assumption that the first specific 
maxim of quality is satisfied. According to Benton, Grice does not mean to rule out cases in 
which one conversationally implicates by exploiting a maxim, since working out 
implicatures depends on the other maxims being operative. With this set out, Benton 
formulates an argument to try and show that the status of the first specific maxim of quality 
is such that it is not dependent on the cooperative principle in the way that the other 




98 As far as I am aware, this is the only time in Grice’s work where he says, ‘the maxim of Quality’. It is not 
entirely clear what he is referring to, whether it is the super-maxim, one of the first or second specific maxims, or 
some combination of them. Thank you to Deirdre Wilson (personal correspondence) for bringing this to my 
attention.  




Premise 1: If the first specific maxim of quality is not presumed (by the audience) 
to be respected (by the speaker), then the other maxims do not 
operate. 
Premise 2: If the other maxims do not operate, the cooperative principle cannot 
be operative. 
Conclusion: Unless the first specific maxim of quality is presumed (by the 
audience) to be respected (by the speaker), the cooperative principle 
cannot be operative.100 
 
The problem with Benton’s argument, however, is that it does not square with the 
conversational evidence. That is, inferences that have the marks of calculating implicatures 
are often made by hearers even when they recognise that the speaker does not satisfy (or 
‘respect’) the first specific maxim of quality. Stokke (2016) demonstrates this with the 
following case: 
 
Thelma and Louise 
 
Thelma attempts to deceive Louise about the fact that she is OK to drive. However, 
Louise knows that Thelma has been drinking (and thus knows that she is not OK to 
drive), but Thelma does not know that Louise knows this.  
 
Louise: Are you OK to drive?  
Thelma: I haven’t been drinking. (450) 
 
Louise takes Thelma as having implicated that she is OK to drive by means of exploiting the 
maxim of relation in uttering that she has not been drinking, yet Louise knows that Thelma 
is nonetheless violating the first specific maxim of quality. (Of course, Thelma thinks that 
 
 
100 Note, this seems to show that ‘respecting’ the first specific maxim of quality is conditional on the cooperative 




Louise will take her as satisfying (or ‘respecting’) the first specific maxim of quality to 
generate the implicature in question.) Since the implicature is still calculated by Louise, it is 
not the case that if the maxim of quality is not presumed (by the audience) to be respected 
(by the speaker), then the other maxims do not operate – the maxim of relation is plainly in 
operation, after all. Therefore, premise 1 of Benton’s argument is false. A solution to the 
obscureness problem is still needed.  
 
4.3. Positive Proposal 
 
With my epistemological commitments and Grice’s framework of communication set out, I 
am almost ready to construct my novel theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, 
(AE). In order to do this, however, I must construct an account of the conversational 
dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges generally. I will then this use to 
construct an account of the nature of the interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge 
transmission specifically. This, in turn, will provide us with a fully developed view of 
knowledge transmission – a view of knowledge transmission which is consistent with anti-
reductionism as the position is traditionally construed – in light of which I can construct my 
theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum. Given the ambitiousness of this task, it 
is important I take things slowly. Let us start, then, by fleshing out just the initial details of 
our candidate explicatum, (AE): 
 
(AE) Essentially, assertion is a communicative act which involves a speaker saying 
that p with the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p. 
 
As I see it, Grice’s notion of saying is best construed as delineating the speech act of 
assertion as I understand it.101 That is, (AE) should be fleshed out in the following way. 
Essentially, assertion is when a speaker says that p (in the Austinian sense (see §2.1)) with 
 
 





the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p on the basis of the hearer recognising 
their intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p. On my view, then, comprehending a 
speaker as making an assertion involves assuming that they satisfy Grice’s telling 
mechanism. Furthermore, assuming that the speaker satisfies the telling mechanism 
involves employing the expectation that the speaker adheres to certain standards which 
hold during our communicative exchanges generally, within which fall the conversational 
maxims specific to maximally effective exchanges of information.102 Importantly, though, 
since a maximally effective exchange of information just is a communicative exchange the 
purpose or direction of which is to inform each other of the facts by means of the telling 
mechanism, I think such communicative exchanges are best construed as delineating 
communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of which is to transmit knowledge 
specifically. Hopefully, so far so good. 
 
Having fleshed out the initial details of our candidate explicatum, I will now move on to 
construct my account of the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative 
exchanges generally. I will then use this to construct my account of the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge transmission specifically. This, in turn, 
will provide us with a fully developed view of knowledge transmission – a view of 
knowledge transmission which is consistent with anti-reductionism as it is traditionally 
construed – in light of which I can finalise the construction of my theoretical elaboration of 
our candidate explicatum. Doing all of this, though, involves understanding Grice’s 
communicative standards (i.e., the cooperative principle and the maxims that fall within it) 




102 Although I employ Grice’s framework to articulate my account of assertion, my aim here is not to provide a 
piece of scholarly work on Grice’s thought. Rather, I interpret and develop Grice’s framework in a way that 
makes sense to me, which means that I may sometimes diverge from Grice’s thought. As such, my account of 




Although Grice’s communicative standards might typically be understood in terms of rules 
(or norms), I do not understand them in this way. Instead, I think they are best understood 
in terms of the mutual expectations that speakers and hearers have about their 
contributions. That is, I think the cooperative principle encapsulates the expectations that 
speakers and hearers expect each other to expect each other to have about their 
contributions when engaged in communicative exchanges generally, and I think the 
cooperative principle and conversational maxims together encapsulate the expectations that 
speakers and hearers expect each other to expect each other to have about their 
contributions when engaged in communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of which 
is to transmit knowledge specifically.103 That is not all, though. Crucially, I think it is the 
mutual expectations that speakers and hearers have about their contributions which 
determine Grice’s communicative standards, rather than the other way around. Although 
our projects are significantly different, Goldberg (2018) endorses a view which is kindred in 
spirit, namely, a view according to which social and epistemic standards generally are 
determined by the social and epistemic expectations we have of each other, rather than the 
other way around. He captures this idea neatly in what he calls his ‘order-of-explanation 
thesis’. I recast it here, in my own terms, for my own purposes: 
 
It is natural to think that our communicative standards are themselves independent 
of our mutual expectations of each other as communicators. That is, it is natural to 
think that such communicative standards rationalise or justify our mutual 
expectations of each other as communicators. According to this picture, we mutually 
expect individuals to conform to these communicative standards, precisely because 
these are the communicative standards. We might cast this picture in terms of an 
order-of-explanation thesis of the sort that is familiar from the Euthyphro dialogue: 
mutually we expect as much from individuals as communicators because these are the 
communicative standards. I propose to depart from this way of thinking on this point, 
 
 
103 Thank you to Craig Bourne and Emily Caddick Bourne (personal correspondence) for many helpful 




reversing the order of explanation: our communicative standards are what they are 
because we have mutual expectations of individuals as communicators. In other words, I do 
not regard the communicative standards themselves as independent of our mutual 
expectations, rather our mutual expectations themselves determine our 
communicative standards.104 
 
It will be helpful to explain the source of my inspiration for understanding Grice’s standards 
of communication in the way that I do. The source of my inspiration comes from Lewis’s 
(1969; 1975) work on convention. According to Lewis, conventions are regularities in 
behaviour within a population, established by the mutual expectations and derived from the 
common interests of the individuals within said population. Consider the following 
example: 
 
[S]everal of us are driving on the same winding two-lane roads. It matters little to 
anyone whether he drives in the left lane or the right lane, provided the others do 
likewise. But if some drive in the left lane and some in the right, everyone is in 
danger of collision. So each must choose whether to drive in the left lane or in the 
right lane, according to his expectations about the others: to drive in the left lane if 
most or all of the others do, to drive in the right lane if most or all of the others do. 
(1969: 6) 
 
Lewis calls situations such as this ‘coordination problems’. The idea is that when two or 
more individuals are faced with a coordination problem each must choose one action from 
 
 
104 To emphasise, the idea here is this. Providing an account of communicative standards in terms of rules (or 
norms), especially those with an epistemological dimension, is somewhat mysterious. And so, an account that 
explains them in terms of something which is clear and plain, i.e., expectations, is highly desirable. Indeed, it 
constitutes significant philosophical progress. Note, Goldberg’s original formulation of his order-of-explanation 
thesis may be found in his (2018: 145–189). Importantly, though, unlike Goldberg, who uses ‘expectation’ in the 
normative sense (i.e., expectations about what ought to happen), I use ‘expectation’ in the non-normative sense 




two or more alternative actions, where the outcomes they want to produce or prevent are 
determined jointly by the actions of all the individuals involved, and where the outcome of 
any action an individual might choose depends on their expectations about what the others 
will do. Successful combinations of the individuals’ chosen actions are called ‘equilibria’, i.e., 
combinations in which each individual has done as well as they can, given the actions of the 
other individuals. In the coordination problem above, the common interest is in being able 
to travel as safely as possible, i.e., without colliding. Thus, the two possible equilibrium 
combinations are the regularity that everyone drives in the left lane, or the regularity that 
everyone drives in the right lane. Notably, on Lewis’s picture, explicit agreement is not 
necessary to generate conventions. That is, coordination problems may be solved via 
agreement, salience, or precedent. However, according to Lewis, whatever route individuals 
take in finding a solution to a coordination problem, they are most likely to succeed through 
the agency of a system of suitably concordant mutual expectations. Lewis’s inspiration here 
comes from Schelling’s (1960) work on coordination:  
 
What is necessary is to coordinate predictions, to read the same message in the 
common situation, to identify the one course of action that their expectations of each 
other can converge on. They must “mutually recognise” some unique signal that 
coordinates their expectations of each other. Most situations […] provide some clue 
for coordinating behaviour, some focal point for each person’s expectation of what the 
other expects him to expect to be expected to do. (Schelling 1960: 54–57 – emphasis added) 
 
In a nutshell, Lewis’s account of convention is as follows. A regularity R is a convention in a 
population P if and only if, within P, everyone conforms to R, everyone expects that others 
conform to R, the presence of the expectation that others conform to R serves as the 
explanation for why everyone conforms to R themselves, and everyone prefers general 
conformity to R rather than conformity by all but one. Vitally, for R to be a convention in P it 
cannot be the only possible regularity. That is, there must be at least one alternative 
regularity, R*, which could have perpetuated itself instead of R to realise the common 




feature of Lewis’s account is designed to capture the characteristic arbitrariness of 
conventions.105 
 
Lewis famously uses his account of convention to explain what it is for it to be a convention 
among a population to use some particular language over some alternative language, e.g., 
what it is for it to be a convention among a population to speak English rather than 
Mandarin. He claims that if we look for the fundamental difference in verbal behaviour 
between members of two distinct linguistic communities, we find something which is 
arbitrary but perpetuates itself because of a common interest in communication, which 
derives from a common interest in benefitting from, and in preserving, our ability to control 
each other’s beliefs and actions. His analysis is as follows: 
 
A language £ is used by a population P if and only if there prevails in P a convention 
of truthfulness and trust in £, sustained by an interest in communication.106 
 
While constructing his analysis, however, Lewis poses an objection against it: 
 
Objection: Truthfulness and trust cannot be a convention. What could be the 
alternative to uniform truthfulness – uniform untruthfulness, perhaps? But it seems 
that if such untruthfulness were not intended to deceive, and did not deceive, then it 
too would be truthfulness. (Lewis 1975: 29) 
 
He then provides the following reply to this self-imposed objection: 
 
Reply: The convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust simpliciter. It is 
the regularity of truthfulness and trust in some particular language £. Its alternatives 
 
 
105 Admittedly, Lewis’s picture is slightly more complicated than this. For example, he has further conditions 
which draw on the notion of common knowledge. However, this simplified account will suffice for our purposes.  




are possible regularities of truthfulness and trust in other languages […] There is a 
different regularity that we may call a regularity of truthfulness and trust simpliciter. 
That is the regularity of being truthful and trusting in whichever language is used by 
one's fellows. This regularity neither is a convention nor depends on convention. If 
any language whatever is used by a population P, then a regularity […] of 
truthfulness and trust simpliciter prevails in P. (29–30) 
 
Now, the source of my inspiration for understanding Grice’s communicative standards the 
way that I do is not Lewis’s explanation of what it is for it to be a convention within a 
population to use some particular language over some alternative language, but rather what 
he calls a ‘regularity of truthfulness and trust simpliciter’. As can be seen from the passage 
above, he thinks that the regularity of truthfulness and trust simpliciter is not a convention, 
because it is not arbitrary. That is, there is no alternative regularity which could have 
perpetuated itself instead of truthfulness and trust simpliciter to realise the common interest 
in communicating true information, true information that is relevant to which actions will 
produce desired results, which itself derives from a common interest in benefitting from, 
and in preserving, our ability to control each other’s beliefs and actions. As such, the 
regularity of truthfulness and trust simplicter is best understood as falling under Lewis’s 
related though distinct concept of a ‘demythologised social contract’.107 Lewis maintains that 
a so-called ‘demythologized social contract’ is similar to but not the same as a convention, 
because there is no alternative regularity in behaviour which can realise the common 
interest in the specific aim/outcome the population has in that particular context. And so, it 
is not the case that everyone prefers general conformity rather than conformity by all but 
 
 
107 See Lewis (1969: 88–96; 1975: 30–31). Note, Hobbes (1651) provides us with what is arguably the most 
developed picture of a ‘mythologized’ social contract. He begins by inviting us to consider a primitive 
unstructured order, which he calls the ‘state of nature’. Here, individuals have unlimited natural freedom to 
further their own selfish interests, including the freedom to harm anyone who threatens their own self-
preservation. This thus leads to generalised conflict and instability. He maintains therefore that it is rational for 
individuals to relinquish some of their unlimited natural freedom, so that they may enjoy the benefits that social 




one, as with convention. Instead, everyone prefers general conformity to a certain 
contextually definite state of general nonconformity, i.e., a so-called ‘demythologized state 
of nature’. As such, a so-called ‘demythologized social contract’ is underpinned by a mixture 
of selfish interests, altruistic interests, and interests derived from moral obligation, where 
usually all are present in strength, but where usually any one is enough to sustain it.108 That 
is, individuals do not merely have interests which fit a model of selfish interest, but also 
have non-selfish interests due to the way they have been socialised (at home and/or at 
school) to be helpful, get along, or at least not go out of their way to make things difficult for 
others.109  
 
Having sketched out the source of my inspiration for understanding Grice’s communicative 
standards the way that I do, I can now construct my account of the conversational dynamics 
which underpin communicative exchanges generally. I will then use this to construct my 
account of the nature of the interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge 
transmission specifically. This, in turn, will provide us with a fully developed view of 
knowledge transmission – a view of knowledge transmission which is consistent with anti-
 
 
108 See Lewis (1975: 30).  
109 Note, Lewis does not offer up or draw upon any particular account of trust, but merely remarks that the 
appropriate response to truthfulness for a hearer, i.e., trusting, involves believing the speaker. However, there is 
an account of trust on the market which shores up neatly with Lewis’s picture and which shores up neatly with 
my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum as well, namely, Hawley’s (2012) commitment account of 
trust. On Hawley’s account, to trust someone to do something is to believe that they have a commitment to doing 
it, and to rely upon them to meet that commitment. Accordingly, to distrust someone to do something is to 
believe that they have a commitment to doing it, and yet not rely upon them to meet that commitment. To make 
the account plausible, she uses a very broad notion of commitment. As she says, commitments on her account 
can be implicit or explicit, weighty or trivial, conferred by roles and external circumstances, default or acquired, 
welcome or unwelcome. In particular, though, she maintains that mutual expectations as well as conventions 
give rise to commitment, unless we take steps to disown these. Although I will not say too much more about 
trust, this is the account I am sympathetic to and which readers should have in mind as I work through my 




reductionism as it is traditionally construed – in light of which I can construct my theoretical 
elaboration of our candidate explicatum. Here goes.  
 
As I see it, Gricean cooperation derives from a common interest in communication generally, 
which itself derives from a common interest in benefitting from and preserving the ability to 
control one another’s beliefs and actions. It is preferable to a state in which individuals 
cannot communicate with each other and thus benefit from, and preserve, the ability to 
control one another’s beliefs and actions. And so, it is underpinned by a mixture of selfish 
interests, altruistic interests, as well as interests derived from moral obligation, where 
usually all are present in strength, but where usually any one is enough to sustain it. The 
standard of cooperation itself, however, is determined by the mutual expectation that 
individuals will do all and only that which is required in order to realise the common 
interest in communication. Specifically, it is determined by the mutual expectation that 
individuals will make their contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, 
by the accepted purpose or direction of the communicative exchange in which they are 
engaged. As such, the mutual expectation of cooperation does not merely determine the 
standard of cooperation, it also constitutes the conditions for communication generally. 
Importantly, it is the presence of the mutual expectation of cooperation, engendered 
whenever an individual makes a contribution, which serves as the explanation for why 
individuals conform to the standard of cooperation by default. Why? Not merely because 
there is future gain to be had from conforming (i.e., selfish interests), but because they have 
been socialised (at home and/or at school) to be helpful, get along, or at least not go out of 
their way to make things difficult for others (i.e., altruistic interests and interests derived 
from moral obligation). Of course, if an individual defects, they are liable to experience 
personal hardship for undermining their own integrity and/or receive sanctions. Thus, the 
benefit that an individual might enjoy for being uncooperative must be significant enough to 




others (e.g., the hearer) as well as themselves down and/or receiving sanctions.110 However, 
this is not to say that individuals conform to the standard of cooperation out of fear or 
concern for experiencing personal hardship for undermining their own integrity and/or 
receiving sanctions necessarily. They might conform simply because the thought of 
defecting does not cross their minds. Given that the presence of the mutual expectation of 
cooperation, engendered whenever an individual makes a contribution, serves as the 
explanation for why individuals conform to the standard of cooperation by default, the 
mutual expectation of cooperation itself is a mutual default expectation. That is, individuals 
are not merely psychologically disposed to expect that contributors will do all and only that 
which is required in order to realise the common interest in communication, they are 
entitled (albeit defeasibly) to expect that contributors will do all and only that which is 
required in order to realise the common interest in communication by default.111 To put it in 
Lewis’s epistemological terms, although the possibility that an individual is uncooperative 
cannot be eliminated, it can be (properly) ignored. Finally, Gricean cooperation is not a 
convention, because there is no alternative mutual default expectation which can be 
satisfied, and thus no alternative standard which can be met, in order to realise the common 
interest in communication. 
 
This is my account of the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative 
exchanges generally. I can now use this to construct my account of the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge transmission specifically, which, in turn, 
will provide us with a fully developed view of knowledge transmission – a view of 
knowledge transmission which is consistent with anti-reductionism as the position is 
traditionally construed. As I see it, communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of 
which is to transmit knowledge specifically are an extension of – and indeed conditional on 
 
 
110 Simion (2020), a proponent of the constitutive rule (or norm) account of assertion, argues for anti-reductionism 
as the position is traditionally construed using Hobbes’s ‘mythologized’ social contract (mentioned in fn.107), 
part of which involves employing a similar sort of schema to the one I mention here.  
111 This of course should not be read as involving a vicious circularity, but rather read as involving a legitimate 




– the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges generally, and so 
they embody the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges 
generally, as follows. 
 
Truthfulness derives from a common interest in transmitting knowledge specifically, which 
itself derives from a common interest in benefitting from and preserving the ability to 
communicate true information about the environment to each other reliably, true 
information that is relevant to which actions will produce desired results. It is preferable to a 
state in which individuals cannot engage in transmitting knowledge and thus communicate 
true information about the environment to each other reliably, true information that is 
relevant to which actions will produce desired results. And so, it is underpinned by a 
mixture of selfish interests, altruistic interests, as well as interests derived from moral 
obligation, where usually all are present in strength, but where usually any one is enough to 
sustain it. The standard of truthfulness itself, however, is determined by the mutual 
expectation that individuals will do all and only that which is required in order to realise the 
common interest in transmitting knowledge. Specifically, it is determined by the mutual 
expectation that individuals will tell that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why the tell 
that p is that they know that p, a relevant corollary of which is the mutual expectation that 
what they tell, p, is true. As such, the mutual expectation of truthfulness does not merely 
determine the standard of truthfulness, it also constitutes the conditions for knowledge 
transmission. Importantly, it is the presence of the mutual expectation of truthfulness, 
engendered whenever an individual makes a contribution which involves the telling 
mechanism specifically, which serves as the explanation for why individuals conform to the 
standard of truthfulness by default. Why? Not merely because there is future gain to be had 
from conforming (i.e., selfish interests), but because individuals have been socialised to be 
helpful, get along, or at least not go out of their way to make things difficult for others (i.e., 
altruistic interests and interests derived from moral obligation). Of course, if an individual 
defects, they are liable to experience personal hardship for undermining their own integrity 
and/or receive sanctions. Thus, the benefit that an individual might enjoy for being 
untruthful must be significant enough to make doing so rational, in combination the 




and/or receiving sanctions. However, this is not to say that individuals conform to the 
standard of truthfulness out of fear or concern for experiencing personal hardship for 
undermining their own integrity and/or receiving sanctions necessarily. They might 
conform simply because the thought of defecting does not cross their minds. Given that the 
presence of the mutual expectation of truthfulness, engendered whenever an individual 
makes a contribution which involves the telling mechanism specifically, serves as the 
explanation for why individuals conform to the standard of truthfulness by default, the 
mutual expectation of truthfulness itself is a mutual default expectation.112 That is, 
individuals are not merely psychologically disposed to expect that contributors will do all 
and only that which is required in order to realise the common interest in knowledge 
transmission, they are entitled (albeit defeasibly) to expect that contributors will do all and 
only that which is required in order to realise the common interest in knowledge 
transmission by default. To put it in Lewis’s epistemological terms, although the possibility 
that an individual is untruthful cannot be eliminated, it can be (properly) ignored. Finally, 
truthfulness is not a convention, because there is no alternative mutual default expectation 
which can be satisfied, and thus no alternative standard which can be met, to realise the 
common interest in transmitting knowledge.113  
 
Given that communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of which is to transmit 
knowledge specifically are an extension of – and indeed conditional on – the conversational 
dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges generally, we can see now that the 
nature of the interpersonal relation at play between speakers and hearers in cases of 
knowledge transmission is such that the default position for speakers is to assert the truth. 
 
 
112 Again, this of course should not be read as involving a vicious circularity, but rather read as involving a 
legitimate form of bootstrapping. 
113 I appreciate that this might be seen as gratuitously repetitious, but I think that repetition is a helpful device 
here for seeing clearly the sense in which communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of which is to 
transmit knowledge specifically are an extension of – and indeed conditional on – the conversational dynamics 
which underpin communicative exchanges generally, and thus the sense in which they embody the conversational 




As such, hearers do enjoy a defeasible entitlement to believe speakers, and thus what is 
asserted as true, by default. Thus, it is not the case that on top of comprehending the speaker 
as having made an assertion the hearer need be aware of additional positive reasons for 
believing what is asserted.  
 
We now have a fully developed view of knowledge transmission – a view of knowledge 
transmission which is consistent with anti-reductionism as it is traditionally construed – in 
light of which I can finalise the construction of my theoretical elaboration of our candidate 
explicatum. I think this will be achieved most advantageously, however, by working 
through the three problems for Grice’s framework of communication, mentioned above: the 
inaccurateness problem, the incompleteness problem, and the obscureness problem. I start 
with the inaccurateness problem. 
 
4.3.1. The Inaccurateness Problem Revisited 
 
As we saw in §4.2.1, Benton’s arguments go some way towards providing evidence that the 
most plausible interpretation of Grice’s maxims of quality is that they require knowledge, 
even if Grice does not explicitly endorse this himself. However, such evidence is hardly 
definitive, nor does it take us much further than what Grice thought. What we need is a 
principled explanation – a rationale – for why the maxims of quality are best understood in 
terms of requiring knowledge. Fortunately, we are now in a position to offer one. 
 
Although the co-operative principle and maxim categories hold during our communicative 
exchanges in general, the conversational maxims themselves do not, since Grice formulates 
these with a specific type of communicative exchange in mind, namely, a maximally 
effective exchange of information. A maximally effective exchange of information just is a 
communicative exchange the purpose or direction of which is to inform each other of the 
facts by means of the telling mechanism. On my interpretation, such communicative 
exchanges are best construed as delineating communicative exchanges the purpose or 
direction of which is to transmit knowledge specifically. Accordingly, when a speaker makes 




true, which is a corollary of an ancillary mutual default expectation they engender when 
they make an assertion that p, namely, that they assert that p in virtue of the fact that the 
reason why they assert that p is that they know that p. This explains why knowledge is the 
requirement of the maxims of quality. Why? Because if the specific ancillary mutual default 
expectation required anything weaker than knowledge, e.g., belief, not only would this 
undermine the possibility of transmitting knowledge, but it would also undermine the idea 
that there is a mutual default expectation that what the speaker asserts, p, is true – a mere 
belief that p might well be false, after all. We might say, then, that when a speaker makes an 
assertion that p there is a ‘super’ mutual default expectation that what the speaker asserts, p, 
is true, which is a corollary of a ‘specific’ mutual default expectation that the speaker asserts 
that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they assert that p is that they know that p.114 I 




114 Sperber & Wilson (2002) argue that truth cannot be the requirement for assertion because speakers make 
assertions that are only approximated and so not strictly true. For example, when someone asks, ‘What is the 
time?’ or ‘How tall are you?’, speakers typically assert answers like, ‘It is 5pm’ and ‘I am 6ft’, when in fact it is a 
few seconds or minutes before or after 5pm, and when in fact they are a few millimetres or centimetres taller or 
shorter than 6ft. However, by drawing on Schoubye & Stokke’s (2016) account of ‘what is said’, I believe we can 
solve this apparent problem. As Schoubye & Stokke argue, what is said by an utterance of a sentence in a context 
is determined by the answers to ‘questions under discussion’ (or QUDs). On this view, contexts are assumed to 
contain QUDs as formal objects, and sentences are analysed as true or false relative to the QUD addressed in that 
context. However, what a sentence can be used to express, i.e., what its potential truth conditions are, is 
constrained by a compositionally derived minimal content. So, while a single sentence has a wide variety of 
potential truth conditions depending on the contextually relevant QUD being addressed, this set of potential 
truth conditions is constrained by the meanings of its constituents and its syntax. Crucially, though, Schoubye & 
Stokke do not identify minimal compositional meaning with the truth conditions of a sentence relative to the 
context. Therefore, when a speaker says, ‘It is 5pm’ or ‘I am 6ft’, this minimal compositional meaning alone does 
not determine what is said, but rather the QUD, say, ‘Approximately (give or take a minute or so), what is the 
time?’ or ‘Approximately (give or a take a centimetre or so), how tall are you?’, along with the minimal 
compositional meaning, determines what is said. In these two cases, then, what is said is, ‘Approximately (give 
or take a minute or so), it is 5pm’ and ‘Approximately (give or a take a centimetre or so), I am 6ft tall’. If so, 








• Assert that p only if p is true. 
 
The specific maxim: 
 
▪ Assert that p only if you know that p.115 
 
Since the communicative standard of truthfulness is determined by the mutual default 
expectations encapsulated in the maxims of quality, a speaker is truthful in what they assert 
when and only when they satisfy the specific mutual default expectation and thus the super 
mutual default expectation. 
 
4.3.2. The Incompleteness Problem Revisited  
 
As we saw in §4.2.2, according to Grice, in cases of telling, the speaker exercises intentions to 
influence the hearer’s beliefs in a certain way, namely, the speaker intends that the hearer 
acquire a belief that p on the basis of the hearer recognising the speaker’s intention that the 
hearer acquire a belief that p. However, it seems there is something missing in Grice’s 
account, specifically, the mere recognition of a speaker’s intention does not seem to provide 
an epistemic basis for the hearer to believe anything. Grice wants us to think of the hearer as 
having been furnished with a ‘reason’ in something more like the sense in which an 
individual has been provided with a motive for adopting a certain course of action. Why, 
though, would the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s intentions influence the hearer’s 
beliefs in this way? The following passage from Grice offers a clue: 
 
 
115 I have simplified the specific maxim here, for the mutual default expectation is that the speaker asserts that p 




On my account, it will not be true that when I [assert] that p, I conversationally 
implicate that I believe that p; for to suppose that I believe that p […] is just to 
suppose that I am observing the first maxim of Quality on this occasion. I think that 
this consequence is intuitively acceptable; it is not a natural use of language to 
describe one who has [asserted] that p as having, for example, “implied,” 
“indicated,” or “suggested” that he believes that p; the natural thing to say is that he 
has expressed […] the belief that p. He has of course committed himself, in a certain 
way, to its being the case that he believes that p, and while this commitment is not a 
special case of [asserting] that he believes that p, it is bound up, in a special way, with 
[asserting] that p. (Grice 1989: 42) 
 
What Grice’s passage seems to suggest is that the speech act of assertion and the maxims of 
quality have a special relationship. Recall, however, that on my interpretation the maxims of 
quality are understood in terms of the mutual default expectations between the speaker and 
the hearer. Specifically, they are understood in terms the specific mutual default expectation 
that the speaker asserts that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they assert that p is 
that they know that p, of which the super mutual default expectation that what the speaker 
asserts, p, is true is a corollary. Moreover, on my interpretation, said mutual default 
expectations are engendered whenever a speaker makes a contribution which involves the 
telling mechanism specifically. Strictly speaking, then, it is the telling mechanism and said 
mutual default expectations which have a special relationship. As such, the maxims of 
quality should be understood as having a more general form, as follows: 
 











The specific maxim: 
 
▪ Tell that p only if you know that p.116 
 
What precisely is the nature of the special relationship between the telling mechanism and 
said mutual default expectations, though? I submit that it is an exclusive symbiotic 
relationship. Let me explain what I mean by this. When a speaker intends that a hearer 
acquire a belief that p on the basis of the hearer recognising the speaker’s intention that the 
hearer acquire a belief that p, the very recognition of this intention is comprised of the 
specific mutual default expectation that the speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the 
reason why they tell that p is that they know that p, a corollary of which is the super mutual 
default expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true. Furthermore, if a speaker makes a 
contribution which does not involve the intention that a hearer acquire a belief on the basis 
of the hearer recognising the speaker’s intention that the hearer acquire a belief, then the 
specific mutual default expectation that the speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the 
reason why they tells that p is that they know that p, of which the super mutual default 
expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true is a corollary, simply is not engendered. In 
other words, the maxims of quality are contribution-specific, namely, they are specific to 
contributions which involve the telling mechanism.117 Therefore, the speech act of assertion 
 
 
116 This is as it should be, given that that the maxims of quality are applicable not only to the speech act of 
assertion, but to implicature as well – another realisation of the telling mechanism. (I discuss this in §4.3.5). Note, 
I have again simplified the specific maxim here, for the mutual default expectation is that the speaker tells that p 
in virtue of the fact that the reason why they tell that p is that they know that p. 
117 Notice that this idea suggests that different contributions have their own unique contribution-specific maxims, 
all of which fall under the maxim category of quality. For example, Schaffer (2006) suggests that the speech act of 
asking questions is perhaps beholden to certain standards, such as: ‘ask only when you do not know’. We might 
say, then, that comprehending a speaker as asking a question involves the mutual default expectation that the 
speaker asks whether p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they ask whether p is that they do not know that 
p. If so, we would say that this maxim is also a maxim of quality, but a maxim of quality engendered when 




and the maxims of quality have a special relationship only because the speech act of 
assertion is a realisation of the telling mechanism. With this in place, the solution to the 
incompleteness problem presents itself. 
 
When a speaker makes an assertion, they freely and publicly publish their intention that the 
hearer acquire a belief on the basis of the hearer recognising the speaker’s intention that the 
hearer acquire a belief. In doing so, they freely and publicly engender the specific mutual 
default expectation that the speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they 
tell that p is that they know that p, a corollary of which is the super mutual default 
expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true. Why? Because due to the exclusive 
symbiotic relationship between the telling mechanism and the maxims of quality, i.e., the 
mutual default expectations that they encapsulate, these mutual default expectations are 
comprised of the mutual recognition of the speaker’s reflexive intention, and the mutual 
recognition of the speaker’s reflexive intention is comprised of said mutual default 
expectations. This thus affirms the significance of the self-referential nature of the telling 
mechanism: the speaker’s reflexive intention provides the hearer with a ‘reason’ to believe 
what is told, because it is mutually understood between the speaker and hearer what the 
speaker is doing in exercising it, namely, inviting the hearer to trust them. And unless there 
is some relevant defeater present, the hearer is entitled (albeit defeasibly) to accept the 
speaker’s invitation by default. We might say, then, that the telling mechanism is imbued 
with epistemic value in virtue of the mutual default expectations of which it is comprised, 
and thus, as a realisation of the telling mechanism, the speech act of assertion is endowed 
with epistemic import.  
 
Notice that this solution to the incompleteness problem makes good sense of the somewhat 
mysterious comments Grice makes regarding attitude expression and commitment. That is, 
by appealing to the mutual default expectations of which the telling mechanism is 
 
 
the maxim of quality for asking questions, just like the maxims of quality for telling, would fall under the maxim 




comprised, we can see the sense in which a speaker, when they make an assertion that p, 
freely and publicly confers a commitment upon themselves to it being the case that they 
assert that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they assert that p is that they know that 
p, and thus that what they assert, p, is true.118 As such, we can see the sense in which a 
speaker, when they make an assertion, not only expresses or manifests a belief in what they 
assert, but indeed represents themselves as having the knowledge in question – even if they 
neither know nor believe what they assert. Lastly, we can see the sense in which a speaker, 
when they make an assertion, freely and publicly incurs a responsibility for the belief that 
the hearer acquires (if they acquire it). Importantly, though, it is neither the commitment the 
speaker confers upon themselves, nor their expression of belief or having represented 
themselves as knowledgeable, nor the responsibility they incur in making an assertion 
which explains why the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s reflexive intention influences 
the hearer’s beliefs. Rather, it is the mutual default expectations of which the speaker’s 
reflexive intention is comprised which explain this. 
 
Notice further that this solution also explains challenges to and retractions of assertions. 
That is, by appealing to the mutual default expectations of which the telling mechanism is 
comprised, we can see why a speaker, when they make an assertion, might be met with 
challenges such as, ‘That is not true’, ‘How do you know that?’ or ‘You do not believe that!’. 
If the hearer doubts that the speaker satisfies the super mutual default expectation that what 
the speaker asserts, p, is true and/or the specific mutual default expectation that the speaker 
asserts that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they assert that p is that they know that 
p, they might issue a challenge of this sort. Accordingly, we can see that a retraction of an 
assertion would be called for whenever a speaker asserts under conditions in which they do 
not satisfy said mutual default expectations. Making such a retraction, in turn, would make 
it clear to the hearer that the speaker is not available to shoulder the epistemic burden for 
the proposition in question. 
 
 
118 We can get a sense here of the way in which Hawley’s account of trust and my theoretical elaboration of our 




4.3.3. The Obscureness Problem Revisited 
 
As we saw in §4.2.3, for convenience, Grice proposes that the conversational maxims which 
fall within the cooperative principle hold an equal status among one another. However, he 
acknowledges that the maxims of quality may have a special status. Specifically, he claims 
that the other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that the first specific 
maxim of quality is satisfied. Benton’s attempt to vindicate this claim fails. What, then, 
should we make of this? 
 
On my interpretation, communication generally is conditional on the cooperative principle, 
i.e., the mutual default expectation that the speaker makes a contribution such as it is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
communicative exchange in which they are engaged. As such, when a speaker makes a 
contribution which involves the telling mechanism specifically, comprehending the speaker 
involves assuming that they satisfy the telling mechanism, which itself involves employing 
the cooperative principle as well as the maxims that fall within it. We might say, then, that 
the cooperative principle and the maxims that fall within it work in the service of contribution 
comprehension, contributions which involve the telling mechanism specifically. Moreover, 
on my interpretation, the maxims of quality are understood as a particularised extension of 
the cooperative principle, exclusively for contributions which involve the telling mechanism 
specifically, and thus exclusive to communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of 
which is to transmit knowledge specifically. Indeed, this is the sense in which the maxims of 
quality have a special status.  
 
Notice, however, that contribution comprehension is compatible with the possibility that a 
speaker quietly and unostentatiously violates the maxims of quality, even if the hearer is 
aware of the speaker’s artfulness. Why? Because although the cooperative principle, and 
thus the maxims that fall within it, i.e., the mutual default expectations that they 
encapsulate, are defeasible, it does not follow from this that a speaker’s artfulness, and 
indeed the hearer’s awareness of a speaker’s artfulness, results in all-out abandonment of 




entitled to expect that the speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why the 
speaker tells that p is that the speaker knows that p, a corollary of which is the super mutual 
default expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true. Nevertheless, the hearer expects the 
speaker to expect them (the hearer) to expect that they (the speaker) tell that p in virtue of 
the fact that the reason why the speaker tells that p is that the speaker knows that p, a 
corollary of which is the super mutual default expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is 
true. And the speaker expects the hearer to expect them (the speaker) to expect that they (the 
speaker) tell that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why the speaker tells that p is that the 
speaker knows that p, a corollary of which is the super mutual default expectation that what 
the speaker tells, p, is true. In other words, even though the speaker quietly and 
unostentatiously violates the maxims of quality, and even if the hearer is aware of the 
speaker’s artfulness, said mutual default expectations are employed in such a way that 
enables the hearer to comprehend the speaker’s contribution, regardless of the fact that the 
hearer ultimately is not entitled to believe what the speaker tells them, and likely does not 
believe what the speaker tells them.119 Thus, Grice and Benton are mistaken in thinking that 
any of the maxims of quality must be satisfied in order for the other conversational maxims, 
and indeed the cooperative principle, to come into operation. 
 
4.3.4. Speaker Sincerity and Speaker Reliability 
 
According to my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, the specific mutual 
default expectation that a speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they 
tell that p is that they know that p – of which the super mutual default expectation that what 
the speaker tells, p, is true is a corollary – may be conceptually split into mutual default 
 
 
119 If, however, the situation was such that both the speaker and the hearer were mutually aware that the speaker 
at least seemingly fails to satisfy the cooperative principle, and thus the maxims that fall within it, i.e., the mutual 
default expectations that they encapsulate, contribution comprehension would not be possible. I discuss this in 




expectations regarding the speaker’s sincerity and the speaker’s reliability, i.e., regarding the 
speaker being both honest in what they tell and actually having the knowledge in question. 
 
Following Stokke (2018), I think that speaker sincerity is best understood in terms of 
assent.120 Assent is the mental action of an individual occurrently putting forward a 
proposition as true in their mind – conscious mental affirmation.121 Assent is different from, 
but intimately related to, the state of belief. Ordinarily, an individual who assents to p holds 
the corresponding belief that p. However, it is possible for assent and belief to come apart, 
i.e., for an individual to assent to p but not hold the corresponding belief that p. Moreover, it 
is possible for this to happen and for it not to be transparent to the individual in question, or 
anyone else. The reason why an individual might assent to p but not hold the corresponding 
belief that p is due to non-rational factors, such as self-deception, prejudice, and phobias.122 
Accordingly, I think that speaker reliability is best understood in terms of the speaker 
holding the corresponding belief to the proposition they assent to and that belief amounting 
to knowledge. Ordinarily, when a speaker tells that p, they are both sincere and reliable. 
However, it is possible for a speaker’s sincerity and reliability to come apart, i.e., for a 
speaker to assent to p but not hold the corresponding belief that p (due to non-rational 
factors), or, if they do hold the corresponding belief that p, for that belief that p not to 
amount to knowledge that p. Moreover, it is possible for this to happen and for it not to be 
transparent to the individual in question, or anyone else. The reason why an individual 
might assent to p and hold the corresponding belief that p but not have knowledge that p is 
because said belief that p does not satisfy the conditions to ascribe knowledge that p to that 
individual in that particular context, as sketched out in §4.1. To be clear, then, the mutual 
 
 
120 Admittedly, sincerity is traditionally thought of as a matter of a speaker telling what they believe. However, 
due to various (I think, convincing) counterexamples in the philosophy of language literature, this traditional 
view is not so plausible. See Chan and Kahane (2011) and Stokke (2018) for a comprehensive exposition of the 
sincerity debate. 
121 As Stokke observes, ‘assent’ and ‘judgement’ are often used interchangeably. However, like him, I stick with 
the former term.  




default expectation that a speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they 
tell that p is that they know that p (of which the super mutual default expectation that what 
the speaker tells, p, is true is a corollary) may be conceptually split into the mutual default 
expectation that they tell that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why tell that p is that 
they:  
 
(i) assent to p  
(ii) hold the corresponding belief that p,  
(iii) and said belief that p amounts to knowledge that p.  
 
Therefore, a speaker is insincere when they do not aim to satisfy the specific mutual default 
expectation that they tell that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they tell that p is that 
they know that p, of which the super mutual default expectation that what the speaker tells, 
p, is true is a corollary. That is, a speaker is insincere when they tell that p but it is not the 
case that the reason why they tell that p is that they assent to p. Accordingly, a speaker, on 
the assumption that they are sincere, is unreliable when they do aim to satisfy the specific 
mutual default expectation that a speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why 
they tell that p is that they know that p, of which the super mutual default expectation that 
what the speaker tells, p, is true is a corollary, but unbeknownst to them they fail to do so. 
That is, a speaker, on the assumption that they are sincere, is unreliable when they tell that p 
in virtue of the fact that the reason why they tell that p is that they assent to p, but 
unbeknownst to them they do not hold the corresponding belief that p, or they do hold the 
corresponding belief that p but unbeknownst to them said belief that p does not amount to 
knowledge that p. 
 
At this juncture, I would like to flag an uncertainty of mine. As just mentioned, according to 
my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, the specific mutual default 
expectation that a speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they tell that p 
is that they know that p – of which the super mutual default expectation that what the 
speaker tells, p, is true is a corollary – may be conceptually split into mutual default 




speaker being both honest in what they tell and actually having the knowledge in question. 
However, although what I have proposed so far in my theoretical elaboration of our 
candidate explicatum seems to vindicate the mutual default expectation that speakers are 
sincere, does any element of it vindicate the mutual default expectation that speakers are 
reliable? For instance, a speaker, due to the way they have been socialised to be helpful, get 
along, or at least not go out of their way to make things difficult for others, may aim to 
satisfy the specific mutual default expectation that they tell that p in virtue of the fact that 
the reason why they tell that p is that they know that p, of which the super mutual default 
expectation that what they tell, p, is true is a corollary. However, unbeknownst to the 
speaker (and perhaps unbeknownst to the hearer they address as well), they may fail to do 
so. Why? Either because they tell that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they tell that 
p is that they assent to p, but unbeknownst to them they do not hold the corresponding 
belief that p, or because they tell that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they tell that 
p is that they assent to p and hold the corresponding belief that p, but said belief that p 
unbeknownst to them does not amount to knowledge that p. Both cases are ones in which 
the speaker is sincere but unreliable. It might seem, then, that regardless of what I have 
proposed so far, the possibility of a speaker’s unreliability is such that it flies in the face of 
the idea that there is a specific mutual default expectation that a speaker tells that p in virtue 
of the fact that the reason why they tell that p is that they know that p, of which the super 
mutual default expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true is a corollary. In other 
words, what I am wondering is this: although my theoretical elaboration explains why the 
possibility that a speaker is lying can be (properly) ignored, strictly speaking does it explain 
why the possibility that a speaker is irrational or incompetent can be (properly) ignored as 
well? If not, then my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum is incomplete and 
thus needs supplementing.123 
 
 
123 As I say, I am uncertain whether my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum is incomplete in the 
sense I have described. For instance, it might be thought that what I have said so far already implies that 
speakers are sufficiently vigilant in selecting what they choose to tell and what they choose not to tell, such that, 
in ordinary contexts, what is told is told sincerely and reliably. After all, what is clear from my theoretical 




On the assumption that my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum is 
incomplete in the sense that I have described, I suggest tentatively that a promising way to 
supplement it might be found in Davidson’s (1973; 1984; 1991; 2001) work on 
interpretation.124  
 
According to Davidson, in order to interpret the language of another speaker, an interpreter 
must construct a manual that enables the assignment of truth conditions to any sentence of 
the language under interpretation, where the manual is constructed by means of discerning 
patterns in the relations between the uttered sentences the speaker holds true and the objects 
and events in the speaker’s environment that prompt them to assent to the truth of the 
sentences they utter. He exemplifies his account of interpretation by focusing on what he 
calls ‘radical interpretation’, which is a matter of interpreting the speaker of a hitherto 
unknown language without relying on any prior knowledge either of the speaker’s beliefs or 
the meanings of the speaker’s utterances. What such cases draw out is that an interpreter 
cannot assign meanings to a speaker’s utterances without knowing what the speaker 
believes, and an interpreter cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s 
utterances mean. Davidson responds to this challenge, however, by suggesting that we must 
assign meanings to speakers’ utterances and identify the relevant beliefs simultaneously. He 
maintains that this can be achieved via the application of what he calls the ‘principle of 
 
 
understanding what it is the speaker is doing and what it is that is expected of the speaker in doing it. If this is 
the case, then we might already have a straightforward explanation not only for why the possibility that a 
speaker is, say, lying can be (properly) ignored, but also why the possibility that a speaker is, say, irrational or 
incompetent can be (properly) ignored. Moreover, it is not obvious that this problem (if it is a problem) is specific 
to my view. That is, even though the possibility that speakers are insincere when engaged in the act of telling is 
(properly) ignorable by hearers, if the possibility that speakers are irrational or incompetent when engaged in the 
act of telling is a live possibility for hearers (i.e., not (properly) ignorable), then this potentially undermines any 
anti-reductionist position as it is traditionally construed, specifically, conditions (AR2) and (AR3). 
124 I am by no means the first to draw upon Davidson’s account of interpretation to defend anti-reductionism as it 




charity’, a principle which he holds is constitutive of interpretation generally, not just radical 
interpretation: 
 
Principle of charity: when interpreting a speaker’s linguistic behaviour, optimise 
agreement between oneself and the speaker in such a way as to maximize the 
number of true beliefs attributed to the speaker.125 
 
For Davidson, the principle of charity encapsulates the ineliminable (albeit defeasible) 
presuppositions that must be employed in order to interpret speakers’ utterances. More 
specifically, an interpreter, on the presupposition that they themselves are rational and 
respond to their environment in such a way as to acquire true beliefs, must presuppose that 
the speaker under interpretation is rational and responds to their environment in such a way 
as to acquire true beliefs as well. Said presuppositions enable the interpreter to ascribe true 
beliefs to the speaker (albeit defeasibly), which, in turn, enables the interpreter to assign 
meaning to the speaker’s utterances (albeit defeasibly). Davidson’s justification for the 
principle of charity rests on the claim that without the presuppositions encapsulated within 
it, interpretation is not possible. Why? Because, he claims, for interpretation to be possible, 
the interpreter must be able to accept or reject certain interpretations of a speaker’s 
utterances, and this is only intelligible against a background of massive agreement between 
the interpreter and the speaker, which the presuppositions encapsulated within the principle 
of charity provide. In other words, the principle of charity is the bedrock of the possibility of 
interpretation altogether. He writes: 
 
If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a creature 
as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we 
have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying 
anything. (1973: 137) 
 
 
125 Davidson’s principle of charity admits of various formulations and so is difficult to articulate precisely, but 




Since Davidson’s account of interpretation – especially his principle of charity on which his 
entire account of interpretation is built – enjoys some support within the philosophical 
community, it is not unreasonable to suggest tentatively that it might offer a promising way 
to supplement the apparent incompleteness of my theoretical elaboration of our candidate 
explicatum.126 What, then, is my tentative suggestion? To explain this, I first need to make a 
revision to Davidson’s principle of charity. As we have seen, the principle of charity does 
not merely encapsulate the presuppositions that interpreters are psychologically disposed to 
employ when they interpret speakers’ linguistic behaviour. Rather, it encapsulates the 
ineliminable (albeit defeasible) presuppositions that interpreters must employ in order to 
interpret speakers’ linguistic behaviour at all. Moreover, as we have seen, what interpreters 
presuppose essentially is that the speaker under interpretation is rational and responds to 
the environment in such a way as to acquire true beliefs, just like the interpreter. This, as we 
have seen, enables the interpreter to ascribe true beliefs to the speaker (albeit defeasibly), 
which, in turn, enables the interpreter to assign meaning to the speaker’s utterances (albeit 
defeasibly). We might ask, though, what is it for an individual to respond to an environment 
in such a way as to acquire true beliefs? Put slightly differently, we might ask, how does an 
individual respond to an environment in such a way as to acquire true beliefs instead of 
falling into error? My answer to this question, as we have seen in §4.1, is reliabilist in nature, 
namely, by bringing it about that the processes by which they acquire beliefs are truth 
conducive. Indeed, as we also saw in §4.1, I think that knowledge in general is the product 
of forming true beliefs in this way. As such, I think that what interpreters ascribe to speakers 
under interpretation (albeit defeasibly) is not merely true belief, but knowledge. I appreciate 
that there is a lot more to say in filling out and defending such a revision to the principle of 
charity, but to ward off any immediate worries, it is worth noting that an almost identical 
revision to the principle of charity is already filled out and defended by Williamson (2000; 









The appropriate principle of charity will give high marks to interpretations on which 
speakers tend to assert what they know, rather than to those on which they tend to 
assert what is true, or even what is reasonable for them to believe. (2000: 267 – 
emphasis added) 
 
With this revision in place, I am ready to offer up my tentative suggestion: when a speaker 
makes a contribution which involves the telling mechanism specifically, the hearer must 
employ the ineliminable (albeit defeasible) presuppositions that the speaker is rational and 
knowledgeable, and they must employ said ineliminable (albeit defeasible) presuppositions 
in combination with the cooperative principle and the maxims that fall within it, i.e., the 
mutual default expectations that they encapsulate, in order to interpret the speaker’s 
utterance and thus comprehend the speaker as satisfying the telling mechanism.  
 
Supplemented in this way, my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum does not 
merely vindicate the mutual default expectation that speakers tell that p in virtue of the fact 
that the reason why they tell that p is that they assent to p, it also vindicates the mutual 
default expectation that speakers tell that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they tell 
that p is that they assent to p, hold the corresponding belief that p, and that said belief that p 
amounts to knowledge that p. In other words, supplemented in this way, my theoretical 
elaboration of our candidate explicatum not only explains why the possibility that a speaker 
is lying can be (properly) ignored, it also explains why the possibility that a speaker is 
irrational or incompetent can be (properly) ignored. And so, we can now recast Lewis’s 
passage (from §4.1) on the overall reliability of perception in terms of the overall reliability 
of assertion: 
 
What non-circular argument can be given for our reliance on assertion? Assertions 
depend on the speaker, and what we believe about the speaker depends in turn on 
their assertions. Each dependence covers a wide and varied range of alternatives. Of 




possibilities never can be eliminated. But they can be ignored. And if they are 
properly ignored – as they mostly are – then assertions give us knowledge.  
 
To reiterate, I am uncertain whether my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum 
even is incomplete in the sense I have described. Moreover, on the assumption that it is, 
what I have provided is only a tentative suggestion for how it might be supplemented. Still, 
what I aim to have shown here is that I know what I have got an argument for and where I 
propose to look for support for the extra step, if I need it. 
 
4.3.5. Assertion vs. Implicature 
 
On my view, just like Grice’s, the notion of telling cuts across assertion and implicature.127 
As such, when a speaker generates an implicature, they freely and publicly publish their 
intention that the hearer acquire a belief on the basis of the hearer recognising the speaker’s 
intention that the hearer acquire a belief. In doing so, they freely and publicly engender the 
specific mutual default expectation that the speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the 
reason why they tell that p is that they know that p, a corollary of which is the super mutual 
default expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true. By appealing to the mutual default 
expectations of which the telling mechanism is comprised, we can see the sense in which a 
speaker, when they implicate that p, freely and publicly confers a commitment upon 
themselves to it being the case that they implicate that p in virtue of the fact that the reason 
why they implicate that p is that they know that p, and thus that what they implicate, p, is 
true. As such, we can see the sense in which a speaker, when they generate an implicature, 
not only expresses or manifests a belief in what they implicate, but indeed represents 
themselves as having the knowledge in question – even if they neither know nor believe 
what they implicate. Plus, we can see the sense in which a speaker, when they generate an 
implicature, freely and publicly incurs a responsibility for the belief that the hearer acquires 
 
 
127 Of course, Grice would hold that that the notion of telling cuts across saying and implicature, rather than 




(if they acquire it). Accordingly, on my view, implicatures, just like assertions, are apt to 
transmit knowledge.  
 
Fricker (2012), however, disagrees. According to her, in making an assertion, a speaker 
incurs full responsibility for the truth of what is communicated, whereas, in generating an 
implicature, they do not. Essentially, her argument takes the following form: 
 
Premise 1: If a speaker's communicative act is governed by the standard of 
knowledge, then the speaker incurs full responsibility for the truth of 
p by performing that communicative act. 
Premise 2:  A speaker does not incur full responsibility for the truth of p by 
generating an implicature that p. 
Conclusion: Implicature is not a communicative act which is governed by the 
standard of knowledge.  
 
Fricker’s argument stands or falls on the strength of premise 2, for which she provides a set 
of interlocking supporting arguments. Let us take them in turn. First, she makes the 
observation that, in cases of assertion, the speaker's reflexively intended meaning is made 
explicit by virtue of the symbols used (because the speaker’s reflexively intended meaning is 
essentially the same as what is said (in the Austinian sense (see §2.1)), which the 
‘surrounding linguistic context’ suffices to fix and allow the recovery of the speaker's 
reflexive intentions. However, in cases of implicature, the speaker's reflexively intended 
meaning is not made explicit by virtue of the symbols used (because the speaker’s 
reflexively intended meaning is something over and above what is said, but instead depends 
on the ‘shared knowledge context’ and Grice’s conversational maxims to recover the 
speaker's reflexive intentions. Based on this observation, she argues that, in cases of 
implicature, unlike cases of assertion, it is unclear to hearers what proposition is 
communicated, if there even is a single proposition communicated. Indeed, she maintains 
that what is communicated via implicature is more like a fuzzy set of propositions. Second, 
she argues that implicature thus demands far more from the hearer than assertion does to 




that, in cases of implicature, unlike in cases of assertion, the speaker thus enjoys plausible 
deniability regarding what is communicated. She concludes, therefore, that, in cases of 
implicature, unlike cases of assertion, a speaker cannot plausibly be understood as incurring 
full responsibility for the truth of what they communicate. 
 
However, I do not find Fricker’s interlocking arguments in support of premise 2 compelling. 
Let me explain. Although Fricker’s initial observations about assertion and implicature seem 
to be acceptable, it is not obvious that her first argument follows from these observations. 
Why? Two reasons. First, as Grice makes clear, for an implicature to count as an implicature, 
it must be capable of being worked out. He writes: 
 
The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; 
for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by 
an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational 
implicature. (Grice 1975: 31)128  
 
Thus, Fricker’s argument that, in cases of implicature, unlike cases of assertion, it is unclear 
to hearers what proposition is communicated is simply at odds with Grice’s stipulation of 
what implicature is, and so she is not giving implicature a fair footing from the off. Second, 
and as a way of bolstering her first argument, Fricker maintains that what is communicated 
via implicature is more like a fuzzy set of propositions. The problem with this, however, is 
that it is applicable to assertion as well. That is, we successfully communicate all the time by 
asserting such things as, ‘He is a bit aggressive’, which is of course compatible with a fuzzy 
 
 
128 Grice (1975) provides a general pattern for the working-out of implicatures, as follows:  
 
He has said that q; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the 
Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that p; he knows (and knows that I 
know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that p is required; he has done 
nothing to stop me thinking that p; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that 




set of specific propositions about how aggressive the individual is. What a speaker 
communicates (whether by means of implicature or assertion) is almost never without some 
degree of vagueness, after all. As for Fricker’s argument that implicature demands far more 
from the hearer than assertion does to work out correctly what the speaker’s reflexively 
intended meaning is, I struggle to see what the relevance of this is. That is, even if 
implicature does demand more of the hearer than assertion does in order to work out 
correctly what the speaker’s reflexively intended meaning is, and even if there is, for this 
reason, more responsibility on the hearer to work it out correctly, it is hard to see what this 
has to do with the specific mutual default expectation that the speaker tells that p in virtue of 
the fact that the reason why they tell that p is that they know that p, a corollary of which is 
the super mutual default expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true. In other words, it 
seems quite plain that there are two different types of responsibility at play in cases of 
implicature, just as there are in cases of assertion, namely, the speaker's responsibility 
regarding the truth of what is communicated and the hearer's responsibility regarding 
working out correctly what is communicated. As I see it, even if it is true that that 
implicature demands far more from the hearer than assertion does to work out correctly 
what the speaker’s reflexively intended meaning is, this is orthogonal to the speaker's 
responsibility regarding the truth of what is communicated. Lastly, Fricker’s argument that, 
in cases of implicature, unlike in cases of assertion, the speaker enjoys plausible deniability 
regarding what is communicated simply does not have the force which she takes it to have. 
Why? Two reasons. First, both implicature and assertion suffer from plausible deniability. 
To see this in the case of assertion specifically, consider the following example from Peet 
(2015): 
 
Special Craft Lager 
 
Suppose it is the start of a new year and we have organised a party for the new 
graduate students. We have a variety of beers on offer, but there are some special 
craft lagers I want for myself (even though they were brought for the guests). I have 
stored most of the beer in the fridge, but I have put the craft lagers outside. Sally, one 




the fridge'. Later on you find the craft lagers outside and ask me why I told Sally that 
all the beer was in the fridge. In response to this challenge I might attempt to 
construct a story along the following lines: I had heard that Sally was a vegan, and I 
am aware that craft lagers often contain animal products. So when I said 'all the beer 
is in the fridge' I didn't mean every beer we had purchased for the party, I meant 
every beer which was safe for Sally, as a vegan, to drink. (33) 
 
This observation is of course not intended to spell trouble for assertion in the same way that 
Fricker tries to spell trouble for implicature. Instead, it is intended to level the playing field 
by showing that there is no difference in principle between implicature and assertion on the 
matter of plausible deniability, thus taking the sting out of Fricker’s argument. Admittedly, 
the plausible deniability for assertion is comparatively lower in degree than it is for 
implicature. However, the plausible deniability of implicature is also often exaggerated. And 
this is my second point. Recall Grice’s famous case of the referee who writes a reference for a 
candidate for an academic position but only utters, ‘He has very neat handwriting’. Given 
that the referee is supposed to focus on academic expertise, the information that they 
provide seems to be irrelevant, as well uninformative. In order to reconcile the speaker’s 
utterance with the maxims of relation and the maxims of quantity, the hearer takes the 
referee as being as relevant and as informative as it is possible to be within the remit of the 
task, which is to provide positive information about the candidate. So, the hearer calculates 
that the referee has used their utterance of ‘He has very neat handwriting’ to implicate that 
the candidate is not suitable for the position. Suppose, though, that the recipient of the 
reference comes to know the candidate personally through other avenues and (quite 
unprofessionally) later challenges the referee for having told them (and the rest of the 
academic board) that the candidate in question was not suitable. Suppose further that the 
referee responds to the recipient’s challenge by saying, ‘I didn’t tell you that! I said that they 
have very neat handwriting. I certainly did not intend for you to believe that they are not a 
suitable candidate’. The referee’s response would of course be frustrating for the reference 
recipient because the referee would have changed the topic of conversation from one about 
the (il)legitimacy of what they told the reference recipient (and the rest of the academic 




though, the referee’s denial would not be plausible. Why? Because the assumption here is 
that it is mutually understood between the referee and the referee recipient (and the rest of 
the academic board) that, when engaged in writing and providing the reference, the 
question under discussion would have been, ‘Is the candidate suitable for the position?’. As 
such, for the referee to deny that they intended the reference recipient (and the rest of the 
academic board) to believe that the candidate in question was not suitable for the position 
by uttering, ‘He has very neat handwriting’, implies that the referee did not understand 
what the question under discussion was at the time, which is tantamount to renouncing any 
understanding of the type of communicative exchange they were engaged in at the time. 
Alternatively, it implies that the referee had a perfectly good understanding of the question 
under discussion at the time, and thus the type of communicative exchange they were 
engaged in at the time, but nevertheless decided to trigger the formal process of providing a 
reference to an institution just to pontificate irrelevantly about the candidate’s handwriting. 
Neither of these options is plausible.129 In sum, I do not find Fricker’s interlocking arguments 




In the previous chapter (§3.4), I said that knowledge transmission is the processes by which 
a speaker’s knowledge that p becomes a hearer’s knowledge that p (i.e., the hearer’s 
knowledge that p is grounded upon the speaker’s knowledge that p), in virtue of the fact that 
the reason why the speaker asserted that p is that the speaker knows that p, and whereby the 
content so asserted, p, comes to be known by the hearer by way of the hearer believing the 
 
 
129 The notion of a ‘question under discussion’ need not be formalised to understand my meaning here. If a 
formalisation were to be sought, though, Roberts (1996) would be my first port of call, with the idea being that 
what is implicated by an utterance of a sentence is determined (at least in part) by the answers to ‘questions 
under discussion’ (or QUDs), much like Schoubye & Stokke (2016) argue that what is said by an utterance of a 
sentence in a context is determined by the answers to ‘questions under discussion’ (or QUDs). (See fn.114.) This 
would provide a more theoretically robust way of understanding what is implicated by a speaker in a certain 




speaker themselves. Moreover, I said that to fully understand knowledge transmission we 
must understand the nature of the interpersonal relation at play between speakers and 
hearers in such cases. Furthermore, I said that to understand this we must understand the 
conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges generally. In this 
chapter (§4.3), using Grice’s framework of communication, I provided an account the 
conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges generally. This enabled 
me to provide an account of the nature of the interpersonal relation at play between 
speakers and hearers in cases of knowledge transmission. And this, in turn, provided us 
with a fully developed view of knowledge transmission – a view of knowledge transmission 
which satisfies (AR1), (AR2), and (AR3) of the anti-reductionist position as it is traditionally 
construed. In light of this fully developed view of knowledge transmission, I constructed my 
theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum Moreover, in the course of constructing 
my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, I solved three immediate problems 
for Grice’s framework of communication as well as addressed items (1) through (10) on the 
substantive list (from §2.5). Plus, there is no immediate reason to think that my theoretical 
elaboration of our candidate explicatum will not afford us a vocabulary to help us explain 
any outstanding philosophically interesting phenomena peripheral in the study of assertion 
as well. Indeed, I addressed certain other philosophically interesting phenomena which are 
peripheral in the study of assertion in terms of it, namely, implicature and Davidson’s 
theory of (radical) interpretation.130 In the next chapter, I respond to some potential 
objections to my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum. In addition, I address 
the final item, item (11), on the substantive list. 
 
4.5. Appendix C: a sneaky solution to sneaky intentions 
 
The formulation of the telling mechanism I use in my theoretical elaboration of our 
candidate explicatum is essentially the same as Grice’s original formulation: 
 
 
130 Admittedly, if Davidson’s theory of (radical) interpretation is to be understood in the way I present it in §4.3.4, 




“U meant something by uttering x” is (roughly) equivalent to “U intended the 
utterance of x to produce some response in an audience [e.g., the acquisition of 
belief] by means of the recognition of this intention”. (Grice 1989: 220) 
 
However, supposedly following a suggestion from Strawson, Grice replaces his original 
formulation with a second, ‘iterated’ formulation:131 
 
“By uttering x, U meant something” is true if and only if for some audience A, U 
uttered x intending: 
 
1) A to produce some particular response r [e.g., the acquisition of belief] 
2) A to recognize that U intends (1) 
3) A’s recognition that U intends (1) to function, in part, as a reason for (1). (Grice 
1989: 92) 
 
As Neale (1992) observes, it is not entirely clear why Grice makes this replacement: he might 
see the iterated formulation as an elaboration on the original formulation (without involving 
any fundamental change), or he might see the iterated formulation as a modification of the 
original formulation (involving a fundamental change). I will not speculate on Grice’s 
reasons for making this replacement. However, I see no fundamental difference between the 
two. As such, when I talk about the ‘telling mechanism’, I should be understood as referring 
to both formulations – they are essentially the same, as far as I am concerned, after all. 
Historically, Grice’s telling mechanism has been thought to suffer from a debilitating 













Suppose A, a friend of U, is about to buy a house, but U intends that A acquire a 
belief that the house is rat-infested, because U knows that it is. U lets rats loose in the 
house knowing that A is watching U. However, U knows that A does not know that 
U knows that A is watching U do this. Nonetheless, U knows that A will not take the 
presence of U’s rats as evidence that the house is rat-infested. But U knows, indeed U 
intends, that A will take the fact that U let rats loose in the house as evidence for 
thinking that U intends that A acquire a belief that the house is rat-infested. 
Furthermore, U knows that A has grounds for thinking that U would not intend that 
A acquire a belief that the house is rat-infested unless U has knowledge that it is.132 
 
According to Strawson, in this case, conditions (1), (2), and (3) of the telling mechanism are 
satisfied, yet U cannot be accurately described as communicating with A in the sense that 
Grice seeks to elucidate, because U’s intentions are not ‘wholly overt’. He writes: 
 
A will indeed take [U] to be trying to bring it about that A is aware of some fact; but 
he will not take [U] as trying, in the colloquial sense, to “let him know” something 
(or to “tell” him something). But unless [U] at least brings it about that A takes him 
[(U)] to be trying to let him [(A)] know something, he has not succeeded in 
communicating with A; and if, as in our example, he has not even tried to bring this 
about, then he has not even tried to communicate with A […] An essential feature of 
the intentions which make up the illocutionary complex is their overtness. They 
have, one might say, essential avowability. […] [T]he understanding of the force of 
an utterance in all cases involves recognizing what may be called broadly an 









Strawson is of course right to think that overtness in this sense is an essential feature of 
communication. Thus, given that the telling mechanism apparently violates this 
requirement, it seemingly allows for cases of communication in which all three conditions of 
the telling mechanism are satisfied but the utterer intends the audience to believe that they 
are not. Indeed, the utterer may intend that the audience believe that the utterer wants to 
produce some particular response in the audience (e.g., the acquisition of belief) for an 
entirely different reason. This has come to be known as the ‘problem of sneaky intentions’. I 
believe, however, that a novel solution to the problem of sneaky intentions can be found by 





Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second World War [...] captured by 
Italian troops. And suppose [...] that I wish to get these troops to believe that I am a 
German soldier in order to get them to release me. What I would like to do is to tell 
them in German or Italian that I am a German soldier. But let us suppose I don't 
know enough German or Italian to do that. So I [...] attempt to put on a show of 
telling them that I am a German soldier by reciting those few bits of German I know, 
trusting that they don't know enough German to see through my plan. Let us 
suppose I know only one line of German which I remember from a poem I had to 
memorize in a high school German course. Therefore, I, a captured American, 
address my Italian captors with the following sentence: Kennst du das Land wo die 
Zitronen blühen? Now let us describe the situation in Gricean terms. I intend to 
produce a certain effect in them, namely the effect of believing that I am a German 
soldier, and I intend to produce this effect by means of their recognition of my 
intention. I intend that they should think that what I am trying to tell them is that I 
am a German soldier. But does it follow from this account that when I say, Kennst du 





Searle originally uses German Soldier as an objection to Grice’s so-called ‘intention-based 
semantics’. However, German Soldier, and importantly Grice’s response to it, can be re-
appropriated to shed light on the problem of sneaky intentions. Why? Because Searle’s 
central claim is that German Soldier is a case in which conditions (1), (2), and (3) of the telling 
mechanism are satisfied, when, as Grice demonstrates, it is not. Grice responds to Searle, as 
follows: 
 
Is [German Soldier] […] a genuine counterexample? It seems to me that the imaginary 
situation is under-described […] The situation might be such that the only real 
chance that the Italian soldiers would, on hearing the American soldier speak his 
German line, suppose him to be a German officer, would be if they were to argue as 
follows: “He has just spoken in German (perhaps in an authoritative tone); we don't 
know any German, and we have no idea what he has been trying to tell us, but if he 
speaks German, then the most likely possibility is that he is a German officer – what 
other Germans would be in this part of the world?” If the situation was such that the 
Italians were likely to argue like that, and the American knew that to be so, then it 
would be difficult to avoid attributing to him the intention, when he spoke, that they 
should argue like that. As I recently remarked, one cannot in general intend that 
some result should be achieved, if one knows that there is no likelihood that it will be 
achieved. But if the American's intention was as just described, then he certainly 
would not, by my account, be meaning that he is a German officer; for though he 
would intend the Italians to believe him to be a German officer, he would not be 
intending them to believe this on the basis of their recognition of his intention. And it 
seems to me that though this is not how Searle wished the example to be taken, it 
would be much the most likely situation to have obtained. (Grice 1989: 101) 
 
To be clear, the key point to draw out from Grice’s response to Searle is that although 
German Soldier satisfies condition (1) of the telling mechanism, it fails to satisfy condition (2), 
and thus condition (3). That is, German Soldier is not best described as a case in which the 
American soldier intends that the Italian soldiers acquire a belief that he is a German soldier 




Rather, it is best described as a case in which the American soldier intends that the Italian 
soldiers acquire a belief that he is a German soldier on the basis of an argument that they will 
likely construct for themselves, as follows: 
 
German Soldier Inference  
 
Premise 1:  He has just spoken in German. 
Premise 2:  If he speaks German, then he is a German soldier. 
Conclusion:  He is a German soldier. 
 
This observation is crucial to solving the problem of sneaky intentions, because, on 
reflection, we can see that German Soldier and Rat Infestation are in fact structurally 
analogous: Rat Infestation satisfies condition (1) of the telling mechanism, but it fails to satisfy 
condition (2), and thus condition (3). That is, Rat Infestation is not best described as a case in 
which U intends that A acquire a belief that the house is rat-infested on the basis of A 
recognising U’s intention that A acquire a belief that the house is rat-infested. Rather, it is best 
described as a case in which U intends that A acquire a belief that the house is rat-infested 
on the basis of an argument A will likely construct for themselves, as follows: 
 
Rat Infestation Inference 
 
Premise 1:  U released rats into the house. 
Premise 2:  If U released rats into the house, then U intends that I (A) acquire a 
belief that the house is rat-infested. 
Premise 3:  If U intends that I (A) acquire a belief that the house is rat-infested, 
then the house is rat-infested.  
Conclusion:  The house is rat-infested. 
 
What this demonstrates is that Strawson does not provide a genuine counterexample to 
Grice’s framework of communication. Why? Because he does not provide a case in which 




communicators intentions are not wholly overt in the relevant sense. Notice, though, that 
Rat Infestation, unlike German Soldier, has the following feature: A’s inferences involve 
reference to U’s intentions (as can be seen in Premise 2 and Premise 3 of Rat Infestation 
Inference). My sneaky solution to the problem of sneaky intentions thus resides in the 
following observation: although A’s inferences involve reference to U’s intentions, it is a 
mistake to think that this alone supports the claim that U intends that A acquire a belief that 
the house is rat-infested on the basis of A recognising U’s intention that A acquire a belief 
that the house is rat-infested.133 Strawson, however, mis-describes the case in just this way 
and thus makes precisely this mistake.  
 
Note, we can vindicate this sneaky solution to the problem of sneaky intentions by reflecting 
on the mutuality involved in genuine cases of telling. Recall, when a speaker makes a 
contribution which involves the telling mechanism specifically, comprehending the speaker 
involves assuming that they satisfy the telling mechanism, which itself involves employing 
the cooperative principle, and thus the maxims that fall within it, i.e., the mutual default 
expectations that they encapsulate. That is, when a speaker makes a contribution which 
involves the telling mechanism specifically, they freely and publicly publish their intention 
that the hearer acquire a belief on the basis of the hearer recognising the speaker’s intention 
that the hearer acquire a belief. And in doing so, they freely and publicly engender the 
specific mutual default expectation that the speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the 
reason why they tell that p is that they know that p, a corollary of which is the super mutual 
default expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true. Why? Because due to the exclusive 
symbiotic relationship between the telling mechanism and the maxims of quality, i.e., the 
mutual default expectations that they encapsulate, said mutual default expectations 
comprise of the mutual recognition of the speaker’s reflexive intention, and the mutual 
recognition of the speaker’s reflexive intention is comprised of said mutual default 
expectations. As I see it, it is precisely this mutuality involved in genuine cases of telling 
 
 
133 Note, this seems to provide us with a kind of pattern for generating solutions to cases of this form, no matter 




which embodies Strawson’s notion of ‘essential avowabilty’ and ‘overtness’. However, as 
Strawson himself observes, Rat Infestation does not admit of such mutuality. Rather than 
thinking this spells trouble for Grice’s notion of telling, though, it seems more appropriate to 
think it spells trouble for Rat Infestation being plausibly construed as a genuine 































































5. Exploring the Exotica 
 
In this chapter, I play the assertion counterexample game. I start by setting out my 
general approach to apparent borderline cases of and apparent counterexamples to my 
view of assertion, which essentially is to let my theoretical elaboration of our candidate 
explicatum, (AE), lead the way. I focus on three types of cases in particular, namely, so-
called ‘bald-faced lies’, ‘double bluffs’, and ‘resolute assertions’ (introduced in §2.5). 
Each one of these types of cases apparently shows that it possible to make an assertion 
that p without the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p, which would therefore 
mean that (AE) is too restrictive and thus implausible. However, by utilising my 
theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, as well as drawing on other 
independently plausible theoretical considerations from the philosophy literature, I 
show that (AE) can be defended against these three types of cases. Moreover, in the 
course of doing this, I address the final item, item (11), on the substantive list (i.e., 
Moore’s paradox). By the end of the chapter, I hope to have shown that playing the 
assertion counterexample game is not the daunting prospect that it is sometimes made 
out to be, but rather a useful philosophical tool. 
 
5.1. Arguing by Theory vs. Arguing by Counterexample 
 
At the beginning of this thesis (§2.5), I proposed the following candidate explicatum:  
 
(AE) Essentially, assertion is a communicative act which involves a speaker saying 
that p with the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p. 
 
In the previous chapter (§4.3), I provided a full theoretical elaboration of our candidate 
explicatum, as follows. Essentially, assertion is when a speaker says that p (in the Austinian 
sense (see §2.1)) with the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p on the basis of the 
hearer recognising their intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p. As such, 




telling mechanism. Furthermore, assuming that the speaker satisfies the telling mechanism 
involves employing the cooperative principle, and thus the maxims that fall within it, i.e., 
the mutual default expectations that they encapsulate. Specifically, it involves employing the 
specific mutual default expectation that the speaker tells that p in virtue of the fact that the 
reason why they tell that p is that they know that p, of which the super mutual default 
expectation that what the speaker tells, p, is true is a corollary. Accordingly, the type of 
communicative exchange in which the speech act of assertion is performed are those the 
purpose or direction of which is to transmit knowledge specifically. 
 
With this in hand, I am almost ready to play the assertion counterexample game, i.e., where 
I, having identified a subset of sayings in terms of the features detailed above, and 
essentialising and labelling the resulting act type ‘assertion’, am faced with counterexamples 
designed to show that it is possible to make an assertion which does not involve said 
essential features. Before I play, however, some comments are in order. As I said in §2.6, 
while some philosophers might hastily and wholeheartedly rely on arguments which turn 
on apparent borderline cases or apparent counterexamples as a way of guiding their inquiry, 
I am sceptical of this strategy. As I see it, trying to interpret and respond to apparent 
borderline cases or apparent counterexamples without first imposing some theoretical 
considerations on them is tantamount to philosophising inside a vacuum, where no traction 
can be gained, and which leads to a philosophical war of attrition in which each side fights 
using only their intuitions. As such, I think that arguments should instead turn on the 
theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, which should occasion philosophers to 
scrutinise apparent borderline cases or apparent counterexamples more cautiously. That is, 
furnished with my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, we should feel 
comfortable to raise questions about the inherent plausibility of apparent borderline cases or 
apparent counterexamples, or at least be willing to entertain the possibility that they might 
be best understood in terms of something other than assertion, especially if not doing so 
might all too quickly cost us the theoretical elaboration of the concept and the fruit it bears. 
As I also said in §2.6, I appreciate that some might worry that this will lead to an unpalatable 
revisionism about certain apparent cases of assertion. However, I think such a worry is 




under consideration are sufficiently well-established in the philosophy literature as cases of 
assertion in the first place in order to make revising them unpalatable. Yet, as we have seen, 
what ‘assertion’ denotes in the philosophy literature, apart from the paradigm case, is 
unclear. 
 
In light of this, I wish to dismiss at the outset what might be seen as two apparent borderline 
cases of assertion and thus what might be seen as two potential counterexamples to my 
view: secret diary entries and soliloquies (see §2.2). Since speakers in such cases are typically 
not understood as directing their thoughts and feelings towards another person, they simply 
do not fit my conception of assertion. Moreover, I do not see any compelling reason why we 
must class them as cases of assertion. This should not be seen as a problem, though, not only 
because the objection of revisionism cannot be meaningfully levelled against me, but 
because I concede that they are nonetheless cases of testimony – indeed, cases of hearer-
testimony. And, as we have seen, the term ‘testimony’ extends over different types of speech 
act, though it is unclear just how many different types of speech act it may extend over.134 
Thus, these cases already have their respective labels, and philosophers are already well 
positioned to theorise about them, without classing them as cases of assertion.135 Some might 
flag up here that there are alternative conceptions of assertion in the philosophy literature 
on which cases of secret diary entries and soliloquies are classed as cases of assertion. In 
response, I invite them to consider the following three questions regarding any such 




134 To the best of my knowledge there is no comprehensive philosophical treatment of a secret diary entry or a 
soliloquy. Nonetheless, they have been subsumed under the moniker ‘assertion’ by philosophers of language and 
epistemologists of testimony alike. 
135 I should say, though, that I think it has been overstated how often hearers might acquire knowledge on the 
basis of finding secret diary entries and overhearing soliloquies. Secret diary entries are often the result of 
venting sessions, where the speaker expresses their feelings and emotions. Similarly, soliloquies are often 
performed by speakers who are venting, and thus expressing their feelings and emotions. In other words, in 




• Can it, like the conception of assertion I have proposed, fruitfully be applied to 
almost all the philosophically interesting phenomena related to the speech act (i.e., 
all of items (1) through (11) on the substantive list in §2.5)?136  
• Does it, like the conception of assertion I have proposed, at least seemingly afford us 
a vocabulary to help us explain the outstanding phenomena peripheral in the study 
of assertion? 
• Is it, like the conception of assertion I have proposed, transparent with regard to the 
things that it postulates, the nature of those things, and the mechanisms involving 
them? 
 
The invitation to consider such questions embodies the method of reflective equilibrium at 
play here, namely, to weigh up the cost/benefit of ruling out certain cases as cases of 
assertion against the cost/benefit of ruling in such cases as cases of assertion. As I see it, 
when it comes to ruling out secret diary entries and soliloquies as cases of assertion 
specifically, there is no cost apart from maybe some initial discomfort for some readers in 
reconciling their intuitions. However, the benefit of ruling out such cases as cases of 
assertion means that we get to keep hold of a comprehensive, fruitful, and transparent 
conception of assertion. Thus, I do not see my immediate dismissal of secret diary entries or 
soliloquies as cases of assertion as unreasonable, nor do I see it as showing that my 
conception of assertion is implausible in anyway.137  
 
Essentially, I think more weight should be given to verdicts with the force of theory behind 
them. And since I think that my view is the best unified theory, I take my verdicts about 
 
 
136 I address the final item, item (11), on the substantive list (i.e., Moore’s paradox) in §5.2.2. 
137 Admittedly, the implication here is that there is currently no alternative conception of assertion in the 
philosophy literature such that these questions can be answered affirmatively, let alone answered affirmatively 
and rule in secret diary entries and soliloquies as cases of assertion. Although this is what I think, I am not able to 
gather together all the existing conceptions of assertion in the philosophy literature in one place and show that 
this is the case and why. As such, the best I can do is invite the reader to consider such questions themselves and 




what counts as an assertion to be better for that reason. As such, I am making a suggestion 
about how I would categorise cases which, on my view, do not turn out to be assertions but 
concerning which there is at least some reason to think that they are assertions. That is, I am 
not trying to convince anyone that my re-categorisations must be correct but rather to show 
that I have a reasoned and defensible response to apparent counterexamples. Of course, a 
problem might arise if someone rejects the theory that I endorse, but that will not be because 
apparent counterexamples create a problem for my view while not creating a problem for 
others. In other words, my take on apparent counterexamples seems to be at least as good as 
any alternative. Therefore, objectors will have to do more than just assert that certain cases 
are counterexamples to my view. 
 
This, I hope, serves as a clear articulation of the way in which I approach apparent 
borderline cases and apparent counterexamples generally, having provided a theoretical 
elaboration for what is, after all, a philosophical term of art. To put it in a slogan: although 
intuitions are welcome to the party, the theory buys the drinks. With that, I am ready to play the 
assertion counterexample game. 
 
5.2. Objection 1: bald-faced lies 
 




A gifted pianist is practicing when the telephone rings inconveniently. The butler 
picks up the phone and says to the caller that the maestro is not home. The caller 
objects by saying, ‘But I hear him playing’. The butler responds, ‘You are mistaken, 










A party guest is wreaking havoc – he is drunk, offending people, bumping into and 
breaking things, and generally causing a scene. The host suggests to the guest that he 
should leave. As the guest is leaving, he says, ‘I’m sorry, I shouldn’t have drunk so 
much’. The host says politely, ‘Not at all. It was an utter pleasure having you. We 




A Dean catches a student red-handed cheating during an exam. However, there is no 
direct confession from the student. The Dean has a strict policy by which she refuses 
to punish any student for cheating in the absence of a confession from that very 
student – which is well-known by all students. The Dean calls the student into her 
office and plays video footage of the incident. She then asks, ‘Did you cheat?’ The 
student says, ‘No, I did not cheat’. The Dean sends the student away unpunished.139 
 
Cases of this sort are known as ‘bald-faced lies’. These types of cases are described as ones in 
which the speaker asserts that p even though it is common knowledge (between speaker and 
hearer) that the speaker does not believe that p. That is, the speaker and the hearer each 
know that the speaker does not believe that p, and each know that each know that the 
speaker does not believe that p, and each know that each know that each know that the 
speaker does not believe that p, and so on. It is this last point specifically, i.e., it being 
common knowledge (between speaker and hearer) that the speaker does not believe that p, 
which supposedly determines why the speaker does not – because they cannot – intend that 








Premise 1:  If so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are assertions, then it is possible to make 
an assertion without intending that the hearer acquire a belief that p. 
Premise 2:  If it is possible to make an assertion without intending that the hearer 
acquire a belief that p, then (AE) is false. 
Premise 3: So-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are assertions. 
Conclusion:  (AE) is false.140 
 
By using a novel adaptation of Moore’s paradox based on my theoretical elaboration of our 
candidate explicatum, I intend to show, however, that premise 3 is false. Note, it is 
traditionally thought that it is a necessary condition on lying that the speaker intends that 
the hearer acquire a belief in a proposition which the speaker believes to be false. As such, 
many have argued that so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ show that the traditional definition of 
lying is false.141 Therefore, my defence of (AE) also functions as a defence of the traditional 
definition of lying. 
 




I start from this: that it’s perfectly absurd or nonsensical to say such things as [‘p but I 
don’t believe that p’]. So far as I can see, when we say it’s absurd to say [‘p but I don’t 
believe that p’], we don’t mean that it’s absurd merely to utter the words, but 
something like this: it’s absurd to say them in the sort of way in which people utter 
sentences, when they are using these sentences to assert the proposition which these 
sentences express. I will call this ‘saying them assertively’. I don’t want to say that to 
 
 
140 Those who defend the view that so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are genuine assertions and thus genuine lies include 
Carson (2006), Fallis (2009; 2012; 2014), Garcia-Carpintero (2018), Saul (2012), Sorensen (2007), and Stokke (2013; 
2018). 




utter sentences assertively is the same as making an assertion. (Moore in Baldwin 
(ed.) 2003: 207) 
 
He writes further: 
 
[W]hat I imply by saying [‘p but I don’t believe that p’] contradicts what is meant by 
my saying that I don’t believe it: so that there is a contradiction between what I 
implied and something I said, though none between the two things I said. And I 
suggest that this is why it is absurd for me to say it, even though there’s no 
contradiction between the two things I said. But now the question may be raised: 
What’s meant by saying that I imply it? The only answer I can see to this is that it is 
something which follows from the following empirical fact: viz. that in the immense 
majority of cases in which a person says a thing assertively, he does believe the 
proposition which his words express. (Moore in Baldwin (ed.) 2003: 210) 
 
It is worth making a few comments here. First, the reason why such cases are considered 
paradoxical is because there is nothing problematic in both p being true and an individual 
not believing that p, but seemingly there is something problematic with a speaker asserting 
both at the same time. Second, Moore claims that when a speaker makes an assertion that p, 
they ‘imply’ that they believe that p. His account of the way in which assertion implies belief 
rests on an inductive association, whereby the link between assertion and belief is so 
common that we experience utterances in which this implication is contradicted as wrong.142 
However, we need not endorse this Moorean notion of ‘implication’. Why? Because we can 
account for the sense in which a speaker, when they make an assertion, not only expresses or 
manifests a belief in what they assert, but indeed represents themselves as having the 
knowledge in question, by appealing to the maxims of quality, i.e., the specific mutual 
default expectation that speaker asserts that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they 
assert that p is that they know that p, of which the super mutual default expectation that 
 
 




what the speaker asserts, p, is true is a corollary. Third, and especially important for our 
purposes, Moore makes a point of distinguishing between ‘uttering a sentence assertively’ 
and ‘making an assertion’. I submit that the most plausible reading of Moore’s distinction is 
this: although a speaker may utter assertively ‘p but I don’t believe that p’, they will not 
succeed in making an assertion to that effect in doing so. Note, though, my defence of (AE) 
does not depend on whether Moore actually endorses this particular reading of his 
distinction or not, nor does it depend on any pre-theoretical intuitions I may have about his 
distinction. Rather, the fact that I am starting from my theoretical elaboration of our 
candidate explicatum vindicates this particular reading of Moore’s distinction as the most 
plausible, as I will show.143 
 
5.2.2. A Gricean Account of Moorean Paradox 
 
Consider the following: 
 
Bank Location Frustration 
 
Shannon is new in town and does not know where the bank is, so she asks a passing 
stranger, Sylvester: 
 
Shannon: Excuse me, is the bank on the East- or West-side of town? 
Sylvester: It’s on the East-side of town, but I don’t believe that it’s on the East-





143 As such, any objections against this particular reading of Moore’s distinction which do not respect the fact that 





Shannon is at a complete loss. She is not able to take Sylvester’s utterance as a joke, she is not 
able to calculate an implicature from it, and she is not able to ascribe the belief that the 
station is on the East-side to Sylvester, so that she can interpret and, in turn, comprehend 
him as having asserted anything to her. In sum, Sylvester’s utterance does not play a proper 
role in the conversation. What we have here is a standard Moorean paradox.  
 
Using the theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, we can diagnose this case in 
the following way. Sylvester utters assertively, which is to say that he makes his utterance in 
such a way which would usually license Shannon to ascribe to Sylvester the intention that 
she acquire a belief on the basis of her recognising his intention that she acquire said belief. 
However, Sylvester utters assertively not only that p, but also his lack of belief in p, openly 
flouting the maxims of quality, i.e., the specific mutual default expectation that speaker 
asserts that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they assert that p is that they know that 
p, of which the super mutual default expectation that what the speaker asserts, p, is true is a 
corollary. Since Shannon is not able to employ the maxims of quality, she is not able to 
interpret and, in turn, comprehend Sylvester’s behaviour as an act of assertion. This thus 
results in Sylvester apparently making a contribution (in virtue of performing a locution), 
but not successfully making a contribution (failing to perform an illocution) such as it is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
exchange in which he and Shannon are purportedly engaged. In other words, Sylvester 
blocks the ways in which Shannon tries to recognise his intention, rendering his utterance 
wholly uncooperative.144 
 
Austin’s (1962) discussion of ‘infelicities’ is instructive here, in which he talks about the 
‘unhappy’ functioning of a speech act. According to Austin, infelicities fall into two 




144 Note, the case could be reformulated such that Sylvester utters assertively that he believes that not-p rather 





Abuses: the speech act is achieved but it is ‘insincere’. 
Misfires: the speech act is not achieved, because the speech act which the speaker 
purports to perform is ‘botched’. (13–24) 
 
As I see it, Moorean paradox is best understood in terms of Austinian misfire, not abuse.145 
Indeed, understanding Moorean paradox in terms of Austinian misfire provides a neat way 
of understanding Moore’s distinction between ‘uttering assertively’ and ‘making an 
assertion’. Accordingly, let us call Moorean paradox an instance of ‘botched assertion’, 
where a botched assertion should not be seen as an instance of assertion, but rather as an 
instance of a special type of utterance characterised by its failure to be the type of speech act 
it purports to be.146 
 
5.2.3. Contextual Moorean Paradox 
 
What can we learn from Moore’s paradox? I suggest the following: 
 
Moorean lesson: If a speaker utters assertively that p whilst at the same time (at least 





145 Thank you to Mitch Green (personal correspondence) for a helpful conversation about this.  
146 Another (albeit non-Moorean) case in which speakers’ assertions might be thought to misfire is in a case put 
forward by Kripke (1975), where the professor in classroom 1A writes on the board, ‘Whatever the professor in 
1B writes on their board is true’, and where the professor in classroom 1B at the same time just happens to write 
on their board, ‘Whatever the professor in 1A writes on their board is false’. As I see it, both professors’ 




By fleshing out the notion of openness in terms of ‘mutual manifestness’, we can gain a 
better understanding of what Moorean absurdity amounts to.147 Specifically, Moorean 
absurdity is the clash between the mutual manifestness of the speaker’s lack of belief that p 
and the specific mutual default expectation that the speaker asserts that p in virtue of the fact 
that the reason why they assert that p is that they know that p, of which the super mutual 
default expectation that what the speaker asserts, p, is true is a corollary. Since the 
employment of said mutual default expectation is essential to comprehending the speaker’s 
intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p on the basis of the hearer recognising the 
speaker’s intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p, the clash between the mutual 
manifestness of the speaker’s lack of belief that p and said mutual default expectation 
explains why the speaker’s intention is thwarted. Moreover, this provides us with a clear 
articulation of the way in which Moorean paradox results in botched assertion. What is 
especially interesting about this, though, is that a speaker’s (at least apparent) open lack of 
belief can manifest itself in more ways than Moore appreciates. Specifically, it can manifest 




It is common knowledge between friends Jack and Jane that Jack believes in ghosts 
and that Jane does not – he is head of the Paranormal Activity Society and she is head 
of the Shifty Sciences Society. Jack’s wife calls when he is with Jane and, after the call, 
he says, ‘My wife’s angry because she found the front door unlocked when she came 
home. Now I think about it, it was probably my son, whom I suspect went out after 
me but before my wife got in’. Jane says, ‘It can’t have been him. He was at our 
house’. Jack realises Jane is correct. Jane takes a sip of her drink and says, ‘So, it must 
 
 
147 See Sperber & Wilson (1986) for more on mutual manifestness. Essentially, something is manifest to an 
individual if and only if they can represent it mentally and accept its representation as true or probably true. 





have been ghosts’. Jack scowls playfully at her, ‘Alright, quit mocking me’. ‘I’m not 
mocking you. It was ghosts’, she says seriously. Jack responds confused and irritated, 
‘Please, stop’. Jane looks at Jack earnestly and says, ‘It’s ghosts that unlocked your 
front door, trust me’. Jack stares at Jane, puzzled. 
 
Jack is at a complete loss. He is not able to take Jane’s utterance as a joke, he is not able to 
calculate an implicature from it, and he is not able to attribute the belief that ghosts unlocked 
the door to her, so that he can interpret and, in turn, comprehend her as having asserted 
anything to him. In sum, Jane’s utterance does not play a proper role in the conversation. 
What we have here is a contextual Moorean paradox. 148 
 
Again, using the theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, we can diagnose this 
case in the following way. Jane utters assertively, which is to say that she makes an utterance 
in such a way which would usually license Jack to ascribe to Jane the intention that he 
acquire a belief on the basis of him recognising her intention that he acquire said belief. 
However, Jane utters assertively that p when it is common knowledge (between Jack and 
Jane) that Jane does not believe that p, openly flouting the maxims of quality, i.e., the specific 
mutual default expectation that speaker asserts that p in virtue of the fact that the reason 
why they assert that p is that they know that p, of which the super mutual default 
expectation that what the speaker asserts, p, is true is a corollary. Since Jack is not able to 
employ the maxims of quality, he is not able to interpret and, in turn, comprehend Jane’s 
behaviour as an act of assertion. This thus results in Jane apparently making a contribution 
(in virtue of performing a locution), but not successfully making a contribution (failing to 
perform an illocution) such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the exchange in which she and Jack are purportedly engaged. In 
 
 
148 Max Black (1952) serves as my inspiration here. He gives an example of a speaker uttering assertively that they 
are 2ft tall when it is common knowledge (between speaker and hearer) that the speaker is at least 6ft tall, and 




other words, Jane blocks the ways in which Jack tries to recognise his intention, rendering 
her utterance wholly uncooperative, thus resulting in a botched assertion. 
 
5.2.4. Contextual Moorean Paradox Test 
 
Apart from being interesting in and of itself, the contextual Moorean paradox can be put to 
work. Consider the following: 
 
Contextual Moorean Paradox Test 
 
If a speaker utters that p when it is common knowledge (between the speaker and the 
hearer) that the speaker does not believe that p, there are only two options regarding 
the status of the speaker’s utterance: 
 
a) The speaker performs some (speech) act other than assertion, or 
b) The speaker’s utterance results in Moorean absurdity (i.e., botched assertion).  
 
How does the test work? To start, consider any case of a speaker uttering that p and re-
construct it (if it is not already so constructed) in such a way that the speaker’s utterance is 
performed against a context in which it is common knowledge (between the speaker and the 
hearer) that the speaker does not believe that p. Then, make a verdict on whether the 
utterance results in Moorean absurdity or not. This will depend on the plausibility of 
ascribing to the speaker the intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p on the basis of the 
hearer recognising the speaker’s intention that the hearer acquire a belief that p, which itself 
will depend on the plausibility that the specific mutual default expectation that speaker 
asserts that p in virtue of the fact that the reason why they assert that p is that they know that 
p, of which the super mutual default expectation that what the speaker asserts, p, is true is a 
corollary is in place. If the utterance does not result in Moorean absurdity, then it must be 
some (speech) act other than assertion. If the utterance does result in Moorean absurdity, 
then it must be a botched assertion. The crucial observation to make here, though, is that 




the contextual Moorean paradox test demonstrates that so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are not 
assertions. As such, premise 3 is false. (AE) is preserved. 
 
5.2.5. The Many Faces of So-called ‘Bald-faced Lies’ 
 
Following Keiser (2016), I not only hold the view that so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are not 
assertions, but I also hold the view that the term ‘bald-faced lie’, as it has been used in the 
philosophy literature, fails to pick out a single act type. Indeed, I think that cases of so-called 
‘bald-faced lies’ cut across options (a) and (b) from the contextual Moorean paradox test. Let 
us consider the ways in which we might interpret cases of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ which 
seem to fall most comfortably under category (a): the speaker performs some (speech) act 
other than assertion. Perhaps some cases of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are best understood as 
cases of implicature, whereby the speaker utters that p in a context in which it is common 
knowledge (between the speaker and the hearer) that the speaker does not believe that p in 
order to implicate q. (Notice that Loyal Butler may be plausibly interpreted in this way.) 
Perhaps some cases of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are best understood as cases of ‘acting’, 
whereby the speaker utters that p in a context in which it is common knowledge (between 
the speaker and the hearer) that the speaker does not believe that p, because the speaker and 
the hearer are engaged in some form of mutual pretence.149 (Notice that Polite Host may be 
plausibly interpreted in this way.) Or, perhaps some cases of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are 
best understood as cases of ‘(quasi-)institutional’ speech acts, whereby the speaker utters 
that p in a context in which it is common knowledge (between speaker and hearer) that the 
speaker does not believe that p in order to, say, formally ‘enter a plea’ of not guilty. (Notice 
that Cheating Student may be plausibly interpreted in this way.)150  
 
Let us move on now to cases of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ which seem to fall most 
comfortably under category (b): the speaker’s utterance results in Moorean absurdity (i.e., 
 
 
149 Maitra (2018) makes an argument for a position which is like this. 




botched assertion). Cases of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ which fall under category (b) arise for 
various reasons. For example, perhaps the speaker is conversationally cornered and wishes 
to opt out of the exchange, and yet cannot do anything but perform a botched assertion 
given the other conversational moves the exchange allows them to make.151 A particularly 
interesting type of case which falls under category (b), however, is when a speaker 
deliberately and nefariously performs a botched assertion. Why would a speaker 
deliberately and nefariously perform a botched assertion? Because the speaker wishes to put 
the hearer in the position where they cannot judge properly what the speaker is doing, in an 
attempt to tease, afront, intimidate, or confuse the hearer for their own gain or amusement. 
In other words, these are cases in which the speaker is ‘trolling’ the hearer.152 As I see it, such 
cases are best understood in terms of the notion of ‘conversational perversion’, a notion 
recently developed by Bourne & Caddick Bourne (2018).153 
 
5.2.6. So-called ‘Bald-faced Lies’ & Conversational Perversions 
 
Bourne & Caddick Bourne’s inspiration for their account of conversational perversion comes 
from Nagel’s (1969) account of sexual perversion. Nagel suggests understanding sexual 
perversion as something which thwarts the reciprocal awareness and recognition involved 




151 Politicians and public figures are often seen behaving as such, especially when conversationally cornered by 
journalists.  
152 Just to be clear, I am not trying to define what trolling is here, nor am I committed to the position that trolling 
must be understood solely in terms of Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s notion of conversational perversion. Rather, 
I am merely illustrating how Bourne & Caddick Bourne’s notion of conversational perversion helps articulate the 
mechanisms at play in at least some instances of trolling. For more on trolling, see Barney (2016).  
153 Meibauer (2014) argues that so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are acts of ‘verbal aggression’. By understanding so-
called ‘bald-faced lies’ in terms of conversational perversion, we have a neat way of articulating the underlying 




[R]eflexive mutual recognition is to be found in the phenomenon of meaning, which 
appears to involve the intention to produce a belief or other effect in another by bringing 
about his recognition of one’s attention to produce that effect. (That result is due to H. P. 
Grice, whose position I shall not attempt to reproduce in detail.) Sex has a related 
structure: it involves a desire that one’s partner be aroused by the recognition of one’s 
desire that he or she be aroused. (Nagel 1969: 12) 
 
Although Nagel’s observation is made in passing, Bourne & Caddick Bourne claim that it is 
key to articulating the possibility of perversion not only in the sexual but in the 
conversational case. The structure Nagel identifies is a sexual analogue of the telling 
mechanism. Call it the ‘Nagelian mechanism’:  
 
Nagelian mechanism: A desires that B become aroused on the basis of B recognising 
A’s desire that B become aroused.154 
 
The idea here is that a sexual act is perverted if it does not allow for the instantiation of the 
Nagelian mechanism. For instance, an act that involves selecting a sexual partner which one 
thinks is incapable of recognising one’s desire is perverted for that very reason (e.g., 
bestiality). Bourne & Caddick Bourne’s idea, then, is to use the structural similarity between 
conversational and sexual encounters to define various conversational perversions 
corresponding to sexual perversions. One type of perversion that they focus on is sadism. 
According to them, the way to pinpoint the source of the perversion in sexual sadism is to 
focus on what is needed in order for a person to recognise a desire that they be aroused: the 
desire must be demonstrated to them. They write: 
 
Sadistic actions do not demonstrate a desire that the other person be aroused. Instead, 
they demonstrate a desire that the partner suffer or that they be hurt or humiliated 
(for example), rather than that they be aroused. By not demonstrating the desire that 
 
 




the other person be aroused, the sadist blocks the other person from recognising that 
desire in them. Thus in choosing sadistic acts, a person does not desire that they 
demonstrate, to their partner, the desire that the partner be aroused, and so does not 
desire that the partner recognise a desire that they be aroused. The desire that the 
partner be aroused on the basis of recognising the desire that they be aroused is 
therefore missing, and the basic Nagelian mechanism is not instantiated. (2018: 149—
150) 
 
With this in mind, recall that the telling mechanism captures a structure in which 
conversational participants comprehend each other by means of mutual recognition of the 
speaker’s intention, whereby the speaker intends that the hearer acquire a belief that p on 
the basis of the hearer recognising the speaker’s intention that the hearer acquire a belief that 
p. Moreover, recall that the ways in which conversational participants attribute such 
reflexive intentions to each other is described by appealing to our communicative standards, 
i.e., the cooperative principle, and thus the conversational maxims which fall within it. 
Bourne & Caddick Bourne’s idea, then, is that our communicative standards can be 
exploited by a speaker to deliberately block the ways in which the hearer tries to recognise the 




Olivia, a project manager for a large organisation, has put together an initial plan for 
the deployment of a new IT system. However, she has not consulted the IT team. 
During a presentation of her proposed strategy, one of the IT experts in the audience, 
Drew, realises that several steps will not work, because Olivia has failed to consider 
certain technical limitations. Irritated by her lack of communication with the IT team, 
Drew raises his hand and, when invited to speak, reels of the following: ‘If you wish 
to deploy this new IT system, you need to decide whether it is going to be an on-
premise or cloud-hosted solution, and then, depending on that, you need to work out 
how it is going to fit with our virtualised SQL infrastructure, especially given the 




code of connection’. Olivia stands in silence before the audience, confused and 
embarrassed. 
 
The idea in this particular case is that Drew deliberately utters things which he knows Olivia 
does not have the expertise to understand, by choosing obscure specialist terminology. What 
Drew chooses to utter is selected precisely because Olivia cannot identify what beliefs she 
should acquire and thus cannot respond suitably in the conversation. Bourne & Caddick 
Bourne call this an instance of ‘conversational sadism’:  
 
The sadist does not intend that the hearer acquires a belief on the basis of recognising 
their [reflexive] intention, but rather intends that the hearer feels they cannot judge 
what the sadist’s [reflexive] intentions are. (Bourne & Caddick Bourne 2018: 150) 
 
Now, I should note that Bourne & Caddick Bourne do not apply the notion of conversational 
perversion to cases of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’. However, so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ seem to 
fit the model well. Specifically, they seem to be a unique type of conversational sadism. That 
is, rather than, say, deliberately using obfuscating technical jargon to block the instantiation 
of the telling mechanism, so-called ‘bald-faced liars’ block the instantiation of the telling 
mechanism by deliberately uttering assertively what they openly disbelieve. To illustrate 
this, consider again Puzzling Poltergeist which seems to be a case of so-called ‘bald-faced 
lying’ which falls comfortably under category (b) from the contextual Moorean paradox test. 
Jane utters assertively, which is to say that she makes an utterance in such a way which 
would usually license Jack to ascribe to Jane the intention that he acquire a belief on the 
basis of him recognising her intention that he acquire said belief. However, Jane deliberately 
utters assertively that p when it is common knowledge (between Jack and Jane) that Jane 
does not believe that p, deliberately openly flouting the maxims of quality, i.e., the specific 
mutual default expectation that speaker asserts that p in virtue of the fact that the reason 
why they assert that p is that they know that p, of which the super mutual default 
expectation that what the speaker asserts, p, is true is a corollary. Since Jack is not able to 
employ the maxims of quality, he is not able to interpret and, in turn, comprehend Jane’s 




(in virtue of performing a locution), but deliberately not successfully making a contribution 
(deliberately failing to perform an illocution) such as it is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the exchange in which she and Jack are 
purportedly engaged. In other words, Jane deliberately blocks the ways in which Jack tries to 
recognise his reflexive intention, rendering her utterance wholly uncooperative, thus 
deliberately resulting in a botched assertion. 
 
5.2.7. Challenging So-called ‘Bald-faced Liars’ 
 
Although Bourne & Caddick Bourne do not explore the idea of challenging conversational 
perverts, it seems an interesting topic. So-called ‘bald-faced liars’ are particularly interesting 
in this respect, because they are sometimes mistakenly thought to be performing genuine 
assertions and thus genuine lies. A such, a hearer faced with a so-called ‘bald-faced lie’ 
might readily, though uneasily, respond to the speaker the only way they know how. For 
example, they might say, ‘That is false!’, ‘You don’t believe that!’, or ‘How do you know 
that?!’. Of course, such epistemic challenges are misguided, since it is common knowledge 
(between the speaker and the hearer) that the speaker disbelieves what they utter – that is 
the crux of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’, after all. However, given the enigmatic nature of so-
called ‘bald-faced lies’, such responses are understandable and perhaps not uncommon. 
Unfortunately, if a hearer does take this line against a so-called ‘bald-faced liar’, they will 
have been led astray, which may create frustration, confusion, and embarrassment in the 
hearer, resulting in the speaker’s amusement or gain. Thus, we can further see the sense in 
which so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are an appropriate tool for trolling. How, then, should we 
go about challenging so-called ‘bald-faced liars’? The obvious answer is that we should 
charge them with being wholly uncooperative conversationally. However, before we rush to 
declare victory over so-called ‘bald-faced liars’, we must remember that such conversational 
perverts are decidedly brazen in their behaviour – they are overt with respect to the 
infelicity of their utterances. For instance, political journalist Andrew Sullivan (2019) recalls 
a television interview between Donald Trump and George Stephanopoulos in which Trump 
says, ‘I like the truth. I’m actually a very honest guy’. According to Sullivan, Trump’s 




was less a statement of nonfact than an expression of pure power’.155 As such, even if we 
challenge so-called ‘bald-faced liars’ as being wholly uncooperative conversationally, such a 
challenge might be just as futile as the epistemic challenges mentioned above. Indeed, the 
speaker may simply respond with more so-called ‘bald-faced lies’, further demonstrating 
their brazenness. It is no coincidence that advice for ignoring trolls generally is, ‘Please don’t 
feed the trolls’, after all.156 Nonetheless, if we want to hold people accountable, we need to 
know what it is we are holding them accountable for.157, 158 So, we can talk in terms of ‘bald-
faced lies’ if we like, but not only should we not buy into the idea that they are genuine 
assertions and thus genuine lies for purely philosophical purposes, we should not buy into 
this idea for social and political purposes as well. 
 
5.3. Objection 2: double bluffs 
 




Suppose a spy, Natasha, asserts to her foreign counterpart that her partner is dead, 
yet she knows full well that he knows that her partner is alive and is being held by 
 
 
155 See Sullivan (2019). 
156 See Sullivan (2012). 
157 At this point, it might be thought that Cheating Student falls more comfortably under category (b) from the 
contextual Moorean paradox test (in §5.2.4), rather than category (a). I certainly think that this interpretation of 
the case has legs, for when the student is called into the Dean’s office and confronted by the Dean about having 
cheated, the student could avoid punishment by simply staying silent or responding with, ‘No comment’ – only 
a confession will lead to their punishment, after all. However, the student decides not only to avoid punishment 
but to troll the Dean in the process by uttering assertively something it is common knowledge (between the 
student and the Dean) that the student believes to be false, namely, that they did not cheat. 
158 Although it is not a case of so-called ‘bald-faced lying’ but rather a case of standard Moorean paradox, notice 
that we can also interpret Sylvester’s behaviour in Bank Location Frustration as a case of conversational perversion 




him in a nearby facility. Suppose, though, that the reason she asserts to him that her 
partner is dead is because she intends him to believe that she believes her partner is 
dead.159 
 
Let us call cases of this sort ‘double bluffs’. This type of case is described as one in which the 
speaker asserts that p, the speaker believes that not-p, and the speaker knows that the hearer 
knows that not-p. (Notice that, unlike cases of so-called ‘bare-faced lies’, it is not common 
knowledge (between speaker and hearer) that the speaker believes that not-p, since it is not 
the case that the speaker and the hearer know that the speaker knows that not-p.) It is this 
last point, i.e., that the speaker knows that the hearer knows that not-p, which supposedly 
determines why the speaker does not – because they cannot – intend that the hearer acquire 
a belief that p.160 Thus, we seem to have another argument against (AE): 
 
Premise 1:  If so-called ‘double bluffs’ are assertions, then it is possible to make an 
assertion without intending that the hearer acquire a belief that p. 
Premise 2:  If it is possible to make an assertion without intending that the hearer 
acquire a belief that p, then (AE) is false. 
Premise 3: So-called ‘double bluffs’ are assertions. 
Conclusion:  (AE) is false. 
 
By offering up an alternative interpretation of Sneaky Spy based on my theoretical 
elaboration of our candidate explicatum, I intend to show, however, that premise 3 is false. 
To appreciate the thinking behind my alternative interpretation of Sneaky Spy, it will be 
helpful to keep in mind what Natasha’s overarching aim is in this case, namely, for her 
 
 
159 Case inspired by Searle (1969). 
160 It might be thought that it is possible for a speaker to make an assertion that p to a hearer who believes or 
knows that not-p and thereby intend that the hearer acquire a belief that p, so that the hearer relinquishes their 
belief and/or loses their knowledge that not-p. I certainly think this is possible. However, the stipulation in Sneaky 




foreign counterpart to acquire a belief that Natasha herself believes that her partner is dead. 
Here, then, is my alternative interpretation of the case. 
 
Natasha utters assertively, which is to say that she makes an utterance in such a way which 
would usually license her foreign counterpart to ascribe to Natasha the intention that they 
acquire a belief that her partner is dead on the basis of them recognising Natasha’s intention 
that they acquire a belief that her partner is dead. What is more, Natasha’s foreign 
counterpart does indeed ascribe this intention to Natasha. However, they do so mistakenly, 
for Natasha does not actually have this intention. Thus, she does not actually make an 
assertion that her partner is dead. Instead, the point of Natasha’s utterance is to give her 
foreign counterpart the impression that she has made an assertion that her partner is dead 
and thus giver foreign counterpart the impression that she intends that they acquire a belief 
that her partner is dead on the basis of them recognising Natasha’s intention that they 
acquire a belief that her partner is dead. Why? Because in doing so she gives her foreign 
counterpart the impression that the specific mutual default expectation that Natasha asserts 
that her partner is dead in virtue of the fact that the reason why she asserts that her partner 
is dead is that she knows that her partner is dead, of which the super mutual default 
expectation that what she asserts, that her partner is dead, is true is a corollary, is 
instantiated between them when it is not. (Of course, this is conditional on Natasha giving 
the impression that the mutual default expectation that she is making a contribution such as it 
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
exchange in which she and her foreign counterpart are purportedly engaged is instantiated 
between them when it is not.) Since Natasha’s foreign counterpart, however, knows the true 
status of her partner, Natasha thereby gives her foreign counterpart the impression that she 
satisfies only a certain corollary of said purported mutual default expectations, namely, that 
she believes (albeit falsely) that her partner is dead when she does not. In other words, 
Natasha performs a fake assertion, not a real assertion. (AE) is preserved. 
 
What is attractive about this interpretation of Sneaky Spy is not only that it preserves (AE), 
but that it also provides a clear account of the mechanism of deception at play in double 




another individual to acquire a belief that p when they themselves believe that p is false.161 
This of course is precisely what Natasha is doing, but she is not doing it by means of 
communication (e.g., the telling mechanism). Instead, she is doing it by giving her foreign 
counterpart the impression that she is so communicating, with the overarching non-
communicative intention that her foreign counterpart acquire a belief that Natasha believes 
that her partner is dead. Strictly speaking, then, Natasha is not lying to her foreign 
counterpart, though she nonetheless sets out to deceive them.162 
 
5.4. Objection 3: resolute assertions 
 




In the course of their interrogation by the police, it must have become clear very 
quickly to the members of the Birmingham Six that nothing they could say or do 
would persuade their interlocutors either that they (the suspects) had not planted the 
bombs or that they (the suspects again) believed that they had not planted the 
bombs. For all that, when they uttered the words ‘We did not plant the bombs’, the 




161 See Chisholm & Feehan (1977). 
162 To draw out the difference between a case of lying and a case of non-communicative deception, compare a 
speaker who asserts to a hearer that they are sick when they themselves believe this to be false against a speaker 
who makes an assertion about anything other than being sick but does so in such a way (i.e., with a certain look, 
voice, cough, splutter, etc.) which indicates to those around them that they are sick when they themselves believe 
this to be false. Both are instances of attempted deception. Strictly speaking, though, the former is a lie whereas 
the latter is not.  




Let us call cases of this sort ‘resolute assertions’. This type of case is described as one in 
which the speaker asserts that p whilst at the same time knowing that the hearer will not 
believe what they assert. It is this last point, i.e., that the speaker knows that the hearer will 
not believe what they assert, which supposedly determines why the speaker does not – 
because they cannot – intend that the hearer acquire a belief that p. Thus, we seem to have 
another argument against (AE): 
 
Premise 1:  If so-called ‘resolute assertions’ are assertions, then it is possible to 
make an assertion without intending that the hearer acquire a belief 
that p. 
Premise 2:  If it is possible to make an assertion without intending that the hearer 
acquire a belief that p, then (AE) is false. 
Premise 3: So-called ‘resolute assertions’ are assertions. 
Conclusion:  (AE) is false. 
 
By offering up separate alternative interpretations of Interrogation Room based on my 
theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum, I intend to show, however, that either 
premise 1 or premise 3 is false, depending on which interpretation we ultimately opt for. To 
appreciate the thinking behind my separate alternative interpretations of Interrogation Room, 
it will be helpful to keep in mind the underlying intuition that drives the objection, namely, 
that an individual cannot intend to do something which they themselves know to be 
impossible to do. Here, then, is my first alternative interpretation of the case. I start with a 
general question from Thalberg (1962):  
 
• When an individual recognises the overwhelming impediments to an enterprise, can 








As he notes, the answer to this general question depends on the answers to the following 
two specific questions: 
 
• Is the notion of 'knowing it is impossible' always clear enough to serve as a limiting 
case of intending? 
• If an individual can try to reach goals which they know to be unattainable, should 
they ever be understood as intending to succeed in such attempts?165 
 
Thalberg answers the first specific question negatively and the second specific question 
affirmatively, in light of the following example: 
 
Imagine a heroin addict who yearns to free himself of his habit: he knows, from 
having failed in earlier attempts to resist his craving, and from having studied the 
case-histories of other addicts, that he has practically no chance of accomplishing the 
feat. Suppose that the addict makes a sedulous attempt to cease taking his anodyne, 
and […] manages to quell his agonizing desire for the drug. If his friends 
congratulate him on his amazing reformation, should he declare, 'Don't praise me; I 
tried, but I didn't really intend to stop taking narcotics'? His statement expresses 
more than modesty; it borders on paradox. (55–56)  
 
Thalberg maintains therefore that there are at least some cases in which an individual 
recognises the overwhelming impediments to an enterprise but nonetheless intends to 
accomplish it.166 Furthermore, he is not alone in thinking this, for his view is shared by 




165 Rephrased slightly for clarity. See Thalberg (1962: 49). 
166 Of course, as Thalberg gestures, most people strive for realisable goals. Moreover, we tend to rely more often 
on informed individuals to accomplish what they intend. However, individuals who are, say, uninformed, 




'I am going to […] unless I do not' is not like 'This is the case, unless it isn't […]' In 
some cases one can be as certain as possible that one will do something, and yet 
intend not to do it […] A man could be as certain as possible that he will break down 
under torture, and yet determined not to break down. (93) 
 
Given these considerations, I submit that the suspects in Interrogation Room may plausibly be 
interpreted as resolutely making an assertion that they did not plant the bombs and thereby 
trying to get their interlocutors to believe that they did not plant the bombs (and thus 
intending as much), even though they apparently ‘know it is impossible’. If so, premise 1 is 
false. (AE) is preserved. Let us turn now to my second alternative interpretation of the case. 
 
My second alternative interpretation of Interrogation Room is a development on the plausible 
idea (mentioned in §3.7) that institutions can perform speech acts. However, I am not 
interested here in the speech acts that institutions perform, but rather I am interested in the 
speech acts that institutions themselves can comprehend. After all, if it is plausible that 
institutions can perform their own speech acts, it seems unreasonable not to accept that they 
can comprehend speech acts from others as well. Here is what I have in mind. The way that 
Interrogation Room is often presented suggests that the suspects are engaging solely with the 
interrogators who are in the room with them. But it seems plausible that they are instead 
engaging with the larger institution of which the interrogators are part. In the case of the 
Birmingham Six, this would be West Midlands Police, if not the whole of UK law 
enforcement. That is, strictly speaking, the larger institution itself is the suspects’ 
interlocuter, not the interrogators as such. The idea is that in just the same way that some 
single member of an institution may act as a ‘mouthpiece’ for said institution’s assertions 
(regardless of the fact that said member personally does not have the knowledge in 
question), a single member of an institution may seemingly act as an ‘earpiece’ for the 
assertions the institution receives (regardless of the fact that the speaker does not – because 
they cannot – intend said member personally to acquire the relevant belief). Given these 
considerations, I submit that the suspects in Interrogation Room may plausibly be interpreted 




that the institution (not the interrogators in the room with them necessarily) believe that 
they did not plant the bombs. If so, then premise 1 is false. (AE) is preserved. 
 
The two alternative interpretations of Interrogation Room which I have provided so far 
respect the stipulation that the suspects make an assertion that p, though both alternative 
interpretations of course aim to show that the speakers should also be understood as thereby 
intending that the hearer (when it is properly understood who the hearer is) acquire a belief 
that p. Thus, they are objections to premise 1. My third and final alternative interpretation of 
Interrogation Room, however, takes a different tack. By utilising Keiser’s (2016) work on 
‘language games’, I intend to show that when the suspects utter to the interrogators, ‘We did 
not plant the bombs’, they may plausibly be interpreted as performing some act other than 
assertion.167 If so, premise 3 is false. (AE) is preserved. 
 
According to Keiser, there are many varied activities in which we employ language, yet not 
all of them qualify as conversations. Those activities in which we employ language, but 
which do not qualify as conversations, she categorises as language games.168 As such, she 
thinks it is possible for a speaker to make a move in a language game without making a 
move in a conversation. Crucially, though, she thinks that the speech act of assertion can 
only occur as part of a conversation, not a language game. To illustrate what a language 
game is, she provides two key examples. The first is the ‘exam game’. Suppose a student is 
sitting an exam as part of their secondary school education. Keiser’s thought is that when 
the student submits their answers in the exam, they are not engaged in a conversation, but 
rather they are playing a language game, namely, a language game the goal of which is to 
 
 
167 Note, Keiser’s work on language games is originally discussed in relation to so-called ‘bald-faced lies’, namely, 
with the aim of showing that so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ are not genuine instances of lying because they are not 
genuine instances of assertion. Indeed, I flag her work in relation to so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ in fn.150 when 
discussing possible interpretations of Cheating Student. However, it seems to me that Keiser’s work may also 
fruitfully be applied to Interrogation Room. 




submit all and only correct answers.169 The second example she provides is the ‘courtroom 
game’. Suppose a witness takes the stand as part of a trial. Similarly, Keiser’s thought is that 
when the witness presents their case to the courtroom, they are not engaged in a 
conversation, but rather they are playing a language game, namely, a language game the 
goal of which is to formally enter evidence which may then be used by the prosecutor and 
the defence to score points against each other in the trial.170 Interestingly, Keiser suggests 
that the courtroom game – and perhaps any kind of language game – is derivative of 
genuine conversation. This, she claims, would explain why the moves made in a courtroom 
game appear so much like the types of acts performed in conversations, e.g., assertions. She 
writes: 
 
[T]he courtroom game presumably evolved slowly from what were at one point 
genuine conversations. That is, initially people probably attempted to resolve conflict 
and establish justice by coming together to have a genuine conversation about who 
was at fault and what to do about it. But as this procedure became more and more 
structured, it evolved into a game that – while appearing an awful lot like 
conversation – actually departs from it in important respects, having its own 




169 Notice that Keiser’s construal of examination situations shores up neatly with the comments I make in §3.7 
regarding teaching practices, namely, that students are presented with content from a syllabus which has been 
deemed appropriate/correct by the institution (i.e., the school and its governing bodies). 
170 Katherine Hawley (personal correspondence) has suggested to me that entering evidence on a witness stand is 
perhaps best understood as having a performative aspect (e.g., like saying 'I do' at a wedding). Her idea is that a 
witness’s utterance has extra significance due to being uttered in that setting, i.e., an institutional setting in which 
the witness is under oath. This, of course, would explain why there may be legal repercussions for a witness if 
they do not play the game in line with the rules set down by the courtroom. 
171 Note, Keiser maintains that another reason why moves in the courtroom game look so much like 
conversational moves is that it is possible for there to be both a genuine conversation and a courtroom game 
going on simultaneously, and for these to come together and peel apart at various moments throughout the 




Admittedly, Keiser has her own conception of what an assertion is, and she also has her own 
conception of what a conversation is. However, it is not important that we delve into either 
of these, for her general picture is sufficiently clear without doing so, and because we can 
flesh out her general picture further using the theoretical elaboration of our candidate 
explicatum I have provided, anyway. Recall that I think that the speech act of assertion 
essentially involves an intention that the hearer acquire a belief by means of the telling 
mechanism. Moreover, recall that I think the speech act of assertion can only occur as part of 
a maximally effective exchange of information, which essentially is a communicative 
exchange the purpose or direction of which is to inform each other of the facts by means of 
the telling mechanism, i.e., a communicative exchange the purpose or direction of which is 
to transmit knowledge. Given this, my suggestion is that, just like the exam game and the 
courtroom game, the ‘interrogation game’ is not a conversation (or at least not a maximally 
effective exchange of information, i.e., not a communicative exchange the purpose or 
direction of which is to transmit knowledge), but rather a language game. What type of 
language game is it? I submit that it is a language game similar to the courtroom game, the 
goal of which is to formally enter evidence which may be used by the institution (in this 
case, West Midlands Police, if not the whole of UK law enforcement) for any relevant legal 
proceedings.  
 
Just as Keiser suggests with the courtroom game, I think the interrogation game is derivative 
of genuine conversation (or at least derivative of maximally effective exchanges of 
information, i.e., communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of which is to transmit 
knowledge). This would explain why the moves made in an interrogation game appear so 
much like the types of acts performed in conversations (or at least maximally effective 
exchanges of information, i.e., communicative exchanges the purpose or direction of which 
is to transmit knowledge), e.g., assertions. Indeed, it is plausible that the interrogation game 
also evolved slowly from what were at one point genuine conversations (or at least 
maximally effective exchanges of information, i.e., communicative exchanges the purpose or 
direction of which is to transmit knowledge). That is, initially individuals probably 
attempted to inform each other of the facts for the purpose of gathering information so that 




(or at least a maximally effective exchange of information, i.e., a communicative exchange 
the purpose or direction of which is to transmit knowledge). But as this procedure became 
more and more structured, it evolved into a game that – while appearing an awful lot like 
conversation (or at least maximally effective exchanges of information, i.e., communicative 
exchanges the purpose or direction of which is to transmit knowledge) – actually departs 
from it in important respects, having its own independent goals and rules. Given these 
considerations, I submit that the suspects in Interrogation Room may plausibly be interpreted 
as performing some act other than assertion, namely, formally entering evidence as part of 
legal proceedings. If so, premise 3 is false. (AE) is preserved.172  
 
Having laid out my separate alternative interpretations of Interrogation Room, there is one 
final observation I would like to make. When discussing cases like Interrogation Room, and 
even certain cases of so-called ‘bald-faced lies’ (e.g., Cheating Student), some philosophers are 
fond of using a certain phrase to describe the speakers, namely, that they are ‘going on 
record’. Those who are fond of using this phrase seem to think that it in some way 
establishes that the speakers have made an assertion in such cases. However, the phrase is 
used promiscuously while not being theoretically robust. In fact, I am aware of only one 
attempt to provide a theoretical elaboration of the notion of going on record, which is from 
Stokke (2013; 2018). Stokke endorses the view that what makes an assertion the type of 
speech act that it is, rather than some other type of speech act, is that a speaker says that p 
and thereby proposes that p become part of the common ground (see §2.1.2). The problem 
with this, however, as Stalnaker himself observes, is that a speaker might say that p and 
thereby propose that p become part of the common ground merely to make an assumption 
that p, say, for the sake of argument – which everyone agrees is distinct from making an 
assertion. Stokke is aware of this problem and so attempts to remedy it by introducing the 
 
 
172 If anyone still has any residual or lingering discomfort about the immediate dismissal of secret diary entries 
and soliloquies as cases of assertion, they might find some comfort in the idea that they can be accounted for 
further (i.e., on top of being accounted for in terms of hearer-testimony) as alternative types of language games, 




distinction between ‘official common ground’ and ‘unofficial common ground’. He bases his 
distinction on the claim that when propositional content is proposed to become part of the 
unofficial common ground it is only so proposed temporarily, whereas propositional 
content proposed to become part of the unofficial common ground is not. Thus, when a 
speaker makes an assumption, and thereby proposes that p become part of the common 
ground, strictly speaking they are proposing that it become part of the unofficial common 
ground. Yet, when a speaker makes an assertion, and thereby proposes that p become part of 
the common ground, strictly speaking they are proposing that it become part of the official 
common ground. According to Stokke, it is only in the latter case that the speaker goes on 
record, i.e., when a speaker makes an assertion that p and thereby proposes to add p to the 
official common ground. There are, however, two issues which arise for Stokke’s distinction 
between the official common ground and the unofficial common ground. First, as Keiser 
observes, it seems plausible that an individual might make an assumption that p and thereby 
propose to add p to the common ground, but not propose to do so temporarily. Indeed, the 
speaker (and the hearer, for that matter) might be aware that the assumption that p is likely 
to be true, after all. Moreover, it seems plausible that a speaker might assert that p with the 
knowledge that p will only ever be temporarily added to the common ground, since it is 
highly likely to be swiftly rejected by the hearer. In short, the attempt to ground the 
distinction between official and unofficial common ground in terms of temporality is 
misguided. Second, Stokke’s distinction between official and unofficial common ground 
seems worryingly ad hoc. That is, it is highly specific to safeguarding his common ground 
account of assertion and does not serve any other general purpose or have any other 
antecedent motivation. Taking all this together, I think the notion of going on record is best 




173 As I see it, the notion of going on record connotes a certain amount of formality and officialness, formality and 
officialness which more readily accompanies language games in institutional settings compared to conversations 
(or at least maximally effective exchanges of information, i.e., communicative exchange the purpose or direction 
of which is to transmit knowledges). If so, when a speaker goes on record, say, by formally entering evidence as 




5.5. Embracing the Assertion Counterexample Game 
 
At the beginning of the thesis (§2.5), I said that our candidate explicatum, (AE), may, in the 
end, reveal itself to be too restrictive and thus implausible. However, I also said that until a 
theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum is provided, and the apparent borderline 
cases of assertion scrutinised in light of it, we have no immediate reason to think that (AE) is 
not suitably restrictive and thus implausible. In this chapter, equipped with my theoretical 
elaboration of our candidate explicatum, and drawing on other independently plausible 
theoretical considerations from the philosophy literature, I hope to have shown that (AE) is 
suitably restrictive and thus plausible. Moreover, in the process of defending (AE), I hope to 
have shown that playing the assertion counterexample game is not the daunting prospect it 
is sometimes made out to be when we prepare for it properly. Indeed, I hope to have shown 
that it can be a useful philosophical tool, one which not only helps re-align our intuitions, 
but one which enables us to gain a better understanding of various philosophically 
interesting phenomena other than assertion, as well assertion itself. Last, but certainly not 
least, in the course of this chapter, I addressed the final item, item (11), on the substantive 









































































In the introduction to this thesis, I outlined why assertion is troublesome, namely, that 
although you will find that talk of it is ubiquitous in philosophy, you cannot always be sure 
what precisely you have found talk of, or indeed whether you have found talk of anything 
concrete at all. Moreover, I explained how I have been dogged by this ever since I was an 
undergraduate student. As such, and having progressed through this thesis, it should be 
clear why, when I eventually found myself embroiled in the debate on the nature of 
assertion, I was dissatisfied. That is, it should be clear why it seemed to me that 
philosophers were often talking past each other and getting caught up in something which 
was gradually losing significance in the eyes of spectators. However, having now reached 
the conclusion of this thesis, I hope it is clear that assertion is something which is very much 
worthy of philosophical attention. Indeed, by attempting to close the gap between the 
philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony on the topic of assertion, I hope 
to have reaffirmed the concept and, in turn, reinvigorated the debate. If so, then the 
frustration I have felt working with, on, and sometimes against assertion will not have been 
in vain. More importantly, though, we will have a new way of talking when we talk about 
assertion. Here is a brief recapitulation.   
 
In Assertion & Explication, I introduced the philosophical term of art ‘assertion’ as it is 
understood in the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony – its main 
philosophical areas. This included providing an outline of the ongoing debate about the 
nature of assertion in the philosophy of language and the important though sometimes 
unclear status assertion has in the epistemology of testimony. I explained that the way in 
which philosophical discussion about assertion has materialised, especially the lack of 
integration between the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony on the 
topic, has led to doubts about the effectiveness of the concept. Drawing on Carnap’s (1947; 
1950) notion of ‘explication’, however, I held that philosophy simply has not made up its 
mind about how the concept of assertion is best understood, and that what is needed is a 




understood simply in terms of the paradigm case, and nothing more – this was our 
candidate explicatum. I acknowledged the potential worry that restricting assertion in the 
way that I suggested is implausible, given the apparent non-paradigmatic (or borderline) 
cases of assertion that exist in the philosophy literature. However, I pleaded that our inquiry 
into the concept should not be guided by such cases. Instead, I recommended that our 
inquiry should be guided by, connected to, and framed within broader philosophical 
theories, especially from the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony. 
Essentially, my idea was that we will be best placed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
concept of assertion only when our candidate explicatum has received a full theoretical 
elaboration.   
 
In Putting the Epistemology of Testimony to Work, I called upon the epistemology of testimony 
to consider the ways in which the speech act of assertion can put an individual in a position 
to know the truth of what is asserted. I explained that such considerations are apt to guide 
us in our inquiry and thus lay the groundwork for constructing a theoretical elaboration of 
our candidate explicatum. Although I showed that there are various ways in which assertion 
can put an individual in a position to know the truth of what is asserted, I picked out one 
particular way in which assertion can put an individual in a position to know the truth of 
what is asserted which I think illuminates the speech act as I understand it: ‘knowledge 
transmission’. As we saw, to fully understand this independently plausible notion from the 
epistemology of testimony literature, however, we had to understand the nature of the 
interpersonal relation at play between speakers and hearers in such cases. And, to 
understand this, we had to understand the conversational dynamics which underpin 
communicative exchanges generally. I exhibited the current confusion in the epistemology 
of testimony literature about how to understand these things, the result of which was that I 
found myself in a predicament. I intended to construct a theoretical elaboration of our 
candidate explicatum in light of the notion of knowledge transmission. But I did not have an 
accurate account of the conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges 
generally. As such, I did not have an accurate account of the nature of the interpersonal 




did not have a fully developed view of knowledge transmission in light of which I could 
construct a theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum.   
 
In A Gricean Account of Assertion, having first set out my general epistemological 
commitments, I used, revised, and developed Grice’s (1957; 1969; 1975; 1989) framework of 
communication from the philosophy of language literature to construct an account of the 
conversational dynamics which underpin communicative exchanges generally. I then used 
this to construct an account of the interpersonal relation at play in cases of knowledge 
transmission specifically. This, in turn, provided us with a fully developed view of 
knowledge transmission – a view of knowledge transmission which is consistent with anti- 
reductionism as it is traditionally construed – in light of which I constructed my theoretical 
elaboration of our candidate explicatum. In the course of constructing my theoretical 
elaboration of our candidate explicatum, I solved three immediate problems for Grice’s 
framework of communication (i.e., the inaccurateness problem, the incompleteness problem, 
and the obscureness problem) as well as addressed items (1) through (10) on the substantive 
list: 
 
1) How assertion puts a hearer in a position to know the truth of what is asserted. 
2) The conditions under which assertion puts a hearer in a position to know the truth of 
what is asserted. 
3) Speaker sincerity and insincerity (i.e., the sense in which assertion relates to 
speakers’ beliefs). 
4) Speaker reliability and unreliability (i.e., the sense in which sincere assertion relates 
to the reliability of speakers’ beliefs). 
5) Expressing belief (i.e., the sense in which assertion expresses or manifests speakers’ 
beliefs). 
6) Representing oneself as knowledgeable (i.e., the sense in which speakers are typically 
thought to implicitly represent themselves has having knowledge in what they 
assert). 
7) Commitment (i.e., the sense in which a speaker confers a commitment upon 




8) Responsibility (i.e., the sense in which speakers incur a responsibility for the belief 
that the hearer is intended to acquire). 
9) Challenges (i.e., the sense in which assertions can be contested by querying the 
speaker’s epistemic standing on the proposition they have asserted). 
10) Retractions (i.e., the sense in which a speaker can retract an assertion when they 
regard themselves as no longer in a position to believe or vindicate what they have 
asserted). 
 
In Exploring the Exotica, I defended my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum – 
my Gricean account of assertion – against some potential objections. Here, we learned an 
important lesson, namely, arguing by theory is an advantageous way of doing philosophy 
whereas arguing by counterexample is a risky business. In addition, I addressed the final 
item on the substantive list: 
 
11) Moore’s paradox (i.e., the apparent absurdity in attempting to assert ‘p but I do not 
believe that p’). 
 
Now, as I have said, my theoretical elaboration of our candidate explicatum not only affords 
us a vocabulary to help us explain the core phenomena of assertion but also there is no 
immediate reason to think that it does not afford us a vocabulary to help us explain any 
outstanding philosophically interesting phenomena peripheral in the study of the speech act 
as well. These include truth, semantics (i.e., the specification of meanings in linguistic 
expressions within a context), meta-semantics (i.e., the determination of semantic facts), 
implicature, presupposition, lying, so-called ‘epistemic normativity’, knowledge ascriptions, 
expert disagreement, testimonial injustice, radical interpretation, etc. Indeed, with a new 
way of talking when we talk about assertion, we are likely to find that there are new ways of 
understanding such phenomena – we have already found this to be the case in this thesis, in 






One is the role of assertion in mass communication, online or otherwise, and especially in 
political speech. For example, when Donald Trump makes a briefing, one complaint which 
is often heard is that he is attempting to tell people things which are commonly known to be 
false. Alternatively, however, we might understand him as making genuine assertions to 
certain targeted sub-groups of the population in which such common knowledge is not 
instantiated. Those who make complaints of the sort just mentioned above should therefore 
be understood as separate from his intended audience, even though they take themselves to 
be part of that audience. Relatedly, there are the ways in which speakers within the political 
domain often use jargon when disseminating information. Consider, for example, Theresa 
May’s obfuscated assertion ‘’Brexit’ means Brexit’. Such speakers are so unclear in their 
meaning that their audiences are not able to respond appropriately and so not able to 
participate properly in the debate, which, in turn, inhibits political choice. 
 
Another is what we might call ‘conversational destabilisation’ where, say, persistent sceptics 
introduce certain sceptical possibilities into the context of conversation illegitimately, which 
thus frustrates the transmission of knowledge. This, in turn, may result in what we might 
call ‘epistemic destabilisation’, where the victim gradually loses confidence in their own 
epistemic faculties, and perhaps becomes abnormally epistemically dependant on others, 
which may make them more susceptible to machinations. Interesting case studies might 
include gaslighters and conspiracy theorists, especially climate-change deniers and anti-
vaxxers. 
 
Although I think these potential lines of future research are philosophically interesting in 
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